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Abstract 
As a financial contribution harmonised among donors, general budget sup-
port facilitates the implementation of national poverty reduction strategies 
and promotes governance in partner countries. Apart from this financial 
contribution to the national budget, the standard budget support package 
also involves intensive policy dialogue between donors and the partner 
government, as well as accompanying measures to strengthen country 
systems. In the portfolio of German development cooperation, accompany-
ing measures to budget support have gained in importance. 
This evaluation was designed to examine if, how and under which circum-
stances accompanying measures to budget support can contribute to the 
objectives of budget support. Questions on the relevance, effectiveness 
and success factors of these measures were answered based on a literature 
study, a portfolio analysis, an online survey and semi-structured interviews. 
Furthermore, the interrelations between accompanying measures and other 
elements of the package of budget support were analysed.
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G
eneral budget support1 is considered to be a 
paradigmatic instrument for implementing 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
order to establish more effective development 
cooperation (DC). Budget support pursues the following 
objectives: (i) to provide funding for national poverty reduc-
tion strategies by means of a financial contribution which 
has been harmonised among donors and (ii) to promote 
governance in the partner country by accompanying jointly 
agreed reform processes. The financial support of donors 
is aligned to the priorities of the partner governments and 
enables the use of the partner country’s own administrative 
procedures to reduce transaction costs. However, when 
country systems are not performing well, donors face high 
fiduciary and political risks. Therefore, the instrument of 
general budget support – especially among bilateral donors 
– has become increasingly controversial.
Ever since general budget support was first introduced 
at the beginning of this century, so-called ‘accompanying 
measures’2 for strengthening country systems have been 
implemented parallel to providing financial contributions. 
Whereas the standard package of general budget support 
consists of the donors’ financial contributions flowing 
directly into the partner government’s budget, it also 
includes accompanying measures, different conditionalities, 
as well as policy dialogue. Thus, accompanying measures 
are an integral part of the budget support package, not only 
in German DC, but also in most of the other bi- and multila-
teral budget support donor countries. 
In the German portfolio, accompanying measures have 
substantially gained in importance during the last years. The 
European Commission, a major budget support donor, has 
also increasingly used accompanying measures to reduce 
risks associated with the allocation of budget support. 
However, despite the increasing number of evaluations of 
budget support, the level of knowledge about accompany-
ing measures is rather low. 
Objectives and approach
The present instrument evaluation focuses on accompany-
ing measures as one element of general budget support. In 
doing so, the evaluation deepens the understanding of how 
these measures work and improves the basis of knowledge 
required for making informed decisions regarding alloca-
tion, planning, and evaluation of budget support and its 
accompanying measures. A theory-based approach has been 
chosen to examine if, how and under which circumstances 
accompanying measures to budget support can contribute 
to achieving the objectives of budget support. The focus 
of the investigation was not on the effects of individual 
measures, but on the relevance, effectiveness (especially the 
interrelations with other elements of budget support), and 
success factors of accompanying measures as an element of 
budget support. 
The evaluation of accompanying measures was conducted 
in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa receiving German 
budget support. The evaluation is empirically based on the 
analysis of written sources, interviews in person and by 
phone, as well as on an online survey. The data collected 
essentially represents the assessments of stakeholders in-
volved in the process of budget support. When triangulating 
the data, a comparison of the different sources (literature, 
interviews, online survey) and the different perspectives (of 
bilateral and multilateral donors, partner representatives 
in the visited countries Mozambique and Tanzania, and 
independent experts) was considered. The combined and 
sequential use of qualitative and quantitative procedures for 
the data collection have ensured a solid basis of the data.
Portfolio of German accompanying measures
The total commitment of German DC for general budget 
support from 2003 to 2013 amounted to just under 500 
million euros in the nine evaluated countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda). In this context, 
accompanying measures to budget support include all 
interventions of financial and technical cooperation which 
overlap in time with the allocation of general budget 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 This evaluation focuses on general budget support. Hereinafter, the term ‘budget support’ refers to general budget support. References to other forms, as for example sector budget support, will be 
stated explicitly.
2 Accompanying measures to budget support include all interventions of financial and technical cooperation which overlap in time with the allocation of general budget support and can contribute to 
the effectiveness of budget support due to interdependencies.
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support and can contribute to the effectiveness of general 
budget support due to interdependencies. During the 
period of investigation, a total amount of 80 million euros 
was pledged for these accompanying measures.
Until 2010, the volume of both budget support and accom-
panying measures grew constantly. However, partly due to a 
phasing out of German budget support in several countries, 
general budget support has declined since 2010, while 
the volume of accompanying measures has continued to 
increase. In fact, accompanying measures grew substantially 
in proportion to budget support following 2010 and stood at 
68 percent in 2013. 
The majority of funds for accompanying measures were 
pledged to Zambia, Mozambique, and Ghana. For the entire 
period of the evaluation, the focus of accompanying mea-
sures has been on the area of ‘public financial management’. 
A share of 60 percent of total commitments were allocated 
to this area. The remaining volume has been divided equally 
between the areas of ‘support for the formulation and 
implementation of development policies and reforms’ and 
‘strengthening democratic control by the parliament, civil 
society and the media’.
Relevance of accompanying measures 
Previous evaluations suggest that general budget support 
was most successful in the area of increasing poverty-
related expenditures and - albeit to a lesser extent – in 
contributing to reducing income poverty. Furthermore, 
budget support can positively contribute to the dynamics of 
initiating and implementing reforms within sectors that are 
relevant for poverty reduction, as well as to strengthening 
cross-sectoral public financial management (including areas 
of fiscal transparency and accountability). Drawing from an 
overall view of existing evaluations and research work it is 
clear that budget support has fulfilled its financing function 
relatively better than its function to strengthen reforms or 
governance.
The present evaluation concludes that accompanying 
measures are relevant with regard to the effectiveness of 
budget support. They address weaknesses which cause 
inefficiencies, as well as bottlenecks and problems within 
the budget support system. Accompanying measures are 
specifically applied to the appropriate areas for enhancing 
the country systems. Thus, they contribute directly to the 
objective of good governance, and indirectly to the objecti-
ve of poverty reduction. In other words, in contrast to solely 
providing financial contributions, accompanying measures 
immediately address the reform or governance function of 
budget support. When implemented successfully, accom-
panying measures make an indirect contribution to the 
financial function of the instrument.
Although accompanying measures generally focus on rele-
vant thematic areas, there are discrepancies in some areas 
between the severity of existing deficiencies and the degree 
to which these are addressed. This has been observed in 
the areas of ‘budget implementation’ and ‘formulation of 
development policies’ which have been respectively under- 
as well as over-addressed by accompanying measures.
Generally, accompanying measures increase the effectiven-
ess of general budget support when they are implemented 
in a target-oriented, needs-based and demand-oriented 
manner. However, in times of declining general budget 
support, the instrument runs the risk of being undermined 
if the expansion of accompanying measures induces a de 
facto return to project aid. The focus of accompanying 
measures on public financial management is appropriate. 
Yet, a holistic approach should be pursued in order to both 
strengthen demands for more democratic accountability 
and to support development strategies.  
Effectiveness of accompanying measures 
There are interrelations between the individual elements of 
budget support and the implementation of accompanying 
measures induces an added value to the effectiveness 
of general budget support. This is particularly apparent 
for interrelations with policy dialogue. Accompanying 
measures provide information about weaknesses within the 
budget support system, which influences policy dialogue 
at different levels. The experience gained in implementing 
accompanying measures increases the donors’ professional 
skills and facilitates improved policy dialogue. Many donors 
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use the information from policy dialogue on weaknesses in 
the system to apply their accompanying measures in a more 
targeted manner to the identified problem areas.
The coordination of planning and implementing accompa-
nying measures poses a challenge. So far, policy dialogue is 
not being used systematically to coordinate accompanying 
measures. The coordination depends on the aid modality, as 
well as on the respective thematic area: better integrated 
and jointly funded approaches differ from stand-alone offers 
of consultancy and support from individual donors. How-
ever, the area of public financial management is the most 
harmonised in this respect. 
Another relation between the financial elements of budget 
support and the effectiveness of accompanying measures 
has been confirmed: embedding technical assistance and 
capacity building within the context of budget support also 
increases their effectiveness. In public financial manage-
ment, accompanying measures are largely requested by 
the partners. In other areas, the majority of accompanying 
measures are supply-oriented.
There are some synergies between accompanying measures 
in the areas of public financial management and democratic 
control. On the supply side, accompanying measures 
increase budget transparency. In some cases, capacities 
were increased on the demand side and the democratic 
control function of local actors was strengthened. Such 
synergies have been observed in several countries during 
implementation, e.g. the simultaneous support of the court 
of auditors and the work of parliamentary committees. 
Given the continually growing complexity of the issues to 
be dealt with, the demand for accompanying measures by 
civil society, parliament, and the media is high.
Success factors for accompanying measures
Budget support and accompanying measures are influenced 
by similar contextual factors upon which donors only 
have limited influence. Ownership and commitment of 
the partner government are both crucial success factors 
in this respect. These success factors are particularly high 
for accompanying measures aimed at strengthening public 
financial management, because in this area the donors’ 
interests correspond most clearly with the priorities of their 
partners. In other areas, the ownership of partners is lower. 
Harmonisation and alignment of donors to the priorities 
and structures of the partner countries also do not function 
as well. The relationship of trust between partners and 
donors depends on their reliability regarding compliance 
to agreements, disbursement of budget support, and the 
ability to provide coherent assessment of the Underlying 
Principles and for the Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF). A comparable level of competence and experience 
of donor and partner representatives also promotes a 
relationship of trust in policy dialogue. Another important 
prerequisite for needs-based planning and implementation 
of accompanying measures is close coordination between 
donors and partners, within the donor group, as well as 
among German implementing agencies. This coordination 
works best if organised in active working groups for techni-
cal policy dialogue under professional leadership. 
Conclusions and recommendations
Accompanying measures contribute to the effectiveness of 
the instrument of budget support by strengthening country 
systems in critical areas and through their positive influence 
on policy dialogue.  They can improve the acceptance of the 
instrument of budget support among increasingly critical 
parliaments of many donor countries, particularly since they 
reduce fiduciary risks of budget support.
Recommendation 1 (BMZ): The financial contribution of 
budget support should continue to be flanked with accom-
panying measures. The role of accompanying measures 
should be clearly defined and they should be given greater 
consideration when revising the BMZ guidelines on budget 
support. Implementing accompanying measures should 
begin at the latest with the disbursement of the financial 
contribution and continue for the entire period of granting 
budget support.
The basic principle of budget support has been to provide 
funds that are not earmarked. According to previous 
findings of budget support evaluations, the effectiveness 
of the instrument of budget support decreases when the 
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principles of budget support are not consequently imple-
mented. In order to prevent undermining the instrument of 
general budget through a gradual return to project aid in the 
form of accompanying measures, it is necessary to maintain 
an adequate ratio of accompanying measures to budget 
support.
Recommendation 2 (BMZ): The financial contribution of 
budget support to a partner country should be considerably 
higher than the volume of accompanying measures. The 
ratio of accompanying measures to budget support should 
be aligned in a flexible way to reflect the requirements of 
the respective partner country: countries with weaker state-
administrative structures should receive a higher volume of 
accompanying measures.
Currently, donors mainly use accompanying measures to 
strengthen public financial management in order to reduce 
fiduciary risks from the start - especially the risk of possible 
misappropriation. The past has shown, however, that the 
problem of misallocation to areas that are not a priority 
for reducing poverty, threatens the effectiveness of budget 
support at least as much as misappropriation.  
Recommendation 3 (BMZ): In order to increase the effec-
tiveness of budget support by means of accompanying 
measures, the planning of accompanying measures should 
be aligned to the actual systemic weaknesses. At the same 
time, the focus should not necessarily be on the immediate 
reduction of fiduciary risks.
Functioning public financial management is crucial for the 
effectiveness of general budget support as budget support 
depends on country systems. Accompanying measures, 
which modernise public financial management and thereby 
strengthen the partner systems, contribute not only directly 
to the budget support objective of good governance, 
but also indirectly to the objective of poverty reduction. 
Moreover, they contribute to reducing fiduciary risks.
 Recommendation 4 (BMZ): Accompanying measures should 
continue to be focused on the area of public financial 
management. At the same time, more consideration should 
be given to the interrelated thematic areas of improving 
development policy and promoting democratic control, as 
well as to sector and decentral levels.
Deficiencies in budget implementation are perceived 
as especially problematic for budget support in most of 
the recipient countries. At the same time, accompanying 
measures address these deficiencies only to a limited extent.
Recommendation 5 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Before planning 
accompanying measures, the entire budget process should 
be examined for weaknesses, from the budget preparation 
to the implementation of the budget. In countries where the 
problem of poor budget implementation partly traces back 
to insufficient budget planning, an improvement of budget 
planning can be the first step. At the same time, starting 
points for the support of budget implementation should be 
identified.
In the past years, budget support and accompanying 
measures contributed to increased budget transparency. It 
is necessary that institutions of democratic control provide 
continuous analyses and commentaries on budget infor-
mation so that increased transparency will actually lead to 
improved budget implementation.
Recommendation 6 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Measures which lead 
to higher transparency of budget implementation should 
be increasingly implemented. In order to ensure the best 
possible use of the information provided, there should be 
parallel measures to increase capacities on the demand 
side. To better prepare and distribute information, it could 
be useful for some partner countries to build additional 
capacities for independent analyses or to better qualify 
existing capacities.  
Given the observed decline in the allocation of budget 
support in many countries, the influence of donors and their 
ability to keep track of poverty reduction and of budget 
expenditures are diminishing. The accountability of the 
partner government towards local actors gains importance 
in such situations and has to be demanded by these actors.
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Recommendation 7 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Particularly in coun-
tries where revenues are expected to be increasingly drawn 
from extractive industries in the near future, accompanying 
measures should be used to reinforce state and non-state 
actors, as well as institutions of democratic control, in their 
endeavour to demand accountability from the government.
Basket funding is an instrument which (in comparison to a 
large number of individual projects) involves a high degree 
of coordination. Thereby, the efficiency of cooperation also 
increases. Basket funds work especially well whenever there 
is a high degree of common interests between partners 
and donors, as well as among donors, and when the partner 
country takes the responsibility for implementing a good 
strategy. These requirements are often met in the area of 
‘public financial management’.
Recommendation 8 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): When planning 
accompanying measures to strengthen public financial 
management, basket funds should be considered first. If the 
needs and requirements for successful basket funding are 
met, this should be the preferred option. 
However, with regard to supporting democratic accounta-
bility in cooperation with actors outside the executive level 
of government, there are good reasons for a more pluralistic 
donor approach. Indeed, the support of democratic ac-
countability benefits from social and political pluralism and 
promotes democratic participation more effectively, the 
more diverse the approaches of the donors are. 
Recommendation 9 (all donors): In order to promote diver-
sity of opinion and pluralism, accompanying measures can 
be used individually to support various civil society groups, 
including smaller ones, to achieve democratic control 
outside the executive level of government. However, these 
groups must be deeply rooted in the society of the partner 
country and committed to the basic rules of the democratic 
rule of law. Nevertheless, if several donors support the same 
institution of democratic control, for example a larger civil 
society organisation or a parliamentary committee, this 
support should also be coordinated.
The coordination of accompanying measures between 
partners and donors, as well as among donors, is in many 
ways not adequate. Policy dialogue is not used systema-
tically to coordinate the planning and implementation of 
accompanying measures.
Recommendation 10 (all donors): Policy dialogue should be 
used to a greater extent to identify the needs for assistance 
together with the partners, and to coordinate accompanying 
measures within the donor group.
When the work of BMZ, GIZ and KfW is coordinated, an 
added value emerges for the entire package of budget sup-
port. Due to weaknesses in the coordination between KfW 
and GIZ, neither possible synergies between accompanying 
measures of German DC, nor opportunities within the flow 
of information in the policy dialogue are currently being 
realised to their full potential. 
Recommendation 11 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): In order to take advan-
tage of synergies within German DC, the entire process 
of planning, implementing, and monitoring of current and 
planned accompanying measures should be conducted in 
close coordination between BMZ, GIZ, and KfW. Represen-
tation within the various bodies involved in policy dialogue 
should be based on prior agreement and a division of 
responsibilities.
Most of the evaluations of budget support consider accom-
panying measures only marginally, despite their increasing 
importance within the budget support package in recent 
years.  
Recommendation 12 (BMZ, EC, all donors): In future multi-
donor evaluations of budget support, the contribution 
of accompanying measures, i.e. the measures explicitly 
designed as accompanying measures, as well as the accom-
panying measures in a broader sense, should receive more 
attention.
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G
eneral budget support3 is considered to be a 
paradigmatic instrument for implementing the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in order to 
establish more effective development cooperati-
on (DC). Ever since the instrument of general budget support 
was introduced at the beginning of this century, so-called 
‘accompanying measures’ for strengthening country systems 
have also been implemented parallel to providing financial 
contributions. Thus, accompanying measures are an integral 
part of the budget support package, not only in German DC, 
but also for most of the bi- and multilateral budget support 
donors. In the German portfolio, accompanying measures 
have substantially gained in importance in recent years. The 
European Commission, a major budget support donor, also 
increasingly uses accompanying measures to reduce the risks 
associated with the allocation of budget support. However, 
despite an increasing number of evaluations of budget 
support, knowledge about accompanying measures is still 
rather low. The present evaluation contributes to bridging this 
evaluation gap.
In the following sections, the context of this evaluation is 
described (chapter 1.1) before the subject of the evaluation 
(chapter 1.2), the objectives, and evaluation questions 
(chapter 1.3) are set out in greater detail.
1.1
Context: Budget support and accompanying 
measures
Since the mid-1990s, the effectiveness of DC has been 
debated intensely. The starting point of the discussion was 
a growing dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of success 
after four decades of DC. One strand of the debate focuses 
on the importance of political institutions, such as democra-
cy and the rule of law, for economic development (Acemo-
glu et al., 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1995; World Bank, 1996). 
It is argued that DC is especially effective in countries, 
where a certain degree of ‘good governance’ prevails 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Svensson, 1999). Furthermore, 
DC should promote political structures which are based on 
inclusive participation, transparency, and accountability. A 
second strand of this debate on effectiveness draws on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According to this 
perspective, developing countries are caught in a poverty 
trap, of which they can only be freed by providing massive 
external financial flows (Sachs, 2005). A third strand of the 
debate refers to the weaknesses of traditional development 
interventions, which often only have limited effects at a 
local level, cause high transaction costs, and hardly achieve 
ownership of the partners (Koeberle et al., 2006; Leiderer, 
2009). As a result, the ownership of partner countries or 
governments should be strengthened and a harmonisation 
of donor support aligned with the development priorities 
and structures of partners should be promoted.5
Alongside these debates, new instruments of DC have been 
developed. Under the auspices of so-called Programme-
Based Approaches (PBA), general budget support parti-
cularly serves all three of the mentioned reform debates 
and is considered to be a paradigmatic instrument for the 
improvement of ownership, alignment to partner structures, 
and harmonisation.6 Within the scope of general budget 
support, several donors jointly assist a single partner 
country in a coordinated way in order to implement national 
development or poverty reduction strategies. Thereby, 
the objective of poverty reduction is pursued through the 
provision of external funds (financing function) and by the 
promotion of sector-specific and cross-sectoral reforms 
(reform or governance function).
Box 1. Elements of general budget support
On the one hand, the standard package of general 
budget support consists of the financial contributions 
of donors, which are granted directly to the budget of 
the partner government. On the other hand, the budget 
3  This evaluation focuses on general budget support. Hereinafter, the term ‘budget support’ refers to general budget support. References to other forms, as for example sector budget support, will be 
stated explicitly.
4 Accompanying measures to budget support include all interventions of financial and technical cooperation which overlap in time with the allocation of general budget support and can contribute to 
the effectiveness of budget support due to interdependencies.
5 This  debate has resulted in a broad consensus on the five principles of DC: (i) ownership of the partner countries, (ii) alignment of donors towards the strategies, institutions, and procedures of the 
partners, (iii) harmonisation of donors’ activities, (iv) managing for results, as well as (v) mutual accountability of donors and partners for development results (OECD, 2005). These five principles 
have been signed in the Paris Declaration in 2005 by 91 states, 26 international organisations, as well as 14 civil society groups, and have been confirmed by the subsequent agreements of Accra 
(2008) and Busan (2011).
6 General budget support is considered to be an ideal type among Programme-Based Approaches (PBA) as it comes closest to fulfilling the requirements of effective DC. Sector budget support, basket 
funding known as Multi-Donor Trust Funds, and TA-Pooling, as well as individual projects carried out within the scope of PBAs, fulfil the criteria of PBAs to a lesser extent. (Pech, 2010: 5ff). 
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support package includes non-financial elements, 
not only accompanying measures, but also different 
conditionalities and policy dialogue. The Underlying 
Principles (UPs) define the core conditionality. They set 
the basis for the allocation of general budget support 
and can result in the phasing out of budget support in 
case of non-compliance. Furthermore, in the context of 
Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF), objectives 
and indicators relating to different areas of the national 
development plan are agreed upon between donors and 
the partner government. Compliance is at least partially 
relevant for disbursements. Policy dialogue between the 
partner government and representatives of the donor 
countries is held on several levels. Discussions on reform 
progress and the assessment of PAF objectives, are held 
on a technical level in sector working groups, as well as 
in (bi-) annual reviews. Additionally, overriding strategic 
issues are discussed in policy dialogue between repre-
sentatives of embassies and high-level representatives 
of the partner government. In case of an infringement 
of the UPs, this level of policy dialogue allows donors to 
express their concerns and to negotiate countermeasures 
with the government. As a third, non-financial element of 
the budget support package, accompanying measures are 
utilised to strengthen the capacities of the government 
and other institutions in the partner country directly and 
thereby increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
use of funds.
Between the financial and non-financial elements, 
interrelations conducive for development are supposed 
to emerge. Conditionalities, policy dialogue, and accom-
panying measures should contribute to strengthening the 
orientation toward development in the partner country 
and to increasing the effectiveness of the financial 
contribution of budget support. In turn, the financial 
contribution serves as a leverage for the effectiveness of 
non-financial elements (de Kemp et al., 2011: 36ff; Nilsson, 
2004).
By means of a financial contribution harmonised among 
donors, general budget support should increase the 
predictability of support and make a significant financial 
contribution to poverty reduction. This contribution must 
be aligned to the priorities of the partner government and 
use their administrative procedures in order to reduce 
transaction costs (Koeberle et al., 2006; Leiderer, 2009). 
According to the principles of effective DC, development 
objectives are not financed directly through projects, but 
indirectly through the support of activities of the partner 
government. The effectiveness of funds provided by budget 
support largely depends on the public interest orientation 
of the partner government and on the quality of country 
systems.7
When the quality of the country systems is insufficient, 
donors run high fiduciary and political risks. Therefore, the 
instrument of general budget support is controversial, es-
pecially among bilateral donors. On the one hand, fiduciary 
risks involve the danger of misappropriation of the funds 
provided. On the other hand, there is a risk of misallocation 
of budget support funds by recipient governments, for ex-
ample, through the allocation of additional budget funds to 
non-poverty related purposes.8 Political risks arise from the 
fact that the provision of general budget support implies a 
certain level of trust in the political legitimacy, reform capa-
city, and institutions within the partner country, all of which 
can be substantially damaged by human rights violations, 
anti-democratic events, and political corruption. Critical 
studies also point to the danger of unilateral assistance 
to the executive level of government by means of budget 
support, which can have negative impacts on the internal 
accountability of the government to the parliament and 
citizens (Koch and Morazan, 2010; Manning and Malbrough, 
2012; de Renzio, 2006). Furthermore, donors fear that 
budget support reduces the incentive to generate own 
revenues. In order to reduce these risks, budget support is 
only provided selectively to countries fulfilling certain entry 
criteria.9 In these cases donors try to promote cross-sectoral 
reforms and good governance by means of budget support.
7 Country systems are understood to include the system of public financial management, as well as the broader political system, as for example the control function of the parliament.
8 In this evaluation, fiduciary risks are considered in their narrower definition. Due to analytical reasons, these include misallocation and misappropriation of funds, but exclude the risk of inefficient 
utilisation. At the same time, the risk of misallocation and misappropriation also exists within development aid projects, due to the fungibility of DC.
9 The selection of countries is based on the analysis of political, fiduciary, and macroeconomic framework conditions. A prerequisite for German budget support is a medium level of governance 
according to criteria in these three areas, as well as to observable positive development trends (BMZ, 2008: 15f).
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Box 2. Results regarding the effectiveness of general 
budget support 
A number of recently presented evaluations reveal 
important findings on the effectiveness of general 
budget support. There are particularly reliable results 
with respect to the financing function of budget support. 
In this area, improvements of allocation efficiency in 
poverty-related budgeting has been observed (Caputo et 
al., 2011b; Tavakoli and Smith, 2013). The originally feared 
crowding-out effect – meaning reduced efforts by the 
partner government to generate tax revenues – was not 
found to be a systematic side effect (Caputo et al., 2011b; 
Knoll, 2011; Lawson, 2014).
Regarding the governance function of budget support, 
the evaluations give a mixed picture. In some countries, 
successes were achieved in the area of public financial 
management. Here, improvements in the quality of 
public financial administration and transparency in the 
budget process are at least partially attributed to budget 
support (Caputo et al., 2011b; Lawson, 2014; Tavakoli and 
Smith, 2013). Although, present evaluations agree that 
budget support has positive effects on reforms in public 
financial management or in poverty-relevant sectors, a 
high degree of alignment of interests between donors and 
the partner government as well as a foundation for good 
governance must exist (Caputo et al., 2011b; Dijkstra et 
al., 2012: 21f; Lawson, 2014: 10). Research on the effects of 
the instrument on democratic accountability is currently 
still minimal. Particularly the impacts of budget support 
on the work of parliament and civil society have not been 
sufficiently investigated by evaluations (Faust et al., 2012; 
de Kemp et al., 2011; Schmitt and Beach, 2014; Tavakoli and 
Smith, 2013).
The instrument of budget support pursues the following 
objectives: (i) funding the implementation of national 
poverty reduction strategies and (ii) promoting governance 
in the partner country by accompanying jointly agreed 
reform processes. After an initial phase which focused 
on the funding objective of budget support, different 
interpretations of the instrument of general budget support 
evolved over time among donors.
While multilateral donors continued to focus on the finan-
cing function for poverty reduction, bilateral donors have 
begun to increasingly emphasise the governance and reform 
function of the instrument in the last years. Germany has 
placed great importance on the governance objective of 
budget support in its guidelines for the allocation of budget 
support in 2008. For several years now, the Department 
for International Development (DFID) has also adjusted 
its budget support more strongly toward the governance 
objective (Faust et al., 2012: 444; Hayman, 2011: 681f). With 
some delay, the European Commission also followed this 
trend to focus on the governance objective.10 
Given the shifts in the prioritisation of objectives of the 
instrument, bilateral donor governments developed a more 
sceptical attitude towards general budget support. Due 
to changed risk analyses of donors, a significant decline in 
budget support commitments and disbursements has been 
recorded between 2007 and 2013. However, the reason for 
the decline in budget support is not the increase of fiduciary 
or political risks in recipient countries, but rather certain 
political and economic factors in the donor countries (Faust 
and Koch, 2014; Molenaers, 2012). Many donors, including 
Germany, have partially or completely suspended budget 
support as a reaction to political crises and conflicts in 
partner countries. In the German budget support practice, 
disbursement holds and cuts have been justified with grow-
ing fiduciary risks. Complete withdrawal from providing 
budget support is directly linked to deteriorations in the 
fields of human rights and democracy (Faust, 2012b).
A change in the risk perception of donors is also shown by a 
stronger focus on systemic weaknesses in partner countries 
and a growing commitment to directly address these with 
accompanying measures. For example, this is seen by the 
sharp increase of German accompanying measures (see 
chapter 2). At the same time, the United Kingdom has 
committed to spend an amount equivalent to 5 percent 
of their budget support commitments on strengthening 
10 Following pressure of member states, a consultation process was conducted and the instrument of budget support was consequently reformed. In contrast to a previously strong focus on achieving 
the MDGs through the funding of MDG-Contracts, the new approach of the European Commission (with its new Good Governance and Development Contracts) increasingly aims at good 
governance and democratic consolidation (EC, 2012; Faust et al., 2012).
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democratic accountability (DFID, 2011: 2). Finally, in the new 
Budget Support Guidelines of the European Commission, a 
Risk Management Framework was introduced, according to 
which the risks of the programme, as well as countermea-
sures such as policy dialogue or accompanying measures, 
must be clearly stated (EC, 2012: 42ff).
1.2 
Evaluation subject and purpose
The BMZ-budget support concept of 2008 requires that 
accompanying measures be an integral part of the imple-
mentation of general budget support. The original idea of 
the German budget support approach included a combina-
tion of different instruments (project investments, basket 
funds, consultancy services) together with budget support. 
With this diversity of instruments, development synergies 
and leverage effects should be achieved while implementa-
tion and portfolio risks should be reduced (BMZ, 2008b: 4). 
The necessity of this complementary use of instruments has 
been emphasised again in the current BMZ-sector concept 
for the promotion of good governance in the area of public 
finance (BMZ, 2014: 24). However, it has not yet been 
determined which measures are regarded to be accompany-
ing to budget support, nor how they can contribute to the 
intended objectives of budget support. 
In the following sections, accompanying measures to bud-
get support are considered to be all initiatives of financial 
and technical cooperation, which overlap in time with the 
allocation of general budget support and can contribute to 
its effectiveness due to interdependencies. Accompanying 
measures tackle three areas. However, in practice, these 
areas cannot always be defined distinctly and separately 
from each other (see chapter 2 about the German portfolio 
of accompanying measures).
1.  Accompanying measures address the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning in order to strengthen the capacities needed 
for the organisation, implementation, and monitoring 
of development plans. A development strategy focused 
on the core problems and potentials of the country is 
considered to be a basic prerequisite for granting budget 
support. Accompanying measures with targeted consul-
tancy services, should help to improve the formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring of development plans and 
thereby increase the effectiveness of budget support. 
2.  Accompanying measures are implemented in Public Finan-
cial Management (PFM),11 where government institutions, 
such as the national tax authority or the decentralised 
financial administration, can be strengthened to fulfil 
their tasks. Through the direct support to public financial 
management, accompanying measures should be able to 
contribute to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
budget support.
3.  Accompanying measures address the area of democratic 
control. Through such support, parliament, civil society, 
and the media should be in a better position to claim 
accountability of the government and to comment on 
their reports and figures. The improved control function of 
parliament, civil society and the media is relevant for the 
effectiveness of budget support given that the government 
will then align its budget policy more strongly to the needs 
of the population and the political space for the misappro-
priation of funds will shrink.
Besides the direct development benefit of increasing the 
effectiveness of budget support in the partner country, 
accompanying measures can also be beneficial from the 
donors’ point of view: accompanying measures in the three 
areas mentioned above tackle fiduciary and political risks 
associated with budget support. In the short and medium-
term, direct fiduciary risks can be especially addressed in 
public financial management. Long-term effects arise from 
accompanying measures in the area of democratic control 
and development policies, which aim to mitigate fiduciary 
as well as political risks.    
In previous budget support evaluations, the contribution 
of accompanying measures has not yet been analysed in 
a systematic way. Generally, accompanying measures are 
found as an element in the applied intervention logic of 
11 Important elements of public financial management include: own revenues, public or national budget (budget planning, preparation, and implementation), budget control, public procurement, debt 
management and fiscal decentralisation. In addition to the technical elements of financial management, the elements of ‘performance and transparency of the government’ also belong to the area 
of public financial management (BMZ, 2014: 9).
Introduction  |  1. 7
budget support. In several evaluations, they are described 
on the input and output level of the intervention logic. 
(Caputo et al., 2011a: 6; de Kemp et al., 2011; Koeberle et 
al., 2006: 140; de Renzio, 2011: 3). The interrelated effects 
predicted for accompanying measures together with other 
elements of budget support, as well as the potential added 
value in increasing the effectiveness of budget support 
have not been examined in greater detail. So far, direct and 
indirect effects originating from individual accompanying 
measures have also not been examined.
This gap in existing budget support evaluations is often 
justified by the comprehensiveness of the evaluation 
subject and the limited availability of resources.12 Previous 
evaluations indicate that the data and programme docu-
ments necessary for the analysis were either not available 
or could not be made available in a timely manner (Lawson 
2015: 24f). In previous evaluations only measures directly 
linked to budget support (like basket funds in public finan-
cial management) have been taken into account. Moreover, 
a conceptual basis for a more specific analysis of the 
contribution of accompanying measures was missing. The 
intervention logic only illustrates the expected changes on 
different levels, but the underlying mechanisms of action for 
accompanying measures have not been specified (Schmitt 
and Beach, 2014). However, it is particularly these mecha-
nisms that provide information about the effectiveness of 
an intervention (here the accompanying measures).
1.3 
Objectives of the evaluation and evaluation 
questions
The present evaluation examines if, how, and under which 
circumstances accompanying measures to budget support 
can contribute to achieving the objectives of budget 
support. Questions regarding relevance, effectiveness, and 
certain success factors of accompanying measures are cen-
tral to the evaluation. Nevertheless, this does not include a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of individual 
accompanying measures. Instead, the investigation focuses 
on the interrelations between accompanying measures and 
other elements of budget support. The regional focus is on 
nine low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.13
The results of the evaluation are based on data that has 
been collected by the evaluation team which captures 
various assessments of donor representatives, partner 
country representatives, and international experts, as well 
as on results of previous evaluations of budget support. The 
evaluation investigates the time period from the years 2003 
to 2013. 
The aim of the evaluation is to gain a better understanding 
of the role of accompanying measures as an integral part of 
general budget support and to enable a closer look at the 
ways they function. In development practice, implementing 
agencies (IAs) can use the results to better integrate 
ongoing accompanying measures with existing budget 
support programmes. The findings can be used by the BMZ 
to plan new interventions or to resume budget support 
programmes. Additionally, the evaluation helps to close a 
knowledge gap and provide further impulses for the debate 
on the effectiveness of budget support. The findings are also 
relevant for further developing the current methodological 
approach used to evaluate budget support. In this they 
can be used to further differentiate the intervention logic. 
Despite declining bilateral budget support commitments, 
the instrument together with its accompanying measures 
remains highly relevant for multilateral DC. As the main 
contributor in the EU and fourth-largest stakeholder of 
the World Bank, the Federal Republic of Germany plays an 
important role in this field.
12 In this context, Tavakoli and Smith (2013) especially point to the lack of evaluation results regarding the effects and causal mechanisms of budget support on democratic accountability in the 
partner country.
13 The limitation to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa is justified by its relevance within the portfolio of general budget support. Both German development cooperation and the international donor 
community conduct budget support activities mainly within the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2003 and 2013, 79 percent of the German general budget support was allocated to this region. 
The countries to be considered are: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
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Table 1.  Objectives of the evaluation
Objective 1 Contribution to the planning of future accompanying measures within German DC and by other bilateral and multilateral donors, especially the 
European Commission. 
Objective 2 Contribution to the international debate on the effectiveness of budget support by narrowing an evaluation gap regarding accompanying 
measures. 
Objective 3 Contribution to conceptual and methodological discussions about evaluating budget support through refining the intervention logic by 
including the effectiveness of accompanying measures. 
The evaluation questions capture German and international 
stakeholders’ interests for learning based on preparatory 
interviews. The evaluation questions formulated have also 
been matched with corresponding criteria of the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC) and the 
BMZ. The evaluation questions are listed in table 2. 
Table 2. Detailed evaluation questions and corresponding OECD-DAC or BMZ criteria
Evaluation questions OECD-DAC/ BMZ-criteria
1 Can accompanying measures contribute to the objectives of budget support? „Relevance“
1.1 Which problems prevent efficient functioning of budget support? 
1.2 Do accompanying measures address the areas which cause problems in the budget support system? 
2 How can accompanying measures contribute to the objectives of budget support? „Effectiveness“
2.1 How do accompanying measures work in the context of budget support?  
2.2 What is the ‘added value’ of accompanying measures?
3 Under which circumstances can accompanying measures contribute to the objectives of budget 
support?  
„Effectiveness, 
coordination“
3.1 What are the success factors for accompanying measures?
3.2 How can these success factors be reinforced? 
1.4
Structure of the report
Chapter 2 illustrates the subject of the evaluation based 
on the portfolio of German accompanying measures in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In chapter 3, accompanying measures 
are embedded in the intervention logic of budget support. 
Impact hypotheses, as well as mechanisms, are thereby 
derived for the empirical analysis. In doing so, the evalua-
tion already comes to some important results. In line with 
the three overall evaluation questions, chapter 4 considers 
in detail the results concerning relevance (4.1), effectiveness 
(4.2) and success factors (4.3) of accompanying measures. 
Chapter 5 comprises conclusions and recommendations 
derived from the evaluation. In conclusion, a brief view of 
the current trends in budget support is provided.
2.
PORTFOLIO OF GERMAN 
ACCOMPANYING MEASURES 
TO BUDGET SUPPORT
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T
his chapter provides an overview of German DC 
involvement in general budget support, as well as 
of related accompanying measures in nine Sub-
Saharan African countries. The compilation covers 
the period of 2003-2013, from the beginning of German budget 
support activities up to the latest official data available. The 
countries considered – Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia – have 
either received general budget support from Germany during 
that period or continue to receive it.14 The focus of the analysis 
is on Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that both German DC and the 
international donor community have allotted their budget 
support activities mainly to Sub-Saharan Africa, an analysis of 
this region is of special interest. During the evaluation period, 
79 percent of German general budget support was allocated 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, especially to Mozambique and Ghana.15 
The following evaluates the portfolio of German cross-sectoral 
accompanying measures exclusively to general budget support 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sector budget support and sector-
specific accompanying measures are not taken into account. 
Furthermore, the portfolio analysis focuses on German 
accompanying measures to budget support; approaches of 
other donors are briefly described in chapter 2.3. 
Box 3. Definition of accompanying measures to budget 
support
Accompanying measures to budget support include all 
initiatives of financial and technical cooperation, which 
overlap in time with the allocation of general budget 
support and can contribute to its effectiveness due 
to interdependencies. Three layers of accompanying 
measures are differentiated according to their proximity 
to the financial component of budget support. 
Accompanying measures of the first layer are measures 
described in the programme document together with 
budget support and are designed and labelled explicitly 
as ‘accompanying measures to budget support’. They are 
exclusively measures of financial cooperation. 
Accompanying measures of the second layer are indepen-
dent measures of technical cooperation. In their practical 
implementation, these are related to budget support and 
therefore contribute to achieving the objectives of budget 
support.  
Accompanying measures of the third layer are measures 
in which only individual elements are relevant for budget 
support, such as decentralisation programmes or inter-
ventions regarding the governance of natural resource 
utilisation. Accompanying measures of the third layer 
were not incorporated in the portfolio analysis, but were 
given consideration in the two short missions to Mozam-
bique and Tanzania. 
The portfolio analysis serves to describe the evaluation subject 
and to classify accompanying measures within the overall 
package of German budget support. The aim is to provide an 
overview of the German portfolio of accompanying measures 
related to general budget support. The methodological approach 
taken for the portfolio analysis is outlined in annex 8.1.
2.1
Results of the portfolio analysis
The total commitment of German DC to general budget 
support amounted to almost 500 million euros in the nine 
examined countries of Sub-Saharan Africa between 2003 und 
2013. In the same period, 80 million euros were committed 
to accompanying measures. This amount was allocated to 21 
accompanying measures, some being partially implemented 
in several successive phases. From 2003 to 2010, the volume 
of not only general budget support, but also accompanying 
measures steadily increased. With Germany’s complete 
phasing out of providing budget support to several countries, 
14 German development cooperation was temporarily committed to budget support in three more countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, they are not taken into greater account within this 
evaluation. In 2005, Ethiopia once received 4 million euros general budget support from Germany in the form of co-financing World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC). At the end 
of 2005, budget support was suspended by all donors due to human rights violations surrounding Ethiopian general elections. In 2007, Benin received a commitment amounting to 2 million euros 
for a pilot project of budget support disbursed in 2008. The German parliament rejected a continuation for 2009 due to too high fiduciary risks. In 2008, Madagascar received a budget support 
commitment amounting to 7 million euros. However, this commitment was not disbursed, given the coup against the president in 2009.
15 Outside Africa, the countries Bolivia, Nicaragua and Vietnam have also received general budget support from Germany. Additionally, German sector budget support has been provided to Peru, 
Rwanda and Vietnam..
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Figure 2. Share of German commitments of accompanying measures (AM) in relation to German commitments of budget 
support in nine recipient countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 1. German commitments of budget support and accompanying measures (AM) to nine recipient countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
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budget support has decreased from 2010 onward. However, 
the volume of accompanying measures continually increased 
(see figure 1). In relation to the financial element of budget 
support, the share of accompanying measures grew following 
2010, adding up to 68 percent in 2013 (see figure 2).16
Geographical allocation of accompanying measures 
Most of the funds for accompanying measures have been 
granted to Zambia (21 million euros, 26 percent of the total 
commitment), Mozambique (19 million euros, 23 percent 
of the total commitment) and Ghana (18 million euros, 
23 percent of the total commitment). The allocation of 
16  In 2014, outside the evaluation period, a new record of German commitment to budget support was reached at an amount of more than 350 million euros. This record was largely due to three 
comprehensive commitments of sector budget support  totalling more than 330 million euros to medium-income countries Indonesia, Colombia and Mexico. For further information about the latest 
developments since 2014, see chapter 6. 
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accompanying measures to these countries has been stable 
over time (see figure 3a and b).
Thematic allocation of accompanying measures
Based on programme documents, accompanying measures 
were categorised into three areas according to their 
thematic focus. In ambiguous cases, the categorisation was 
discussed and agreed upon with responsible persons from 
the implementing agencies.  The three areas of categorisati-
on include:
 • support for formulating and implementing development 
policies and reforms,
 • strengthening public financial management,
 • strengthening democratic control by parliament, civil 
society and the media.
The first category comprises consultancy measures for eco-
nomic and finance ministries with the objective to improve 
the planning and implementation of general cross-sectoral 
reform plans in line with poverty reduction strategies. 
The second category refers to financial and technical 
assistance to institutions of public financial management 
and budget control (such as tax authorities or the court of 
auditors). Thus, this category is related to the supply side of 
accountability. Measures of the third category focus on the 
Figure 3. Division of the German total commitment of accompanying measures to the nine recipient countries
Source: own calculations based 
on programme documents
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17 In a basket fund, the donors jointly finance a spending plan derived from a strategy to implement a specific package of measures. Funds are earmarked to the agreed measures. The basket can be 
administered by the partner country or by one of the mandated donors. The funds are paid into a special account and are normally recorded for information in the national budget. The financial 
processing of donors’ contributions is not fully subjected to the ordinary budget process of the partner country (BMZ, 2008b: 30).
demand side of accountability as they aim at strengthening 
parliament, the media and civil society. 
There are linkages and overlaps in form and content 
between the three categories. Measures of the first cate-
gory often strengthen the link between poverty reduction 
strategies and the budget process, by involving institutions 
of public financial management. Accompanying measures 
from the second category, which for example strengthen 
the court of auditors, can aim at increasing the number of 
audit reports or at ensuring that they are more informative. 
By means of accompanying measures of the third category, 
parliamentary committees could be qualified to claim more 
accountability of the government on the basis of such audit 
reports.
Throughout the entire evaluation period, the focus of cross-
sectoral accompanying measures was on the area of ‘public 
financial management’, to which 60 percent of the total 
commitment of accompanying measures was allotted. The 
remaining volume of accompanying measures was divided 
equally into the areas of ‘supporting the formulation and 
implementation of development policies and reforms’ and 
‘strengthening democratic control by parliament, civil soci-
ety and the media’ (see figure 4a and b). The composition of 
the portfolios according to countries over the given period 
of time is illustrated in figure 18 in annex 8.2. 
Most of the recipient countries indicate that the portfolio 
of accompanying measures is largely focused on certain 
thematic areas. In Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania, accompa-
nying measures are exclusively carried out in the area of 
‘public financial management’, in Malawi and Mali in the 
area ‘development policies and reforms’. A rather mixed 
portfolio has been implemented in Zambia and Uganda (see 
figure 4c).
Accompanying measures of financial and technical 
cooperation 
One third of the total volume of accompanying measures 
was allocated to the classic accompanying measures of 
financial cooperation (FC) in the first layer. Throughout the 
time period covered by the evaluation, budget support was 
flanked with accompanying measures of the first layer in six 
of the nine countries. Some of these measures consisted 
of several components. For example, in Burkina Faso one 
component was established to support the fight against cor-
ruption and one to support the court of auditors. The most 
comprehensive portfolio of accompanying measures can be 
found in Mozambique, where accompanying measures of FC 
have been implemented intermittently in four components 
since the beginning of budget support. In Mali, there were 
no accompanying measures of FC. In Malawi, measures did 
not run concurrently, but only after budget support had 
been provided and then stopped. In Zambia, the implemen-
tation began only after 2013, so that these measures are not 
considered in this evaluation. Most of the accompanying 
measures of FC (83 percent) have been implemented in the 
form of contributions to basket funds.17 Examples of these 
are the support of the PFM-reform programme FINMAP 
(Financial Management and Accountability Programme) in 
Uganda and the support of the court of auditors in Rwanda. 
Accompanying measures of FC distributed through basket 
funds solely address the area of ‘public financial manage-
ment’, including budget control and institutions such as tax 
authorities or the court of auditors. Accompanying measu-
res of technical cooperation (TC) contribute to basket funds 
as well, however, these contributions can also be found in 
thematic areas other than ‘public financial management’. In 
Zambia, the programme for supporting ‘democratisation, 
government and civil society’ cooperates with the Zambian 
Governance Foundation. Supported by basket funding, 
this Zambian foundation offers civil society organisations 
by financing and capacity development to support their 
work on crucial issues of governance. This is done through 
transparent selection criteria and efficient control mecha-
nisms. Another example is the TC-measure which provided 
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Figure 4. Division of the German total commitment to accompanying measures according to thematic areas
Source: own calculations based on programme documents
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18 However, the data only includes commitments and disbursements of accompanying measures if they coincide with the allocation period of budget support. Measures which partly overlap in time 
are partially considered.
consultancy services to the Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning, and Development in Malawi and thereby con-
tributed to the Joint Programme Support for the National 
Monitoring and Evaluation System.
Accompanying measures of the second layer have been 
implemented by TC in all countries receiving German 
budget support, with the exception of Mozambique and 
Rwanda. In most cases the measures involve multiphase 
interventions. Some of the accompanying measures existed 
before the introduction of budget support and some conti-
nued after the termination of budget support with partially 
new objectives. Hence, budget support is not a necessary 
prerequisite for the implementation of the measures, which 
are classified as accompanying measures to budget support 
in this evaluation.18 Some of the interventions, identified as 
accompanying measures and already established before the 
introduction of budget support, fulfilled not only their later 
function as accompanying measures, but also served as 
preparatory measures for receiving budget support. These 
contributed to qualifying partner country systems to meet 
the prerequisites for granting budget support. German 
accompanying measures can increase the effectiveness of 
budget support from all donors and – provided that they 
contribute to strengthening the countries’ own systems 
- increase the effectiveness of other DC instruments as 
well. Financial contributions to basket funds for individual 
accompanying measures of the second layer constituted 
only part of the respective measure. Some interventions 
(e.g. the Good Financial Governance intervention in Ghana 
or the intervention to support democratisation in Zambia) 
were co-financed by other donors, which is rare among ac-
companying measures of FC. Figure 19 (annex 8.2) illustrates 
the composition of accompanying measures in recipient 
countries according to the layers.
2.2
Accompanying measures of other donors
Various budget support donors implement accompanying 
measures to budget support, but they do not always link 
them systematically to budget support (Dijkstra and de 
Kemp, 2015; Lawson, 2014).
The European Commission (EC) uses an instrument compa-
rable to the one of German accompanying measures. In its 
guidelines to budget support of 2012, the EC requires the 
usage of Mitigating Measures if the risk linked to a budget 
support intervention is ranked as substantial or high within 
the scope of a risk evaluation. These Mitigating Measures 
can be measures of the same type as German accompanying 
measures (EC, 2012).
Denmark also considers accompanying measures to be con-
ceptually closely linked to budget support. This is particu-
larly apparent in their new guidelines which state, „Danida, 
and partners like the EU, regard general budget support 
as a package that in addition to the financial transfer also 
includes elements such as policy dialogue, capacity building 
in relevant areas such as public financial management, 
domestic revenue mobilisation, anti-corruption efforts and 
the support to parliament, civil society organisations and 
others.” (DANIDA, 2013: 5)
Swiss development cooperation also uses Complementary 
Technical Assistance as a pillar of budget support along 
with policy dialogue and a catalogue of reforms. Since 2004, 
these have been contracted separately from the financial 
contribution of budget support and do not have any direct 
links to the disbursements of the variable tranches (SECO, 
2014).
In 2011, the United Kingdom committed to spend  5 percent 
of the volume of budget support on measures to strengthen 
domestic accountability in partner countries (DFID, 2011).
In 2004, the World Bank standardised its guidelines in its 
area of ‘Development Policy Financing’, which includes the 
instrument of budget support. According to the Opera-
tional Policy 8.60 and the affiliated Bank Procedure 8.60, 
accompanying measures are possible within the framework 
of budget support, but are not specified any further (World 
Bank, 2014a; World Bank, 2014b).
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T
he present evaluation is an instrument evaluation 
which focuses on accompanying measures as 
one element of the instrument of general budget 
support. Budget support is described to be a 
complex intervention, because the desired effects can only be 
achieved indirectly through the systems of partner countries 
(Stern et al., 2012: 11). The different elements (accompanying 
measures are just one of them), as well as a great number of 
participating institutions, simultaneously pursue the objecti-
ves of poverty reduction and good governance and influence 
each other. The instrument of budget support therefore fulfils 
the criteria of both a complicated and a complex intervention 
(Rogers, 2008). This particularly applies to accompanying 
measures, which are not only imbedded in the context of 
budget support and specific country systems such as public 
financial management, but also combine different social 
realities (Pawson and Tilley, 2004: 4f).
The cross-sectoral strengthening of country systems and 
good governance depends on various internal and external 
influences, which complicates the attribution of effects. 
Many donors implement accompanying measures parallel 
to providing the financial contribution of budget support, 
which renders it hardly possible to capture the effects of 
individual accompanying measures separately within an 
impact evaluation. Accompanying measures of KfW con-
tribute mainly to basket funds and are therefore evaluated 
on a multi-donor basis. To date, the interrelations between 
accompanying measures and other elements of budget 
support have not been evaluated systematically in these 
evaluations.
One aim of the present evaluation is to better understand 
the functioning of accompanying measures and to improve 
the basis of knowledge for making well-informed decisions 
regarding the allocation, planning and evaluation of 
budget support and accompanying measures. How can 
accompanying measures contribute to the objectives of 
budget support? For answering this question a theory-based 
approach is appropriate as it generates a better understan-
ding of the functioning of an intervention in an iterative 
process between theory formulation and data collection 
(White, 2009: 8). The evaluation combines elements from 
different theory-based approaches, especially from Realist 
Evaluation and Process Tracing (White and Phillips, 2012: 
8ff). The intervention logic of budget support represents 
the starting point of the theory-based approach. It has 
been developed on behalf of the European Commission and 
applied in numerous evaluations of budget support (OECD/
DAC, 2012). Yet, in this intervention logic, the functional 
contribution of accompanying measures has not been 
explicitly illustrated. The present evaluation reconstructs 
the intended effects on the basis of programme documents 
and integrates accompanying measures into the interven-
tion logic of budget support. In doing so, special attention 
is given to interrelations between the different elements of 
budget support.  
This chapter not only describes the methodological ap-
proach and evaluation process, but also submits the first 
results of the reconstructed theory. The validation of the 
theory will be referred to later on (chapter 4). 
3.1
Systemic analysis of the context of budget support
When first considering the subject of accompanying measu-
res, the evaluation team conducted explorative interviews 
with budget support experts, evaluators, researchers, as 
well as with experienced managers of accompanying mea-
sures. In these interviews it became apparent, which role 
accompanying measures play within the budget support 
system, as well as how and where they can contribute to 
strengthening country systems. The financial contribution 
of budget support should enable the partner government 
to finance the implementation of development-relevant 
investments. The allocation of funds fed into the national 
budget at a central level for additional disbursement to 
poverty-relevant sectors on a decentral level requires that 
the systems of the recipient country fulfil certain functions 
as outlined in figure 5. 
As an external financial source, budget support contributes 
to the national budget, which is depicted as a funnel in 
the figure. Here, donor funds merge with the revenues of 
the partner country. The finance ministry of the partner 
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country passes the total funds on to the sector ministries 
and subordinated institutions on the basis of the national 
budget plan. In order to implement this in a timely manner 
and according to the country’s needs, certain requirements 
have to be fulfilled which are partially included in the 
conditionality of budget support. Budget planning should 
be based on policies serving public interest and on feasible 
reform plans. Correct prioritisation and adequate consi-
deration of all population groups and regions, should be 
subject to democratic control by parliament, the media and 
civil society. The financial funds have to be made available 
on time at the decentral level, implemented cost-efficiently, 
and accounted for in a transparent way. To this end, efficient 
institutions and processes of public financial management 
are needed, e.g. an integrated financial management and 
information system. How long budget support is needed 
to boost the national budget and at what point the partner 
government can finance development reforms from its own 
resources, depends on the extent to which public tax and 
customs authorities can increase the internal revenues of 
the country and thereby reduce the dependency on external 
financial sources. 
There are several weaknesses and bottlenecks which can 
emerge out of this complex process of needs-oriented 
allocation, transparent distribution, and efficient use of 
financial funds. These vary from country to country. On 
the donor side, special attention is given to fiduciary risks 
ranging from inefficient use of funds to misallocations 
up to misappropriation (Leiderer, 2009). Accompanying 
measures which tackle these problems by strengthening 
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country systems and qualifying state and civil society actors 
in the budget process are relevant and contribute to the 
achievement of budget support objectives. As part of the 
online survey and subsequent interviews, the question was 
examined whether this applies to the nine recipient coun-
tries of German budget support.
3.2
Theory of change for accompanying measures in 
the context of budget support
As a basis for constructing hypotheses and reducing com-
plexity, the evaluation team developed a generic theory of 
change. It theorises the role of accompanying measures in the 
context of budget support and is applicable to the majority of 
accompanying measures to budget support. The team then 
searched for commonalities among the interventions classified 
as accompanying measures within the programme documents. 
Only a small part of the programme documents contains a 
detailed results framework. Therefore, the challenge lied in 
reconstructing the respective theories of change from the 
narrative part of the programme document,19 and in referring 
them to the context of budget support.20  
Starting from the intervention logic as it has been elabo-
rated by OECD/DAC (2012) and used within the scope of 
multi-donor evaluations of budget support, the evaluation 
team took a closer look at the non-financial elements, 
especially the accompanying measures. Figure 6 shows this 
theory of change in which accompanying measures are rela-
ted to other non-financial elements of budget support and 
contribute to the general objectives of good governance and 
poverty reduction through several interim steps. Programme 
documents of accompanying measures often state program-
me goals such as appropriate development policies, efficient 
and transparent public financial management, or effective 
democratic control. While the objective to reduce fiduciary 
risks is also of similar importance from a donor’s perspecti-
ve, this is congruent with the objective of achieving efficient 
and transparent public financial management according to 
the respondents’ statements. Thus, this latter objective has a 
19 In accordance with the classification of Leeuw (2003), a Policy-Scientific Approach was applied. The first results of this approach were differentiated in dialogue with budget support experts and 
programme personnel responsible for accompanying measures.
20 Measures for strengthening public financial management, development policies and democratic control, which are classified as „accompanying“ in the context of budget support, also exist in 
countries without budget support. However, in this evaluation, the focus was on if, how and under which circumstances these kinds of measures can contribute to meeting the objectives of budget 
support.
dual function: on the one hand, it aims to directly contribute 
to the budget support objective of good governance, and on 
the other hand, by means of enabling a more efficient use of 
available funds, it indirectly contributes to the objective of 
poverty reduction.
According to the impact levels of budget support (figure 6, 
on the right), the programme objectives of accompanying 
measures refer to intermediary results of budget support 
described as Induced Outputs (utilisation or benefits of 
services) in the OECD-DAC methodology to evaluate 
budget support. Drawing from their projected objectives, it 
can be deducted that accompanying measures within the 
intervention logic of budget support aim at strengthening 
performance (inputs / outputs) and contributing to impro-
ved public services. If, at the next higher level of programme 
objectives (outcomes), citizens gain more confidence in the 
state and increasingly use its services, non-income-related 
poverty will reduce. Evidence of this effect has been found in 
various budget support evaluations (Lawson, 2014;  
Rønsholt, 2014).
The present evaluation examined the contribution of 
accompanying measures up to the level of Induced Outputs 
of budget support (compare figure 6, the area with the 
shaded background). There, the focus was particularly on the 
interrelations between different elements of budget support 
and the specific contribution of accompanying measures. 
The thick blue arrows directed to the intermediary objec-
tives of budget support and the programme objectives of 
accompanying measures, represent the impact chains of 
individual accompanying measures. In an impact evaluation 
these would need to be reconstructed and checked for every 
individual programme. 
Regarding the functioning of accompanying measures 
within the context of budget support, their interrelations 
with other elements of budget support (figure 6: thin arrows 
on the two lower levels for inputs and direct outputs) are of 
particular importance. At the same time, combining various 
accompanying measures with different objectives can lead 
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to synergies at the level of induced outputs, which can 
strengthen the results of individual measures and ensure 
their sustainability.
3.3
Hypotheses and mechanisms
Apart from the positioning of accompanying measures 
within the intervention logic of budget support, the 
question arises, how exactly they contribute to the objec-
tives of budget support. In order to learn more about the 
functioning of accompanying measures, the evaluation 
team attempted to open this programmatic black box 
(Astbury and Leeuw, 2010: 364ff). Central hypotheses about 
the functioning of accompanying measures were formula-
ted, prior to the empirical investigation of findings gathered 
from previous budget support evaluations, programme 
documents, and expert interviews. Within the scope of an 
explorative mission to Mozambique, these hypotheses were 
broken down into mechanisms (figure 6: M1 to M7) and then 
checked for plausibility. Such mechanism-based explanatory 
approaches are suitable for identifying the contributions 
of individual components (in this case accompanying 
measures) to one overall result (the objectives of general 
budget support) (Hedström and Bearman, 2009: 5). The 
mechanisms selected are generally observed to be active 
in all recipient countries of general budget support and 
accompanying measures, but their manifestation depends 
Figure 6. Theory of change for accompanying measures to budget support
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on the respective context (Tilly, 2001: 25). Therefore, in a 
further step, the evaluation dealt with the success factors of 
accompanying measures.
The elements of budget support can interact in different 
directions (figure 6: thin arrows in the lower part). For 
example, effects of accompanying measures on policy dia-
logue are expected, whereas policy dialogue also affects the 
planning and implementation of accompanying measures; 
the financial contribution of budget support in combination 
with conditionality has effects on the utilisation of accom-
panying measures. Furthermore, it can be assumed that 
there are mutually reinforcing effects between the different 
types of accompanying measures.
Hypothesis 1: Accompanying measures improve the quality 
of policy dialogue.21 
The first hypothesis to be verified is: accompanying measu-
res improve the quality of policy dialogue. This hypothesis is 
based on statements made by the interview partners in the 
explorative interviews, as well as on information drawn from 
programme documents. Policy dialogue in the context of 
budget support provides a platform for exchange between 
donor representatives and politicians, as well as managers 
of the public administration in the partner country. Through 
their participation, donors can influence the design and 
implementation of political reforms. How the quality of 
policy dialogue can be improved by accompanying measu-
res, is described in two mechanisms:
Mechanism 1: Accompanying measures provide information 
about the quality of public services and the need for 
support of government institutions. In turn, this information 
is used in policy dialogue.   
Mechanism 2: By implementing accompanying measures, 
donor representatives expand their knowledge and skills 
and can act as qualified partners in policy dialogue.
The first mechanism reflects the informational function 
of accompanying measures for policy dialogue. During 
the implementation of accompanying measures, donors 
receive information about existing challenges in the partner 
institutions and can consider these in policy dialogue. The 
second mechanism has the effect that, by implementing 
accompanying measures, donor representatives can better 
understand the country’s structures and processes, and 
therefore act as qualified interlocutors in policy dialogue. 
Hypothesis 2: Policy dialogue increases the effectiveness of 
accompanying measures. 
The second hypothesis to be validated states that policy 
dialogue increases the effectiveness of accompanying 
measures. This hypothesis has been derived from the 
intervention logic of budget support prior to the empirical 
study, according to which accompanying measures are 
coordinated within policy dialogue. As a unique forum 
for harmonisation and alignment between the partner 
government and the donor community, policy dialogue 
provides an opportunity to plan accompanying measures 
based on needs and implement them in a coordinated way. 
If this potential is harnessed, TC and capacity building in 
the context of budget support can be more effective than in 
countries without budget support. In exploratory interviews 
with international experts, two mechanisms were identified 
through which policy dialogue contributes to increasing the 
effectiveness of accompanying measures. One mechanism 
indicates that a needs assessment, which is based on 
accompanying measures being assigned in a more targeted 
manner, can be conducted in policy dialogue (mechanism 
3). The second mechanism indicates that policy dialogue 
can offer a platform for the coordination of planning and 
implementing accompanying measures of different donors 
(mechanism 4).
Mechanism 3: Accompanying measures are planned and im-
plemented on the basis of a needs assessment to eliminate 
the weaknesses of the system in a targeted way.  
21 Policy dialogue of budget support takes place at different levels: (i) technical policy dialogue about reform progress, as well as the assessment of objectives determined in the PAF, takes place on 
the operational level between donor representatives and respective partner representatives in ministries and authorities. ii) in high-level policy dialogue, ambassadors of donors and high-level 
representatives of the partner government discuss general strategic matters.
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Mechanism 4: Planning and implementation of accompany-
ing measures is coordinated between donors.
Hypothesis 3: The financial contribution of budget support 
increases the effectiveness of accompanying measures. 
This hypothesis is based on the interrelation between 
financial and non-financial elements, which are described 
theoretically in the intervention logic of budget support. 
According to de Kemp et al. (2011), accompanying measures 
can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of budget 
support funds, while contributing to strengthening 
the country’s systems. At the same time, the recipient 
government obtains a financial incentive to implement 
accompanying measures if they are linked to the financial 
contribution of budget support (de Kemp et al., 2011: 38). 
Similar synergies are described by Nilsson (2004), who 
found potential positive effects in the combination of bud-
get support funds and accompanying measures to improve 
public financial management (Koeberle et al., 2006: 140; 
Nilsson, 2004: 23ff). Hypothesis 3 was specified in greater 
detail in the course of the empirical study in order to better 
understand the financial incentive stated by de Kemp et al. 
(2011).
Mechanism 5: The financial contribution of budget support 
attached to PAF-indicators provides an incentive for 
government institutions to ask for accompanying measures 
and use them. 
Hypothesis 4: Accompanying measures in the area of public 
financial management and accompanying measures in the 
area of democratic control mutually reinforce each other. 
The foundation of the fourth hypothesis was provided by 
the literature on the theory of democracy.  Hesselmann 
(2011) outlines in her model of democratic accountability a 
three-stage accountability process in which repeated inter-
actions between accountability-givers” and ”accountability-
takers” can result in a deeper accountability-relationship 
between government and citizens (Hesselmann, 2011: 9f). 
By transferring this model to the context of this evaluation, 
accompanying measures can address both, the supply side22 
of democratic accountability (institutions of public financial 
management) and the demand side (democratic control by 
civil society, parliament and the media). In two of the reci-
pient countries of German budget support, accompanying 
measures were implemented to strengthen public financial 
management, as well as to support parliamentarians, the 
media, and civil society organisations. When accompanying 
measures of other donors are also taken into account, it can 
be assumed that this occurs in all nine countries. The paral-
lel support to both the supply side and the demand side can 
contribute to improving the performance of governmental 
institutions as well as to ensuring and strengthening the 
controlling function of democratic actors. The interrelation 
between these two types of accompanying measures is 
assumed to take place at the level of expected intermediate 
results (figure 6) and depends on the effects of the individu-
al measures involved.
Mechanism 6: Transparent institutions of public financial 
management generate and publish budget information.
Mechanism 7: Civil society, parliament and the media use 
the published budget information and increasingly demand 
accountability from the government.
Synergy effects can arise if more or better budget informati-
on is provided by means of accompanying measures on the 
supply side (mechanism 6). Due to further accompanying 
measures to qualify parliament, the media and civil society, 
this information is increasingly taken up and used by actors 
on the demand side to claim accountability - including 
further budget information - from the government (mecha-
nism 7).
These hypotheses and mechanisms have been examined 
and tested for plausibility throughout the survey process. 
The results are outlined in chapter 4.2.
22 Actors on the supply side of accountability comprise all government institutions providing information about the national budget (e.g. the finance ministry, other sector-based ministries, as well as 
tax and customs authorities). Actors on the demand side of accountability are parliament, civil society and the media. The court of auditors can be part of the supply or demand side depending on 
the institutional setup. 
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3.4
Survey process
The evaluation of accompanying measures in nine recipient 
countries of German budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa 
was conducted based on the analysis of written documents, 
telephone and personal interviews23, as well as an online 
survey. The collected data essentially reflect the assessment 
of stakeholders of these countries involved in the budget 
support process and of budget support experts with experi-
ence in other recipient countries of budget support. A solid 
foundation of robust data was attained by the combined use 
of qualitative and quantitative methods during the data coll-
ection and through the triangulation of data gathered from 
written sources of information and from interview partners. 
Therefore, not only different types of sources (literature, 
interviews, online survey) were assessed, but also distinctive 
perspectives were considered, such as from bilateral and 
23  The three guidelines for the interviews with representatives of budget support donors (i) during the explorative mission to Mozambique, (ii) for further investigating the results of the online survey, 
as well as (iii) to collect the partner perspective in Tanzania, are included in annex 8.6.
multilateral donor representatives, partner representatives 
in Mozambique and Tanzania, and independent experts 
(table 8 and 9, annex 8.7).
Analysis of written sources
There are comprehensive sources of information availa-
ble for the instrument of budget support. These include 
strategy papers and implementation guidelines of bi- and 
multilateral donors, published academic articles, as well 
as a growing number of research papers. In addition, a 
growing number of evaluation reports of implementing 
agencies (like from KfW) and large multi-donor evaluations 
(such as from the European Commission) are available. Two 
recently published meta-evaluations provide a synopsis of 
the effects of budget support in eight recipient countries 
of budget support (Lawson, 2014; Rønsholt, 2014). Never-
theless, accompanying measures are only mentioned on the 
periphery of these sources.
Information on individual accompanying measures can be 
found in the project documents of the two German imple-
menting agencies. While classic accompanying measures of 
the KfW are shortly described in an annex to the programme 
proposal for each respective stage of budget support, the 
documentation of measures of the GIZ specifically indicates 
their relation to the context of budget support, and is used 
Figure 7. Workfl ow of the evaluation
Source: authors’ own
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to classify them as accompanying measures to budget 
support (chapter 2.1). 
After studying the literature and analysing the documents 
available, the evaluation team conducted its own survey by 
means of semi-structured interviews and a standardised 
online survey. The explorative interviews conducted in 
person and by telephone at the beginning of the evaluation 
provided the basis for the inductive development of hypo-
theses and mechanisms and helped specify the question- 
and answer-options for the online survey. Thereafter, a set 
of semi-structured interviews served to explore the results 
of the online survey in greater detail. An analysis grid was 
developed in order to categorise and systematically analyse 
all available information on accompanying measures. Each 
document was then coded accordingly using the data 
analysis software MaxQDA (see code plan in annex 8.8).
Interviews during the explorative mission
During an explorative mission to a recipient country of 
German budget support, the evaluation team improved 
its understanding of the planning and implementation of 
accompanying measures. Additionally, the team was able 
to reconsider the reconstructed theory of change and 
the preliminary hypotheses in the context of a specific 
country case. Mozambique was selected, a country where 
German accompanying measures to budget support have 
continuously been implemented over a long period of time. 
At the same time, the evaluation team could immediately 
follow up on results of the EU multi-donor evaluation of 
budget support presented in Maputo on 20 May 2014.
From 19 to 28 May 2014, the evaluation team conducted 
semi-structured interviews with 39 persons in Maputo. 
These included representatives of GIZ and KfW, current and 
former bilateral donors of budget support, the EU, the IMF, 
the World Bank, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Mozambi-
can and international consulting companies, as well as the 
court of auditors, the tax and customs authority, and civil 
society organisations in Mozambique. On the donor side, 
representatives of major budget support donors, as well 
as current and former managers in policy dialogue, were 
selected; on the partner side, representatives of the institu-
tions which received German accompanying measures were 
interviewed.  
Online survey
By means of a standardised online survey in all nine reci-
pient countries of German budget support in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, preliminary findings were validated to provide a 
broader basis and quantifiable evidence relating to the 
relevance, effectiveness, and success factors of accompany-
ing measures. 
Within the nine recipient countries of German budget 
support in Sub-Saharan Africa, one representative for each 
current and former budget support donor, as well as impor-
tant observers, were asked to answer up to 25 questions (see 
online questionnaire in annex 8.3). On the German side, the 
current Heads of Development Cooperation (HoC) at the 
German Embassy (representatives of the BMZ in German 
embassies responsible for economic cooperation), and the 
project managers of German accompanying measures (or 
the most recent ones if the measures had already been ter-
minated) received an invitation to participate in the online 
survey. The survey was conducted from 8 to 30 September 
2014 in English using the software 2ask. 83 out of 143 invited 
persons completed their questionnaire, which corresponds 
to a response rate of 58 percent. Detailed information on 
response rates in individual countries as well as on individu-
al interviewee groups are outlined in annex 8.4.
In the online survey, the participants were requested mainly 
to assess certain statements on a scale concerning problems 
in the budget support process and how these may or may 
not be addressed in the planning and implementing of 
accompanying measures. From this, assessments of donors 
could be derived regarding the relevance of accompanying 
measures, as well as the functioning of individual mecha-
nisms. Moreover, qualitative statements provided insights 
on the success factors of accompanying measures.
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Telephone interviews
In addition to the online survey, further semi-structured 
interviews were conducted (mainly) by phone. Prior to the 
online survey, 16 preparatory talks with all current HoC 
at the German Embassies, as well as with all GIZ country 
directors were held. In order to further reflect some interes-
ting results of the online survey, 15 more in-depth interviews 
were conducted with persons responsible for accompanying 
measures, long-term experts of GIZ, office and project ma-
nagers of KfW, and representatives of other budget support 
donors. For this purpose, persons with long-term experience 
with accompanying measures to budget support were 
chosen and the focus was on countries receiving German 
budget support at the time of the respective interview. The 
team concluded with six interviews with researchers and 
evaluators specialised in budget support. 
Interviews and written survey during the short mission to 
Tanzania 
The online survey and the in-depth interviews focused 
predominantly on the donors’ perspective. Therefore, 
in addition to the findings of the explorative mission to 
Mozambique, the assessment of partner representatives still 
needed to be collected. The choice of a country for a second 
short mission was Tanzania, where a broad portfolio of 
German accompanying measures has been implemented by 
both KfW and GIZ. Following the forthcoming termination 
of German budget support to Tanzania at the end of 2015, 
measures of the GIZ classified as accompanying measures to 
budget support will presumably continue under the Good Fi-
nancial Governance programme, possibly with co-financing 
from the EU. Moreover, the EU budget support evaluation 
from 2013 set a good foundation for a more detailed analysis 
of the role of accompanying measures.
From 4 to 11 December 2014, the evaluation team conducted 
individual and group interviews with a total of 29 persons, 
among them managers of the National Audit Office of Tan-
zania (as a recipient of German accompanying measures), 
managers of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
(in its coordination function for budget support), as well as 
managers of the Planning Commission. Moreover, represen-
tatives of the media, civil society, BMZ, KfW, GIZ, and other 
important budget support donors were also interviewed.
4.
RESULTS
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T
he following results are based on the assessment of 
the respondents. Furthermore, there are country-
specific differences concerning the various contexts. 
However, even though the situation can differ in 
individual cases, if not stated otherwise, the results refer to 
all examined countries as a whole. The collected data do not 
permit a country-specific evaluation as the extent of data is 
insufficient for this purpose.
4.1
Relevance of accompanying measures to budget 
support
Can accompanying measures increase the effectiveness of 
budget support and hence are they relevant for its effective-
ness? Previous evaluations indicate that budget support can 
contribute to an increase of poverty-relevant spending and 
- albeit to a lesser extent - to a reduction of income poverty. 
Budget support contributes positively to the momentum 
of reforms within poverty-oriented sectors, as well as to 
strengthening cross-sectoral public financial management 
including fiscal transparency and accountability. Never-
theless, when looking at the overall picture of evaluation 
and research studies, it is apparent that until now, budget 
support has fulfilled its financing function better than its 
reform or governance function (Caputo et al., 2011a; Dijkstra 
et al., 2012: 169ff; IEG, 2010; Lawson, 2014: 8f und 46; Lister, 
2006; de Renzio et al., 2011: 19; Rønsholt, 2014; Williamson, 
2006).
Despite its positive contributions, the potential of budget 
support to contribute to poverty reduction has not yet been 
fully realised. Drawing from the present studies, two causes 
can be identified to explain this situation in addition to 
individual country-specific factors:   
 • Shortcomings in terms of harmonisation and partner 
alignment of budget support donors regarding issues 
such as disbursement modalities, conditionalities, and the 
choice of sectors and success indicators. Donors often do 
not sufficiently comply with the implementation of the 
intervention principles of budget support, which results in 
a loss of effectiveness and efficiency (Faust et al., 2012: 455; 
Lawson, 2014: 11; Molenaers, 2012).
 • Bad governance and capacity deficiencies in the country 
systems are another cause for diminished effectiveness and 
efficiency. Corruption, as well as violations of basic human 
or democratic rights, provoke (temporary) suspensions or 
complete phasing out of budget support (Dijkstra et al., 
2012: 149; Faust, 2012b; Faust, 2012a; Hayman, 2011: 674; 
Molenaers et al., 2015). Besides these violations of the 
Underlying Principles, deficiencies in the country systems 
lead to trickle down losses or inefficient use of budget 
support funds.  
Regarding harmonisation and partner alignment, the 
difficulties occurring during the implementation of budget 
support cannot be directly solved by using accompanying 
measures. However, accompanying measures can contribute 
to strengthening country systems and, by doing so, can 
increase the effectiveness of budget support. Yet for this, ac-
companying measures must be applied to those deficiencies 
in the country systems which cause the problems within the 
budget support system. This chapter considers the question 
to what extent this requirement is fulfilled. The deficiencies 
in the budget support system will be analysed accordingly 
(chapter 4.1.1) and it will be examined whether accompany-
ing measures address these explicit areas (chapter 4.1.2).  
4.1.1 Potential deficiencies in country systems
Which deficiencies especially hamper the effectiveness of 
budget support with respect to the objective of poverty 
reduction? To answer this question, 83 participants of the 
online survey were asked to evaluate 13 possible problem 
areas corresponding to its severity in their country on a 
scale from one to four. The problem areas can be allotted to 
the areas of ‘public financial management’ (e.g. procurement 
or budget planning), ‘development policies and reforms’ 
(e.g. deficiencies in the implementation or monitoring) and 
‘democratic control’ (e.g. by parliament). 
Figure 8 illustrates the results of the 13 problem areas 
in descending order of severity. The major problems are 
in three sub-sections of public financial management: 
budget implementation, procurement, and budget control. 
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Moreover, the implementation of development policies 
poses a problem, although formulating development policies 
is ranked as less critical. Further results regarding selected 
problem areas are explained in the following. 
Budget implementation
All interviewees confirmed that the field of budget imple-
mentation is very problematic in many countries receiving 
budget support. In the comparative research, this has also 
been identified as a central problem of public financial  
management in developing countries (Andrews, 2010; 
Dorotinsky and Floyd, 2004: 185; de Renzio, 2009; de 
Renzio et al., 2011). The underlying causes and necessary 
counter-measures have to be considered separately for each 
individual case (Hodges and Tibana, 2004: for the Mozam-
bican case). There are various deviations from the budget 
plan for different expenditure categories. Expenditures for 
salaries are normally disbursed as planned, whereas deve-
lopment investments often deviate largely from the original 
planning (Simson and Welham, 2014). Generally, planning 
and implementing the budget is often closely linked. De-
ficiencies in the planning easily result in difficulties for the 
implementation (compare the example of Tanzania, box 4). 
Deviations between the planning and implementation of the 
budget are also often a consequence of insufficient planning 
(Dorotinsky and Floyd, 2004: 192ff). Moreover, deficiencies in 
the budget process have far-reaching consequences, e.g. for 
the implementation of development policies and reforms. If 
the budget is implemented only to a limited extent according 
to plan, the actual expenditures do not correspond to the na-
tional priorities of the development plan and are not subject 
to parliamentary control (Dorotinsky and Floyd, 2004: 189; 
Schick, 2011; Simson and Welham, 2014).
Box 4. Budget implementation in Tanzania
According to interview partners, in the past the implemen-
tation of the Tanzanian budget was often associated with 
difficulties. The problem already begins with insufficient, 
mostly too optimistic, planning. It manifests itself, when 
in the course of the fiscal year, too little revenues are 
Figure 8. Causes for limited effi  ciency of budget support with respect to poverty reduction 
Source: own graph based on 
data from the online survey
How far do defi ciencies in the following areas cause the problems that might prevent budget support 
from effi  ciently contributing to the reduction of poverty? 1 “not at all” to 4 “very much”
 public fi nancial management
 democratic control
 development policies        3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
bu
dg
et
 ex
ec
ut
ion
 
re
ve
nu
e g
en
er
at
ion
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t
de
mo
cra
tic
 co
nt
ro
l b
y p
ar
lia
me
nt
ar
ian
s 
bu
dg
et
ar
y c
on
tro
l 
bu
dg
et
 pl
an
nin
g 
Im
ple
me
nt
at
ion
 of
 de
ve
lop
me
nt
 po
lic
ies
/ r
ef
or
ms
 
mo
nit
or
ing
 of
 de
ve
lop
me
nt
 po
lic
ies
/ r
ef
or
ms
 
fi s
ca
l d
ec
en
tra
lis
at
ion
 
de
mo
cra
tic
 co
nt
ro
l b
y c
ivi
l s
oc
iet
y 
de
bt
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
de
mo
cra
tic
 co
nt
ro
l b
y t
he
 m
ed
ia 
fo
rm
ula
tio
n o
f d
ev
elo
pm
en
t p
oli
cie
s 
av
er
ag
e 
se
ve
ri
ty
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
bl
em
Results  |  4. 29
generated to finance the planned activities. Nevertheless, 
in order to still be able to achieve fiscal solidity and meet 
the predefined deficit objectives of the IMF and other 
institutions, the investment budget is readjusted accordin-
gly. The Ministry of Finance withholds funds and transfers 
them to the respective public institutions just shortly 
before the end of the fiscal year. Activities, for which the 
funds are then finally made available, cannot be carried 
out, because there is not enough time for proper procure-
ment procedures; hence, the funds which could not have 
been spent have to be returned. The situation aggravates 
because public institutions already anticipate that not all 
budgeted funds will actually be disbursed, or disbursed on 
time. Therefore they withhold funds in order to be able to 
cover their running costs at the end of the fiscal year. As a 
consequence, potential investments are not made to their 
full extent, which in turn impedes the implementation of 
reform plans. 
In the fiscal year 2014/2015, this problem was especially 
severe, as government revenues were highly overestima-
ted. The reasons lie not only with withheld budget support 
payments, which were due to the scandal surrounding 
the acquisition of the independent electricity producer 
Independent Power Tanzania Ltd., but also with the 
significantly lower tax revenues caused by the belated 
enactment of the Value Added Tax Act of 2014.
Planning and implementation of development policies
The online survey reveals differences in the severity of 
the problem regarding planning and implementation of 
development policies. This finding is also confirmed by 
the results drawn from the interviews and the literature. 
Representatives of donors, partner governments and civil 
society often focus on the formulation of development 
plans and its strategic further development. Hence, in many 
countries, there is a great number of development plans and 
reform proposals, whose practical implementation is not 
satisfactory (Komives and Dijkstra, 2011: 183). In Tanzania 
some interviewees mentioned that the existence of several 
development strategies, with their different focuses and 
periods of validity, causes confusion and complicates the 
transfer to a central budget. The reasons for the insufficient 
implementation of existing development plans are diverse. 
The problem often lies in a lack of funding or linkage of the 
development plan to the budget; however, partially, the pro-
blem results from a lack of willingness or capacities needed 
for implementation (Cheru, 2006; Kay, 2011). It is difficult 
for actors outside the government (such as civil society 
organisations) to criticise insufficient implementation, if 
government institutions can claim that there were problems 
with the funding and their own capacities. A Tanzanian 
interview partner indicated that, in practice and contrary to 
the theory, reform plans are often determined by the donors 
and that the ownership of the government cannot always be 
expected for a plan:
„Reform plans are only in theory made by the Tanzanian side. In 
practice, donors first organize a workshop, then more meetings, 
then hire a consultant and finally write the plans themselves, at 
the 11th hour.” 
The considerable influence of donors on the formulation 
of Tanzanian development plans has been confirmed by 
a donor representative. The influence of donors on the 
formulation of national development plans has also been 
observed in other countries. This coincides with research on 
the origin of poverty reduction strategies (Craig and Porter, 
2003; Stewart and Wang, 2003).
Democratic control by parliament, civil society and the 
media   
In the online survey, shortcomings in the area of democratic 
control were considered to be less problematic for budget 
support. This holds especially true for control by the media 
and civil society, while insufficient democratic control by 
parliament is viewed as being more critical for limiting the 
effectiveness of budget support. Nevertheless, although 
there are several challenges in the area of democratic 
control, these deficiencies are regarded to be less hampe-
ring for the effectiveness of budget support compared to 
other areas. In contrast, written sources explicitly point to 
capacity deficiencies of members of parliament, civil society 
representatives, as well as journalists. Actors often lack 
the competencies necessary for actively participating in 
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discussions on the national budget (de Renzio and Krafchik, 
2007: 3; Robinson, 2006).
Interviews confirm that parliamentarians are often lacking 
the competencies needed to understand the complex 
information surrounding budget issues and are unable to 
critically take part in relevant debates. While it is already a 
challenge for highly educated persons to understand these 
topics, this applies even more to less educated members 
of parliament from rural areas, who in some cases have 
difficulty in reading or writing. Nevertheless, in the last 15 
years, parliamentary budget committees have been able 
to considerably improve their capacities. At about the 
same time capacity building has also taken place within 
the finance ministries. The capacities on the level of sector 
working groups are still weaker than in budget committees; 
the same applies to sector ministries in comparison to the 
finance ministry. Another challenge lies in the often vast 
majority held by the current ruling party in parliament, 
which weakens parliamentarian control even further. Parlia-
mentarian committees, such as the budget committee or the 
public accounts committee, whose chair is often held by the 
opposition, play a more active role (Pelizzo and Kinyondo, 
2014) (see the example of Tanzania in box 5).
Box 5. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in Tanzania
In Tanzania, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) plays 
an important supervisory role for the implementation of 
the national budget and the use of public funds. In addition 
to controlling public expenditures, the PAC reviews the 
budget closures of the government and the regular reports 
of the National Audit Office. The chair of the Public  
Accounts Committee is held by a member of the oppositi-
on. At the time of the evaluation, the PAC, together with 
the National Audit Office, the anti-corruption office, and 
other actors, were intensively involved in the investigation 
of the scandal relating to the acquisition of the indepen-
dent electricity producer Independent Power Tanzania Ltd.
In several interviews, the civil society of African countries 
receiving budget support was described as being generally 
weak and usually closely observed by the government. 
Significant differences are noticeable between the various 
countries, which among other things can be explained by 
the different manifestations of democracy and rule of law. In 
Mozambique and Tanzania, positive examples of committed 
and competent civil society organisations can be found.24 
The analytical skills of the civil society in Mozambique and 
Tanzania have improved over the last years, just as much 
as their capabilities to represent their positions in public. 
However, the willingness of governments to listen to what 
civil society says, is limited. The Tanzanian civil society is 
formally involved in budget talks between donors and the 
government and can make proposals. Yet, they are only 
consulted once the budget has been almost fully prepared, 
so that it is unlikely that proposals for amendments will be 
heeded. A study relating to the influence of budget support 
systems on the civil society in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda 
revealed that NGOs are excluded from the discussions of 
budget support donors with the government; the influence 
of civil society tended to drop due to the close relationship 
of the budget support donor circle with the government 
(CARE and ActionAid International, 2006). The budget 
support evaluation in Zambia mentions that budget support 
donors are reluctant to involve civil society on budget sup-
port platforms, as direct dialogue with the partner govern-
ment could become more complicated as a result (de Kemp 
et al., 2011: 110). Lawson and Rakner (2005) also describe 
how the role of the Tanzanian civil society as a democratic 
control body to the executive level of government is limited. 
Nevertheless, an interview in Mozambique revealed that the 
parliament has indeed made several amendments to their 
national budget in response to pressure from civil society.  
Despite the progress, actors and institutions of civil society 
continue to have difficulties in their capacities. Interviewees 
both in Mozambique and Tanzania reported that civil society 
often loses influence since it does not speak with one voice 
as a result of various own interests within civil society, 
political motivations, and competition for donor funds. 
However, according to one interview statement, the donor 
community does listen to the positions of civil society when 
they correspond to their own.  
24 In the literature, active civil society actors are also mentioned in other countries receiving German budget support. For example, according to a study of Azeem et al. (2006) the Uganda Debt 
Network (an association of Ugandan civil society organisations, NGOs, academic and religious institutions, as well as individuals) very successfully put pressure on the government in Uganda for an 
improved budget implementation, especially in the poverty-relevant areas of education and health. However, the capacities needed for implementation could generally not be found in Uganda, nor 
in Tanzania, or Malawi (CARE and ActionAid International, 2006: 27).
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According to the annual World Press Freedom index, pub-
lished by the NGO Reporters Without Borders, the degree 
of freedom of the press is more or less at a similar level for 
most of the countries receiving German budget support 
(compare figure 9). Among the countries receiving German 
budget support, Ghana ranks best (index 16.3, rank 27) and 
Rwanda (index 56.6, rank 162) ranks worst. This is consistent 
with Ghana receiving the best score from the organisation 
Freedom House in its index Freedom of the Press and being 
the only country out of the nine to have been rewarded 
the status „free press“. In the remaining countries, the 
press is classified as ‘partially free’ (Burkina Faso, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda) or even ‘not free’ 
(Rwanda, Zambia).25 
Interviews conducted for the evaluation in Mozambique 
and Tanzania reveal a similar level of freedom of the press, 
although interview partners point to instances of critical 
reporting by the media in both countries. In Tanzania, 
many interview partners emphasised the active role of the 
Tanzanian media in the scandal surrounding the acquisition 
of the independent electricity producer Independent 
Power Tanzania Ltd., which clearly indicates the increasing 
importance of freedom of the press over the last years. 
Nevertheless, there are deficiencies in the quality of the 
media, due to a lack of reporting skills regarding the issues 
of public budget, as well as the work of the court of auditors 
and the budget committees. The restricted freedom of the 
press implies that the intensive support of the media by 
donors does not automatically result in improved reporting; 
cases of intimidation and repression of critical journalists 
still continue to occur.
4.1.2 Addressing deficiencies through accompanying 
measures
Whether accompanying measures26 are applied to the 
most relevant areas can be seen by relating the volume of 
accompanying measures implemented to the severity of 
the different problem areas. The participants of the online 
survey were asked to assess to what degree accompanying 
measures address 13 problem areas in their country on a 
scale from one to four. These results were later discussed 
and examined in qualitative interviews.
Figure 10 shows the results of the severity of problems in 
relation to the degree to which these are considered to be 
addressed by accompanying measures. The dots correspond 
to the 13 problem areas of figure 8. The horizontal axis 
25 In addition to classic media, social media, such as internet platforms and blogs, play an increasing role; the chair of the Tanzanian budget committee currently has more than 200,000 followers on 
twitter. Thus, according to a report of the South African Newspaper ‘Mail and Guardian’ of 27 January 2015, he is the user whose tweets are getting the most attention in Tanzania (Mungai, 2015).
26 Alternatively to the forty-five-degree line, figure 20 (annex 8.5) depicts the mean of the severity of the problem and the mean of the extent to which they are addressed by accompanying measures.
Figure 9. Level of freedom of the press in the countries receiving German budget support
Source: World Press Freedom Index 2014
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depicts the severity of the problem: the more a dot is on 
the right, the more severe the problem. The vertical axis 
illustrates the extent to which these are addressed by 
accompanying measures: the higher a dot is positioned in 
the graph, the more intensively the problem is tackled by 
accompanying measures. The yellow diagonal line marks 
the fourty-five-degree line, where the addressing through 
accompanying measures corresponds to the severity of 
the problem. Dots below (or above) the diagonal represent 
problem areas that tend to be ‘under-addressed’ (or over-
addressed), i.e. for which too little (or too many) accompa-
nying measures were carried out in relation to the severity 
of the problem.
The results indicate a positive correlation between the 
severity of problems and the degree to which these are 
addressed by accompanying measures: on the whole, the 
more severe problem areas are tackled more strongly by 
accompanying measures. Accompanying measures also 
tend to focus on areas with deficiencies that are decisive for 
the functioning of the budget support system. The match 
between the severity of problems and the extent to which 
they are addressed by accompanying measures is particu-
larly high in the areas of revenue generation, monitoring 
of development policies, and debt management. However, 
there are discrepancies in some other areas, most of which 
are addressed insufficiently by accompanying measures. 
This particularly applies to the areas of budget implemen-
tation (which causes considerable problems for the budget 
support system, but is insufficiently tackled by accompany-
ing measures) and democratic control by parliament and the 
media. The online survey reveals that the areas of budget 
planning and the formulation of development policies are 
over-addressed.
Budget planning, implementation and control
Interviewees, as well as the literature, explain the weak in-
volvement of donors in budget implementation as having to 
do with the limitations of donors’ influence on the budget 
implementation within the partner country (Informal Gover-
nance Group Alliance, 2010). Budget implementation is one 
of the essential state functions and reflects the political 
priorities of the partner government. The willingness to 
draw on external advice is limited to the technical aspects 
of budget implementation, which play a subordinate role. 
Figure 10. Comparison of severity of problem and addressing through accompanying measures
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In this context, a representative of a Tanzanian civil society 
organisation stated: 
„There is very little donors can do to improve budget execution 
because it is 90 percent about politics and only 10 percent 
about technology.” 
In hierarchically structured government institutions, it is 
difficult - even for their own employees - to openly address 
shortcomings in budget implementation and to make 
improvements.
However, it is easier for donors to be involved in the area 
of budget planning, because it is less political than budget 
implementation. In terms of an appropriate sequencing, it 
makes sense to first concentrate on planning as a basis for 
implementation. A relatively high involvement of donors 
has been observed in planning processes, as well as in the 
formulation of development policies and reform strategies. 
In interviews, donor representatives regarded the provided 
assistance in budget planning as important and necessary. 
In some cases, other forms of support will be needed in the 
medium-term as the actual obstacle does not lie within the 
technical processes. One interviewee of the Tanzanian civil 
society commented:  
„Whether budget planning is a problem or not depends on 
what you want in a plan. If it is about the technical side of 
budget planning (numbers that add up and categories that are 
correct), there is no problem. If it is about strategic decision 
making, then there is a big problem.” 
In countries with well-established budget planning pro-
cesses, the expectations of donors go beyond the level of 
planning. One of the German implementation agencies 
experienced that their support in the budget process was 
welcomed, at least by some of the actors on the partner 
side. The reasons for that were not only existing problems 
in capacities, but also the fact that international consultants 
are considered as being able to provide a neutral opinion in 
the process. They play a mediating role within the country 
system, especially when it comes to “power struggles 
between the Ministry of Finance and other ministries”.  
The area of budget control is the area most addressed by 
accompanying measures, which also corresponds to the 
severity of the problem. In almost all countries receiving 
budget support, the national courts of auditors are sup-
ported by German DC, either with direct consultancy or 
through payments to corresponding basket funds. With the 
introduction of budget support, high attention was gene-
rally given to the national courts of auditors. Budget support 
evaluations also emphasise the role of the courts of auditors 
within the budget support systems and have observed 
improvements in their structural and financial situation, 
as well as in their work results [examples are available for 
Burkina Faso (Landser et al., 2006), Mali (Lawson et al., 
2011), Mozambique (Horton, 2010; Lawson et al., 2014), 
Tanzania (Lawson et al., 2013)].
Procurement
According to the online survey, procurement is under-
addressed by accompanying measures. Procurement is 
a rather complex area. In several countries progress has 
been made in procurement, even if partially comprehensive 
procurement procedures are not always applied consistent-
ly. It was mentioned several times that consultancy in this 
area requires specific know-how, which not all donors have. 
Due to different prioritisation, donor support in this area 
has hardly included German DC, but was mostly provided 
through the World Bank. The example of Tanzania shows 
that procurement is closely linked to budget planning and 
implementation. If funds are not made available to public 
institutions reliably or are delayed, compliance with procu-
rement procedures becomes more difficult. 
Democratic control by parliament, civil society, and the 
media
The online survey and qualitative interviews both confirm 
that democratic control, especially by parliament, is also 
under-addressed, despite the fact that interventions are 
being implemented in most countries to strengthen demo-
cratic control. 
In order to support the work of parliaments, donors have, 
for example, financed trainings for members of parliament 
or trainings for processing budget information in a more 
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comprehensible form. These are sensitive approaches taken 
in order to avoid the impression that the parliament is being 
influenced. Strengthening parliament is not in the interest 
of all actors on the partner side, hence proposals for such 
activities might likely be rejected. The division of labour 
among actors within German DC is increasingly shifting 
the responsibility for providing measures to strengthen 
parliament to German political foundations. Other bilateral 
donors also tend to assign the promotion of political parties 
and national parliaments to political foundations. All in all, 
the promotion of democracy in terms of parliament, civil 
society, and the media is often implemented by actors who 
are not directly linked to budget support. 
Some interviewees preferred strengthening the parliament 
to strengthening civil society. Thus, elected officials receive 
support, while for a vast number of civil society organi-
sations, the criteria for receiving support remain unclear. 
Other interviewees assessed the promotion of civil society 
to be more positive. Despite the fact that the status of civil 
society continues to be weak in Mozambique and other 
countries receiving budget support, the analytical capacities 
have increased on a central level – also through donors’ 
support. There is a number of competent civil society 
organisations which are now able to formulate and publicise 
critical positions. Nevertheless, these voices are not always 
heard and critical statements are not considered. 
Volume of accompanying measures in an ideal DC-portfolio
In addition to comparing accompanying measures to the se-
verity of the problems and the degree to which the 13 problem 
areas are addressed, the relevance of accompanying measures 
can also be evaluated indirectly by checking whether scarce 
funds are spent for accompanying measures. 
The participants of the online survey were asked to imagine 
themselves as being the only donor in their country of assign-
ment and as being able to allocate a certain budget of deve-
lopment assistance for different purposes in their respective 
country. The choices for allocation were ‘budget support funds’, 
‘accompanying measures’ and ‘other programmes and projects’. 
Afterwards, they were asked how they would divide a prede-
termined budget for accompanying measures to the areas of 
‘strengthening public financial management’, ‘improving the 
formulation and implementation of development policies and 
reforms’, ‘supporting democratic control by parliament, civil 
society and the media’, and ‘others’. The resulting hypothetical 
allocation shows that a substantial share of the total budget 
would be allocated to accompanying measures and that the 
funds would be mainly used for strengthening public financial 
management. Interviewees considered accompanying measu-
res to be relevant, otherwise funds would not have been made 
available for that area in an idealised scenario.27  
On average, one third of the total budget was allocated to 
budget support. Accompanying measures to promote budget 
support represented about one fifth of the portfolio. The 
remaining funds were intended for other projects and pro-
grammes. The Box-Whisker-Plot28 in figure 11a permits a more 
detailed breakdown. The chosen shares of budget support 
range from 0-90 percent, while the medium 50 percent of 
the data fall between 20 and 50. The budget support shares 
considered to be optimal, as well as the ideal shares given to 
other projects and programmes, are rather widely dispersed, 
ranging from 0-100 percent and showing an even greater in-
terquartile range. A greater consensus exists relating to the 
share of accompanying measures to the total budget. The 
respective box is narrower and ranges from 10-20 percent. 
Some respondents even chose extreme allocations up to 90 
percent for accompanying measures. It can be concluded 
from the data that donors consider a share of about 10-20 
27 This conclusion is based on the assumption that funds are only spent for accompanying measures when they are relevant for the effectiveness of budget support. Generally, other motivations can 
also lead to the implementation of accompanying measures. For example, donors may be driven by the opportunities to gather information through an insider’s view when implementing measures 
within partner institutions. Hence, the hypothetical allocation of funds toward accompanying measures is not a final proof, but only a further indication of the relevance of accompanying measures..
28 A Box-Whisker-Plot consists of one rectangle - the box -, and two lines extending vertically from this rectangle - the whiskers. The box encompasses the area, where the medium 50 percent of the 
data lies. Its limits are the upper and lower quartile of the allocation. The bigger the box, the greater the dispersion of the data, i.e. the greater the difference among the respondents’ answers. The 
line inside the box marks the median of the distribution, which divides it in two halves. 50 percent of the respondents stated a value below or equal to the median. The further away the median 
is from the centre of the box, the more skewed the distribution. The whiskers normally depict the range of the distribution, representing the biggest and the smallest mentioned value, unless the 
allocation is characterised by extreme answers of just a few respondents. In this case, they are illustrated separately as red dots.
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29 Even if the small number of cases within the data of the online survey do not permit a corresponding assessment, it can be generally assumed that the appropriate volume of accompanying 
measures differs from country to country. The weaker the structures of a country, the more accompanying measures seem to be appropriate. This also becomes apparent in the guidelines of the 
European Commission on budget support. For the so-called State Building Contracts (budget support for fragile states), the guidelines principally recommend the implementation of complementary 
technical assistance. Regarding the instruments of general and sector budget support (Good Governance and Development Contracts, or Sector Reform Contracts), the complementary measures are 
tied to previously conducted risk assessments (EC, 2012). A current study assesses the first experiences with the two largest EU State Building Contracts in two fragile states Mali and South Sudan. 
Using a similar line of argumentation the authors conclude: for South Sudan, which is far more characterised by chronical fragility, more complementary technical assistance is required than for 
Mali, which is currently in transition toward a more stable country after a period of crisis (Bernardi et al., 2015: 35).
percent of the total portfolio for accompanying measures to 
be appropriate.29 
Given the fact that only donor representatives participated 
in the online survey, the collected data cannot provide 
information on whether these assessments are shared by the 
partners. In one interview it was reported that there was a 
“tenacious fight“ with a partner government for every single 
euro that was intended for accompanying measures, because 
from the partner’s point of view, these measures represent a 
step backwards compared to pure budget support; they were 
perceived as a “vote of no-confidence”. Therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that from the partners’ point of view, a hypothetical 
allocation of development aid would have yielded a similar 
Figure 11. Hypothetical allocation of DC-budgets to diff erent purposes
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high share of accompanying measures. When considering the 
volume of accompanying measures, their expansion must be 
carefully considered in cases of declining budget support. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that the expansion of accompanying 
measures could undermine the instrument of general budget 
support by a gradual return to project aid.30
Despite the reservations, there are partner representatives 
who are in favour of implementing accompanying measures, 
albeit not because of their particular modes of impact, but 
as a contribution to maintain budget support. In this regard, 
an interviewed representative of Tanzanian civil society 
stated: 
„Some donors want to go back to project funding which is 
a heavy burden for the already weak local level and implies 
huge transaction costs. What should be done is to keep general 
budget support and to cater to the concerns of the donors 
through the accompanying measures to budget support.”
Regarding the allocation of budget to fund accompanying 
measures, the respondents spent an average of 50 percent for 
the area of public financial management, 24 percent for the 
formulation and implementation of development policies and 
reforms and 22 percent for strengthening democratic control. 
The Box-Whisker-Plot in figure 11b illustrates this clear focus on 
public financial management. The remaining portfolio is divi-
ded almost equally to the other two areas. For all respondents 
the allocation of the budget to the various accompanying 
measures hovers within a similar range in terms of percentage. 
The focus on the area of public financial management is 
consistent with the assessment of the severity of the problems 
for the budget support system (chapter 4.1.1) and the high 
number of implemented accompanying measures in this 
area (compare chapter 4.1.2 and portfolio analysis in chapter 
2.1). This indicates a high level of relevance of accompanying 
measures for the area of public financial management.31
Box 6. Determinants of the chosen share of budget 
support 
The share of development budget that a particular person 
allocates to budget support depends on various factors. 
Both individual characteristics of the person and the cir-
cumstances in the recipient country influence the decision 
regarding allocation. It is assumed that the perceived 
effectiveness of the instrument of budget support plays 
an important role: the more effective a person assesses 
budget support, the more this person is expected to make 
use of it. Analogous to this, a regression analysis of the 
data from the online survey reveals that the perceived 
effectiveness with respect to good governance has a 
large influence on the allocation of budget support. The 
perceived effectiveness of budget support with respect 
to the objective of poverty reduction plays only a minor 
role. This result reflects the prevailing dominance of the 
governance objective compared to the financing objective 
from the perspective of budget support donors, as has 
been repeatedly described in this evaluation.  
In a regression analysis, the direction and strength of the 
relation between the various factors and the chosen share 
of budget support can be calculated. Table 3 outlines the 
result of such an analysis according to the least squares 
method. The dependent variable is the chosen share 
of budget support from the online survey. A significant 
explanatory factor for the chosen share of budget support 
is the subjective assessment of the effectiveness of budget 
support with respect to the objective of good governance. 
A rise of the perceived effectiveness of one unit on the 
scale ranging from one to four increases the chosen share 
of budget support on average by almost ten percent, 
provided that the other conditions remain unchanged. 
Interestingly enough, the subjective effectiveness of 
budget support with respect to the objective of poverty 
reduction does not have any statistically significant 
relation to the chosen share of budget support. Represen-
tatives of German DC are far more reluctant regarding the 
30 There is no danger in itself. Some of the projects declared as accompanying measures are part of superordinate DC-programmes, and hence are aligned to the principles of an effective DC.  
31 The respondents are donor representatives experienced in implementing budget support, but do not represent a certain thematic area of accompanying measures. Hence, a distortion of information 
due to personal priorities is not expected. However, there are differences in the chosen allocations for the respondent groups: respondents of KfW show a significantly higher share of budget for 
measures in the area of public financial management compared to respondents of the GIZ. This is the result of an analysis of variance, which is not depicted in this report. 
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Table 3. Results of the regression analysis to explain the chosen share of budget support in the online survey
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Effectiveness  BS poverty reduction 2.522 1.499 1.425 4.941
(3.73) (4.04) (4.09) (3.76)
Effectiveness BS governance 7.417* 8.919** 9.080** 9.315** 
(4.15) (4.1) (4.24) (3.71)
Representatives of German DC -14.232*** -14.416*** -12.133** -15.431***
(5.00) (5.15) (5.14) (4.89)
Respondents with a lot of experience -0.916 2.004 -1.207
(5.39) (5.33) (5.09)
WGI Voice and Accountability -0.941 -0.976 1.699 -2.145
(9.89) (9.95) (9.99) (8.72)
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Constant 9.121 13.388 13.426 28.325** 15.77
  (11.48) (13.32) (13.41) (11.59) (12.57)
N 81 81 81 82 85
R2 0.065* 0.156** 0.157** 0.101 0.16**
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The level of significance for which the hypothesis that the coefficient of determination of the model is zero, can be rejected in an F-Test, is marked correspondingly after 
the R2.
4.2
Effectiveness of accompanying measures to budget 
support
This chapter examines the question of how accompanying 
measures can contribute to an increased effectiveness of 
budget support. The modes through which accompanying 
measures can be effective are examined in greater detail 
by considering the hypotheses and mechanisms derived in 
chapter 3. If and to what extent these mechanisms function 
is also assessed based on the empirically collected data and 
previous budget support evaluations and studies.
allocation of budget support compared to international 
donor representatives; on average, they allocate 14 
percent less to budget support. This fact corresponds to 
the generally reluctant use of budget support by German 
DC. The level of experience of the respondents, the quality 
of governance in the recipient country (as measured by 
the Worldwide Governance Indicator Voice and Accoun-
tability of the World Bank), and the economic situation 
(as measured by the GDP per capita) are not significantly 
related to the chosen share of budget support.
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4.2.1 Accompanying measures and policy dialogue 
 
Impact direction Hypothesis Mechanism Evidence
AM > policy dialogue Hypothesis 1: Accompanying measures 
improve the quality of policy dialogue.
Mechanism 1: Accompanying measures provide information about 
the quality of public services and the need for support of government 
institutions. In turn, this information is used in policy dialogue.   
strong32
Mechanism 2: By implementing accompanying measures, donor 
representatives expand their knowledge and skills and can act as 
qualified partners in policy dialogue.
strong
The first hypothesis to be verified states that accompanying 
measures improve the quality of policy dialogue. It is based 
on statements gathered from initial meetings to clarify the 
evaluation as well as on formulations found in programme 
documents. The improvement of the quality of policy dia-
logue through accompanying measures is described by two 
mechanisms, which were identified in explorative interviews 
in Mozambique.
The first mechanism involves the informational function 
of accompanying measures for policy dialogue. Through 
implementing accompanying measures, donor representati-
ves receive information about existing challenges in partner 
institutions which can be incorporated into policy dialogue. 
This mechanism was particularly confirmed within technical 
policy dialogue, where information from accompanying 
measures, especially in the area of public financial manage-
ment was used in the policy dialogue. If this information is 
taken into account when assessing a meaningful indicator 
in the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), then the 
benefit is particularly high. A representative of the World 
Bank reported that accompanying measures provide crucial 
information about reform progress and problems regarding 
the compliance of Prior Actions (i.e. the disbursement 
indicators of the World Bank). Several donor representatives 
emphasised the fruitful dialogue in the area of Public 
Financial Management (PFM), in which developments in 
public financing are analysed and progress within the reform 
Figure 12. Use of information from accompanying measures for policy dialogue
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programme is jointly assessed.  Substantial discussions 
about the challenges of public financial management with 
regard to the PFM-reform programmes led to more realistic 
goals regarding the PFM-indicators in the PAF, and hence, to 
improvements.
The first mechanism was also confirmed in the online survey. 
The majority of the respondents indicated that, due to the 
implementation of accompanying measures, useful infor-
mation was provided for the policy dialogues. This applies 
to the technical policy dialogue (96 percent confirmation) 
as well as to high-level policy dialogue (89 percent) held 
between representatives of the partner government and 
ambassadors of the donors. Regarding the utilisation of the 
obtained information for policy dialogue, there was less con-
firmation. The confirmation is 75 percent for technical policy 
dialogue and 64 percent for high-level policy dialogue. 
Possible reasons for this lower utilisation of information in 
policy dialogue are explained in chapter 4.2.2. 
The second mechanism to improve policy dialogue through 
accompanying measures works when donor representatives 
accumulate knowledge and skills through the implementa-
tion of accompanying measures, and as a result act as more 
qualified partners in policy dialogue. This mechanism was 
vividly described by one donor representative in Mozam-
bique regarding public financial management:  
„For engagement in PFM areas you need technical expertise; 
project managers need to acquire skills and knowledge in this 
area which they then use in the policy dialogue. As a conse-
quence, the policy dialogue improves. Without the technical 
assistance programme, agencies would not be able to participa-
te in the policy dialogue with the same quality.” 
The logic behind this mechanism states that qualified policy 
dialogue can only work if the participating donor repre-
sentatives have the expertise to represent well-founded 
positions on complex issues. Hence, the mechanism is 
particularly relevant for the technical policy dialogue. The 
added value of accompanying measures for the donors 
stems from the implementation of such measures, which, 
in turn, generate specific knowledge about the complex 
political and administrative systems of the partner country. 
This knowledge is incorporated into policy dialogue. One 
example is PFM-advisors who are deployed by KfW in its 
country offices to coordinate accompanying measures in 
this area and participate in policy dialogue. Another examp-
le is consultants of GIZ, such as those within the GFG-
Programme in Ghana, who use their acquired knowledge 
and experience gained by implementing accompanying 
measures in the working group on public financial manage-
ment. The level of information within policy dialogue can be 
increased through close cooperation between TC and FC. 
However, for GIZ-consultants the risk of role conflicts has 
been reported. In an ideal case, they should cooperate in a 
close and trustful manner with the respective authority of 
the partner government. Yet, there is the risk of impairing 
the relationship of trust between consultants and their 
colleagues in the governmental institution if the consultant 
is closely interlinked with the donor group.
From the partner government’s point of view, an adequate 
understanding of the country’s budget systems among 
donor representatives is an important prerequisite for a 
fruitful policy dialogue. Thus, in Mozambique, the partner 
side described insufficient knowledge on the side of donor 
representatives as being obstructive to the progressive, 
problem-oriented dialogue on public financial management. 
Nevertheless, the expert knowledge of donor representa-
tives could be expanded and the quality of policy dialogue 
could be improved by additional trainings initiated by 
KfW on distinctive country-specific features of the budget 
process. 
To conclude, accompanying measures can contribute 
to improving the quality of the policy dialogue. On the 
one hand, crucial information is provided, which can be 
incorporated on different levels in the dialogue (mechanism 
1). On the other hand, the experiences drawn from imple-
menting accompanying measures increase the professional 
competencies of the donor representatives and facilitate an 
improved policy dialogue (mechanism 2). The added value of 
accompanying measures therefore lies in the improvement 
of policy dialogue and an increase in the effectiveness of 
budget support.
Figure 12. Use of information from accompanying measures for policy dialogue
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4.2.2 Policy dialogue and accompanying measures 
 
Impact direction Hypothesis Mechanism Evidence
Policy dialogue > AM Hypothesis 2: Policy dialogue increases 
the effectiveness of accompanying 
measures.
Mechanism 3: Accompanying measures are planned and implemented 
on the basis of a needs assessment in order to eliminate the weakness-
es in the system in a targeted way.
mixed
Mechanism 4: Planning and implementation of accompanying 
measures is coordinated among donors.
mixed
The second hypothesis to be verified states that policy 
dialogue increases the effectiveness of accompanying 
measures. The question whether accompanying measures 
are aligned with a needs assessment drawn from the policy 
dialogue (mechanism 3) is answered based on results from 
the online survey and interview statements. Participants 
of the online survey were asked if policy dialogue is used 
to identify weaknesses in the budget support system, and 
if accompanying measures are used to eliminate these 
weaknesses in a targeted way.
Results from the online survey show the following picture: 
the majority of the interviewed donor representatives (69 
percent) agreed that policy dialogue is used to identify 
weaknesses in the budget support system. Almost half of 
the respondents (48 percent) confirmed the statement that 
policy dialogue is used to apply accompanying measures in a 
more targeted manner to address the identified weaknesses. 
With regard to the identification of weaknesses, the agree-
ment among representatives of German DC matches the 
overall results, while the agreement to use policy dialogue 
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Figure 13. Use of policy dialogue to identify and address weaknesses in the budget support system
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in order to apply accompanying measures for addressing the 
identified obstacles was a little bit higher (56 percent).   
The interviews confirm that weaknesses are identified 
within the policy dialogue. Donor representatives from 
Mozambique reported an active exchange of information 
in the working group on public financial management. In 
five subgroups,32 needs are expressed by partner repre-
sentatives, which are then collected by the PFM-reform 
committee. However, accompanying measures are not 
always used according to the identified weaknesses. An 
experienced consultant in the area of budget support 
described a ‘programming gap’ for Mozambique, where 
each donor representative individually decides which type 
of accompanying measures to choose in which thematic 
area. Donor representatives justify such an ad hoc allocation 
of accompanying measures with their own administrative 
regulations and the poor quality of policy dialogue. Interna-
tional experts had the same impression.
The fourth mechanism states that planning and implemen-
ting accompanying measures is coordinated among donors. 
Previous budget support evaluations indicate problems in 
coordinating accompanying measures. In an early synthesis 
report of budget support evaluations, Lister (2006) finds 
accompanying measures to be the least integrated element 
of budget support(Lister, 2006: 4).33 More recent synthesis 
studies reveal that accompanying measures fall short of 
their potential due to the lack of strategic planning (Lawson, 
2014: 76).34 Although synergies may occur with basket 
funds being closely linked to budget support (Lawson, 2014; 
Schwedersky et al., 2014),35 problems of fragmentation and 
coordination arise, when accompanying measures are imple-
mented outside the planning and monitoring processes of 
budget support (Lawson et al., 2014; Rønsholt, 2014: 26).
The fourth mechanism was analysed in the online survey. 
The participants were asked if donors plan and implement 
their accompanying measures in a coordinated way within 
the scope of policy dialogue.
The assessment of donor representatives pertaining to the 
coordination of accompanying measures show reluctant 
agreement to the respective statements (compare figure 14). 
39 percent believe that the planning of accompanying mea-
sures is coordinated within policy dialogue. The statement 
that policy dialogue is used to coordinate the implementati-
on of accompanying measures has been confirmed by about 
one third of the respondents (34 percent). The statements of 
German respondents slightly differ from the overall picture. 
In total, the survey result illustrates that donor representa-
tives do not (sufficiently) use policy dialogue to coordinate 
accompanying measures, neither to better address the 
identified weaknesses, nor to increase the efficiency in the 
implementation of their instruments. Thus, they do not fulfil 
their planned commitment to coordination as associated 
with budget support.
Coordination problems for accompanying measures result 
primarily from the group size of budget support donors. 
Numerous formal provisions, as well as diverging objectives 
and requirements for general budget support, generate 
friction not only in large groups such as in Mozambique with 
its group of (up to) 19 donors (Molenaers, 2012). Originally, 
budget support was meant to reinforce a division of labour 
between donors. In order to reduce the transaction costs 
for partners, donors were supposed to be only committed in 
selected countries and sectors in accordance to their com-
parative advantages (Koeberle et al., 2006: 409ff). The ideal 
form were so-called silent partnerships, whose implemen-
tation was already deemed to be difficult in the early years 
of budget support (Koeberle et al., 2006: 459). More recent 
studies of budget support demonstrate increasing problems 
in the area of donor coordination. Until now, donors did 
not manage to transform the different objectives of budget 
support into a coherent system of incentives for partner 
governments (Faust et al., 2011; Tavakoli and Smith, 2013: 61). 
In view of this ‘unfinished harmonisation’, previous studies 
identify the coordination of all DC at the country level to 
be the greatest challenge. Evaluations in Mali, Tunisia, and 
Zambia reveal the main problems to be weakly coordinated 
32 The PFM working group in Mozambique comprises five subgroups: budget analysis, integrated financial management system (Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado - SISTAFE), 
procurement, audit, and revenues.
33 In the case study on Mozambique, Batley et al. (2006) revealed that accompanying measures „…have never really been developed as a coherent PGBS strategy (Chapter B1).” (128)
34 At the same time, a recognized problem is that donors cannot react to the identified needs due to their reduced flexibility (Lawson, 2014: 76).
35 The current DEval evaluation “30 years of Rwandan-German Development Cooperation in the Health Sector“ has shown that synergies arise from the combination of sector budget support and 
measures for capacity building to improve organisations and the implementation of sector policies (Schwedersky et al., 2014: 113) and that a targeted bilateral embedding of such measures in the 
sector portfolio of individual donors can open new doors for policy dialogue (Gaisbauer and Schwedersky, 2015).
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work in sectors, unrealistic PAF-indicators, and overlapping 
coordination structures (Caputo et al., 2011a: 3).
The coordination of accompanying measures is impeded 
if a strategy of the partner government does not exist, to 
which the donors can align themselves. A comprehensive 
poverty reduction strategy is a basic prerequisite for the 
implementation of budget support, whereas cross-sector 
strategies for capacity development are not the rule. Lister 
(2006) describes the limited willingness of partners to take 
on their own responsibility for coordinating development 
assistance in general and states that the coordination of 
accompanying measures is difficult (Lister, 2006: 4). A more 
recent synthesis study financed by DANIDA confirms this 
observation. Accompanying measures are most likely to 
be coordinated when they are closely aligned with budget 
support or embedded in sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) 
(Rønsholt, 2014: 26). One example of this can be found in 
Zambia, where a PFM basket fund was established. However, 
the overall coordination of accompanying measures was 
evaluated to be insufficient due to a lack of coordination of 
individual measures outside this PFM-basket (de Kemp et al., 
2011).36 In line with the observations from previous evalua-
tions, the difficulty of coordinating accompanying measures 
in Mozambique is outlined in box 7.
Box 7. Coordination of accompanying measures in 
Mozambique
In general, donor representatives in Mozambique describe 
the coordination of accompanying measures as difficult, 
but indicate some examples of very good coordination. 
Many criticise an insufficient division of labour within the 
donor group regarding the support to individual thematic 
areas. Some admit that they do not have an overview 
of the accompanying measures of other donors. The 
basic problem is the size of the donor group and the vast 
number of areas, in which accompanying measures are 
being implemented. 
36 „At the moment, there is no coherent and harmonized approach to capacity development under which a formalized coordination and dialogue process could be established. As a result, technical 
assistance is inefficient, potential synergies are not tapped, sustainability is not guaranteed and the analytical capacity to support the PRBS process remains unused. “ (de Kemp et al., 2011: 28) 
Figure 14. Use of policy dialogue to coordinate accompanying measures
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Some donor representatives regard coordination as a 
responsibility of the partners. They comment further that, 
although there are work plans of subordinate authorities 
(such as the court of auditors or the tax authority), a 
centrally developed and cross-sectoral strategy of the 
government is missing. Hence, it is even more difficult for 
donors to proactively align their measures to the priorities 
of the partner. Due to administrative reasons, a flexible 
reaction is often not possible for them. While the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank can flexibly offer 
short-term consultancy and support services directly 
linked with their disbursement indicators, bilateral donors 
such as Germany are less flexible in their adaption, since 
their accompanying measures are normally designed for 
medium- to long-term periods.
The coordination of accompanying measures depends on 
the quality of the respective working group. One example 
of good donor coordination is the PFM working group. 
Here, an exchange on current developments takes place 
on a regular basis, where e.g. reports of the IMF are also 
discussed. Efforts for better coordination are made by 
donors and partners alike. On the donor side, an inventory 
of accompanying measures in the area of public financial 
management was taken under the lead of the European 
Commission. On the partner side, the subordinate autho-
rities supported by accompanying measures specifically 
contribute to more transparency. The court of auditors 
publishes a list of individually financed consultancy and 
support services in an annex to its annual work plan. This 
special status of public financial management in Mozam-
bique has also been confirmed by existing budget support 
evaluations.
Another differentiation can be observed for the types of 
accompanying measures. Representatives of Mozambican 
authorities stated that they prefer accompanying measu-
res in the form of basket funds. Despite the advantages 
from the partners’ perspective and the confirmed success 
of many basket funds in Mozambique (Lawson et al., 2014), 
representatives of the tax authority report that some 
donors implement individual accompanying measures 
beyond the harmonised procedure of basket funds. An 
increased demand for coordination also exists at the 
Mozambican court of auditors, where support services 
of new donors outside the structures of basket funds 
were expanded over the past years. The court of auditors 
does not have its own strategy for coordinating technical 
assistance and capacity development. Thus, according 
to an international consultant, the challenge for donors 
remains in harmonising these measures as far as possible.
To conclude, many donor representatives use their know-
ledge from policy dialogue about the weaknesses in the 
system to target the accompanying measures (mechanism 
3). However, major challenges remain regarding the co-
ordination of accompanying measures. Policy dialogue is 
not used systematically for coordinating the planning and 
implementation of accompanying measures (mechanism 
4). The extent of coordination of accompanying measures 
strongly depends on the respective aid modality. Stand-
alone consultancy and support projects of individual donors 
have to be differentiated from the stronger integrated and 
commonly funded approaches. Both mechanisms depend 
on the quality of the technical policy dialogue and they both 
function mainly in the area of public financial management.
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4.2.3 Budget support funds and accompanying measures 
 
Impact direction Hypothesis Mechanism Evidence
BS > AM Hypothesis 3: The financial contribution of 
budget support increases the effective-
ness of accompanying measures.
Mechanism 5: The financial contribution of budget support associated 
with the PAF-indicators offers an incentive to government institutions 
to request accompanying measures and to use them.
mixed
Important insights can be drawn from previous evaluations of 
budget support regarding the relation formulated in hypo-
thesis 3. On the one hand, it has been proven that systemic 
changes can hardly be achieved against the explicit will of the 
partner country, even when substantial financial incentives 
have been offered. On the other hand, in areas where donors 
and partners pursue the same objectives, positive effects of 
budget support can be observed (Caputo et al., 2011a; Lawson, 
2014; Tavakoli and Smith, 2013).
The interviewed donor representatives confirmed positive ef-
fects of the financial element of budget support on the willing-
ness of the government to implement reforms. The majority of 
the interview partners share the view that responsible persons 
in partner institutions have a greater interest in implementing 
and finalising reforms, if budget support is granted. It was also 
emphasised that, through the financial incentive of budget 
support, the speed of reforms can be increased.
The majority of the interviewees emphasised that the 
effectiveness of accompanying measures can be increased by 
linking them to the financial contribution of budget support. 
It was stated that accompanying measures implemented in 
the context of budget support obtain a political dimension 
and are therefore backed at a higher political level within the 
partner country. One example is found in the consultancy work 
for the courts of auditors. According to the assessment of an 
experienced consultant, the effectiveness of these measures 
increased after a PAF-indicator related to the expansion of 
auditing had been introduced and after questions raised by 
the court of auditors were increasingly discussed in the policy 
dialogue. At the same time, the entry criteria for budget 
support can have a positive effect on the effectiveness of 
accompanying measures: one added value of accompanying 
measures embedded in the context of budget support is the 
fact that they are less exposed to political risks given that they 
are secured by the core conditionalities of budget support 
inherent in the Underlying Principles.
Mechanism 5 refers to the financial contribution of budget 
support, which is linked to the achievement of certain PAF-
indicators. In order to incorporate result-oriented performance 
incentives within their budget support programme, budget 
support donors have been increasingly using variable tranches 
in recent years. In doing so, the disbursement of a part of 
the committed budget support fund is associated with the 
fulfilment of certain PAF-indicators, which have become to 
be known as disbursement indicators or triggers. Although 
Germany originally intended the use of variable tranches in 
exceptional cases only,  variable tranches have been establis-
hed in several recipient countries (Faust, 2012a: 12f). However, 
previous evaluations of budget support raise doubts with 
regard to the effectiveness of variable tranches. The expected 
effects of the incentives, such as increasing the speed of 
reform, did not materialise. On the contrary, negative effects 
emerged concerning the predictability of budget support funds 
(ICAI, 2012; Lawson et al., 2013: 13; Lawson, 2014: 79; Lawson et 
al., 2014: 72; Rønsholt, 2014: 22).37
Donor representatives attach great importance to the 
PAF-indicators. In the online survey, 55 percent considered 
a coordinated reaction of donors to non-compliance with 
PAF-indicators to be “very important”, another 30 percent 
as “important” for strengthening the commitment and 
37 The main reason for the failing incentive effects expected from variable tranches is considered to be due to the insufficient coordination of certain donors. For example, the introduction of variable 
tranches in Zambia and Mozambique by the German side was not harmonised among budget support donors (Faust, 2012a: 12). In other countries, embedding variable tranches with a coherent 
system of incentives based on just a few disbursement triggers has also not been successful [compare for Zambia de Kemp et al. (2011: 22), for Mozambique Lawson et al. (2014: 70ff)]. The benefit 
of variable tranches lies more on the donor’s side, because they can use them as a signal to their home constituencies. Moreover, they allow donors to react flexibly to governance problems in the 
partner country.
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ownership of the partner government with respect to 
the implementation of accompanying measures. During 
qualitative interviews, interlocutors confirmed that the 
effectiveness of accompanying measures increases if they 
are linked to financial funds of budget support with well-
defined indicators: 
„I think we definitely need financial aid that is linked to good 
indicators for Technical Assistance to be more effective.” 
Examples for the functioning of the hypothesised mechanism 
were described mostly in the area of public financial manage-
ment. Donor representatives from Tanzania and Mozambique 
pointed to the PFM-focus in policy dialogue and reported 
that accompanying measures have gained importance due to 
PAF-indicators. The sharp increase of donors’ involvement by 
means of accompanying measures at the Mozambican court 
of auditors can be attributed to the crucial importance of 
this institution for budget support. Donor representatives, as 
well as experts, report that the PAF-indicator regarding the 
expansion of audits implemented by the court of auditors 
provides a strong incentive for the expansion of its activities.38 
In Ghana, too, where a variable tranche had been incorporated 
from the beginning of the budget support programme, the 
focus on public financial management is also justified by its 
crucial importance for budget support. Since the beginning 
of the budget support programme, at least two disbursement 
indicators for the variable tranche in the area of PFM have 
always been included in the PAF.
Assessments from the partner’s perspective are dispersed 
concerning questions whether budget support creates an 
incentive effect and what role the PAF-indicators play. On the 
one hand, partner representatives of the Mozambican tax au-
thority have observed such an incentive effect. In this case the 
tax authority receives additional funding from budget support 
donors through a basket fund for implementing the authority’s 
action plan. The link to budget support is provided by a 
PAF-indicator in which the tax burden is expected to increase 
at a rate of 0.5 percent annually. Representatives of the tax 
authority also reported close cooperation with the finance 
ministry, since the ministry continuously demands progress in 
this area in order to reach the target set out in the PAF. For the 
tax authority, this translates into a strong incentive for increa-
sing their own revenues and for also achieving the target set in 
the PAF. On the other hand, representatives of the Ministry of 
Planning and Development of Mozambique did not like to call 
the interrelation between the financial contribution of budget 
support and accompanying measures an ‘incentive’. They argue 
that this formulation would suggest that the government is 
not willing to expand the capacities of their own institutions 
without budget support. They rather see an opportunity to 
recognise weaknesses in the system and a chance to eliminate 
these weaknesses by means of accompanying measures 
offered in combination with the various elements of budget 
support. In a study on the effectiveness of variable tranches, 
Orlowski (2013) points out that from the Finance Ministry’s 
perspective, no special attention has been paid to the relevant 
disbursement indicators of the PAF  [compare Orlowski 2013, 
quoted in Lawson et al. (2014: 82)].
The increase of accompanying measures relating to budget 
support is not a result of growing demand from the partner 
institutions, but is rather due to the requirements of donors. 
Nevertheless, representatives on the partner side indicated 
their own interests in the improvement of public financial 
management. These own interests could also be supported 
by budget support donors. Examples of this are found in the 
basket funds provided to support PFM reform programmes in 
Tanzania and the court of auditors in Mozambique. However, 
interlocutors of the donor and partner side reported that a 
vast amount of accompanying measures is supply-driven and 
that the accompanying measures proposed by donors are 
rarely rejected. Accompanying measures are rather perceived 
as requirements of the donors which the partner government 
accepts in order to ensure a continuous flow of budget 
support:39  
38 The Mozambican court of auditors has strongly extended its auditing over the past years. In 2004, there have only been 29 audits; over the years, the court of auditors increased its activity 
continuously up to 450 new audits in 2012. Moreover, the quality of the audit reports has improved as well after the extension of auditing to the district level took place (Lawson et al., 2014: 117f).
39 In their evaluation on budget support in Zambia, de Kemp et al. (2011), show that accompanying measures are often regarded to be a prerequisite to receive budget support and that a vast part of 
these measures have been taken on donors’ initiative. Due to the lack of government ownership, these measures have been assessed to have little effect (de Kemp et al., 2011: 96).
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„Accompanying measures get the political blessing because 
of budget support. [The] Ministry of Finance is seen as [the] 
main beneficiary, and therefore the Prime Minister backs 
their request for better systems with the aim of improving 
macroeconomic management. As a result, only the PFM reform 
is progressing.” 
Assessments of the incentive effect of the financial contribu-
tion on the demand for and use of accompanying measures 
differs between KfW and GIZ. From the perspective of KfW, 
which is responsible for the allocation of budget support, 
as well as the first layer of accompanying measures, this 
incentive effect exists. It was repeatedly emphasised that 
the dialogue on issues of public financial management and 
activities in the context of accompanying measures esta-
blished in recipient countries would have never occurred 
without the financial contributions of budget support. With 
the current trend of declining participation of Germany in 
budget support programs, some programme managers fear 
the risk of losing the role Germany has had in policy dia-
logue and hence, its ability to have an influence on reform 
processes. Interviews with GIZ-representatives gave a mixed 
picture. Both, country directors and persons responsible for 
the projects in various countries, emphasised the general 
autonomy of their projects. Even if they might benefit from 
being embedded in the context of budget support, interlo-
cutors do not expect any negative consequences for their 
projects after German budget support expires. Neverthel-
ess, according to assessments of persons responsible for the 
projects, there is a distinction between smaller consultancy 
projects, where no leverage effect has been observed, and 
larger projects in the area of good financial governance 
(GFG) and decentralisation, which benefit more from their 
links to budget support. The “pressure” exerted by budget 
support is considered to be helpful for the progress of 
GFG-initiatives. Budget support is also described as a “door 
opener“ for the consultancy work related to decentralisation 
of the court of auditors.
To conclude, the assessments from the interviews indicate 
that the relation between financial elements of budget 
support and the effectiveness of accompanying measures 
described in hypothesis 3, generally exists. Yet, a financial 
incentive arising from the variable tranche is not a decisive 
factor in this. The measures embedded in the context of 
budget support receive more political backing and are 
protected against risks through Underlying Principles. An 
incentive effect does not necessarily result from variable 
tranches associated with PAF-indicators, but rather through 
the financial leverage of budget support as a whole. Despite 
this financial incentive, demands from the partner side are 
mainly for measures to strengthen public financial manage-
ment. In other areas, most of the accompanying measures 
are donor-driven.
4.2.4 Accompanying measures in the areas of public financial management and democratic control 
 
Impact direction Hypothesis Mechanism Evidence
AM < > AM Hypothesis 4: Accompanying measures in 
the area of public financial management 
and accompanying measures in the area 
of democratic control mutually reinforce 
each other.
Mechanism 6: Transparent institutions of public financial management 
generate and publish budget information. 
strong
Mechanism 7: Civil society, parliament and the media use the published 
budget information and increasingly demand accountability from the 
government 
moderate
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Hypothesis 4 refers to the budget support objective of 
enhancing democratic accountability in recipient countries. 
For this purpose, accompanying measures can address both 
the supply side of democratic accountability (institutions of 
public financial management) and the demand side (demo-
cratic control by civil society, parliament and the media).
Previous evaluations have shown that the supply side of 
democratic accountability is particularly strengthened by 
budget support. On the one hand, these improvements 
are regarded to be a result of the focus on country systems 
in the partner country. On the other hand, accompanying 
measures providing consultancy and support services have 
directly strengthened the capacities of local systems. In 
some partner countries, budget transparency increased 
since the introduction of budget support - an improvement 
which can be attributed to budget support in some cases. 
However, the effects on the demand side of democratic 
accountability have not been assessed sufficiently (Faust 
et al., 2012; de Kemp et al., 2011; Schmitt and Beach, 2014; 
Tavakoli and Smith, 2013).40
According to statements of donor representatives regarding 
mechanism 6, accompanying measures concerning accoun-
tability had a positive effect on the supply side by providing 
budget information. The online survey showed that accom-
panying measures especially had an impact on the quality 
of budget information (76 percent agreement), as well as 
access to budget information (66 percent agreement) (see 
figure 15).
According to the assessments of the online survey, interview 
partners in Tanzania and Mozambique from both donor and 
partner sides reported that the quality and availability of 
budget information improved after the introduction of budget 
support, even if the information in many budget-related 
documents fall short of the expectations. One example of 
the significance of budget support donors41 is their influence 
on the reforms of the public financial management system in 
Mozambique. In particular the introduction of an integrated 
financial management information system was mentioned, 
which had been supported by comprehensive accompanying 
measures from several donors. One important contribution 
40 Notwithstanding this evaluation gap, donors emphasize the importance to support actors on the demand side of domestic accountability through accompanying measures of budget support.  The 
current budget support guidelines of the European Commission state: „Budget transparency is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the oversight and scrutiny of the budget. The systematic 
integration of programmes to support national legislative and oversight bodies, as well as internal control structures, is key in this regard in order to address capacity weaknesses.” (EC, 2012: 39)
41 With the objective of building an integrated financial management system (Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado – SISTAFE), several donors support the government with accompanying 
measures. The SISTAFE-reform is continually supported by the means of a basket fund which includes contributions from Norway, Denmark and Italy. Moreover, the EU provides financial assistance 
and offers further funds for short-term consultants (EU, 2014).
Figure 15. Accompanying measures and provision of budget information
Source: own graph based on 
data from the online survey
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to improve budget transparency in both countries originates 
from measures for strengthening the respective courts of 
auditors. These were especially promoted in the course of 
accompanying measures to budget support. The institutions in 
both countries received such accompanying measures through 
basket funds, as well as through projects of individual donors. 
As a result of the increased financial and technical assistance 
of donors, the auditing activities of the Mozambican Tribunal 
Administrativo could be expanded significantly. In Tanzania, 
the scope, quality, and timeliness of audit reports from the 
court of auditors have improved significantly from 2006 to 
2010.42
The findings from the online survey and interviews in 
Mozambique and Tanzania largely coincide with results from 
previous budget support evaluations and studies. In several 
publications, budget transparency is described as an area, 
which could be improved by budget support (Caputo et al., 
2011a: 6; Lister, 2006: 5; Loquai and Fanetti, 2011: 53; Røns-
holt, 2014: 11). A positive contribution of budget support 
toward improved transparency is found in Tanzania, where 
budget transparency increased following new impulses in 
policy dialogue (Lawson et al., 2013: 32). However, the case 
of Zambia differs from the entire picture. Although Zambia’s 
court of auditors was indeed strengthened by accompanying 
measures to budget support, budget transparency and the 
involvement of parliament and civil society in the budget 
process could not be improved (de Kemp et al., 2011: 117). 
Besides strengthening the supply side, accompanying mea-
sures also address the demand side. Mechanism 7 postulates 
the use of published budget information by civil society, 
parliament, and the media, as well as an increasing demand 
of accountability from the government. In the online survey, 
donor representatives stated that accompanying measures 
strengthened capacities on the demand side, particularly 
regarding the knowledge of access to budget information. 
However, only about one third of the respondents assume 
that actors on the demand side request higher quality 
budget information from government institutions as a 
consequence of the accompanying measures (see figure 16).
Many interviewees confirmed the results drawn from the 
online survey. Although the capacities of civil society, 
parliament, and the media to use budget information have 
increased, this has not reached improvements on the supply 
side. The ability to appropriately assess comprehensive 
budget data and audit reports and to participate in the 
relevant debates depends on comprehensive technical skills, 
which can only be attained over time. Previous evaluations 
and studies mostly indicate a rather challenging situation: in 
the evaluated low-income countries, only a limited number 
of actors on the demand side of democratic accountability 
have the necessary capacities required to fulfil their control 
function (Loquai and Fanetti, 2011; Rønsholt, 2014).
Media reporting on the budget process has improved in 
Mozambique and Tanzania, yet the reporting strongly 
depends on the expertise of journalists, as well as on the 
quality of the available information. In Tanzania, the demand 
of the media for reports from the court of auditors has risen 
and these documents have also been used for reporting. 
Financed by a number of donors through an accompanying 
measure, the Tanzania Media Fund has been able to support 
journalists to extend their competencies in reporting on 
parliamentary budget debates and for controlling public 
expenditures. Moreover, journalists have more frequently 
reported irregularities within the public financial administra-
tion to the public accounts committee. In Mozambique, the 
heads of two media companies reported that the increased 
number of budget-related documents and audit reports 
have been used by journalists. Given the highly technical 
journalistic requirements, editors cooperate with external 
experts, as well as professionals within civil society. As an 
accompanying measure, KfW funded journalist trainings 
to increase competencies in budget issues (conducted by 
budget experts of a local consultancy company) and in 
professional reporting (conducted by Deutsche Welle).
In Mozambique, there is a small number of civil society 
actors who have increasing expertise in public financial 
management. They critically discuss budget issues and 
actively demand information from the government. 
42 For the period of 2006–2010, the respective indicator (PI-26) of Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessments clearly shows improvements (from D+ to B+) in the scope, quality, and 
timeliness of the reports of the court of auditors (Lawson et al., 2013: 71). Mozambique’s court of auditors also largely expanded its auditing activities from 29 (2004) to 450 audits (2012) over the last 
years (Lawson et al., 2014: 117f).
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However, these actors reported a very slow improvement 
of budget transparency, especially regarding state-owned 
enterprises involved in extractive industries. Interviewees 
from Tanzania criticised that the provided budget data has 
not yet been used or processed sufficiently, due to a lack 
of experts and professionals acting as intermediaries. A 
competent discussion of the issues is just taking root within 
civil society. The Policy Forum in Tanzania, a network of civil 
society organisations, plays a pivotal role. The network has 
established various working groups focused on the national 
budget and has initiated a participatory budget. Over the 
last eight years, the work of the forum could be largely 
expanded due to increasing support from budget support 
donors (Lawson et al., 2013: 70).
The demand side of democratic accountability in the area 
of parliamentary control, was addressed by accompanying 
measures in both Mozambique and Tanzania. In Tanzania, 
trainings in cooperation with the court of auditors were 
carried out for members of parliament as part of an accom-
panying measure financed by the PFM-reform programme. 
According to a partner representative, this measure 
reinforced the capacities of the court of auditors to exercise 
democratic control for the government. In Mozambique, 
trainings on budget analysis have also been carried out for 
members of parliament and continue to be highly apprecia-
ted by the participants. The need for qualification measures 
in parliament is ranked high by the ruling party and the 
opposition alike. Nevertheless, due to high fluctuations of 
the members of parliament, the parties prefer an instituti-
onalised solution (training unit or institute) for members of 
parliament. A few comments from the donor side indicate 
that directly supporting members of parliament, as an ac-
companying measure to budget support, is not always easy, 
because from the perspective of the partner government 
this might be judged as being disloyal.
Both partners and donors see an added value in the 
combination of accompanying measures on both sides of 
democratic accountability. On a conceptual level, there is 
consensus that it makes sense to not only promote transpa-
rency of public financial management but also to strengthen 
the capacities of users of information on the demand side 
to claim more democratic accountability. Drawing from 
their practical experience, several interviewees described 
synergies in the implementation of combined measures. 
The simultaneous support of the court of auditors and the 
work in the parliamentary committees is described as a 
Figure 16. Accompanying measures and use of budget information by civil society, parliament and the media
How do accompanying measures increase the capacity of civil society, parliament and the media to absorb and 
use the provided budget information? (percentage of the interviewees)
Source: own graph based on 
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positive example in several countries. Decisive elements for 
strengthening the control function of the parliament include 
a close linkage of the provision and use of audit reports, 
institutional development on both sides, as well as targeted 
training of committee members.
Interlocutors on both donor and partner sides remarked 
that, particularly in times of declining budget support, it is 
important to strengthen democratic control mechanisms in 
the partner country. In Tanzania and Mozambique, countries 
which are continually receiving lesser amounts of budget 
support while at the same time generating more of their 
own revenues, it is crucial that a functioning counterbalance 
to the executive level of government exists in order to 
ensure an effective and efficient allocation of budget funds 
in the future. Given the complexity of the budget infor-
mation provided, there continues to be a need for further 
accompanying measures. Although the volume and quality 
of information has indeed improved, enormous difficulties 
remain in terms of access to useful information. Particu-
larly in sensitive areas, the government does not disclose 
important information (like revenues drawn from activities 
in the sector of extractive industries).
To conclude, synergies between accompanying measures 
in the area of public financial management and democratic 
control (hypothesis 4) have been confirmed by the donor 
side. Accompanying measures on the supply side contribute 
to increasing budget transparency, while in some cases 
the capacities on the demand side could be increased. The 
complexity of the issues to be addressed continues to grow, 
which has led to a high demand for accompanying measures 
from civil society, parliament, and the media. Especially in 
times of declining budget support and reduced influence of 
donors, it is crucial to strengthen the control functions of 
local actors.
4.3
Success factors
Under which circumstances are accompanying measures 
particularly effective in contributing to the objectives of 
budget support? While the described mechanisms can 
function in all recipient countries receiving budget support 
and accompanying measures, their effectiveness depends 
on the particular context within each country such as: the 
political and economic conditions in the partner country, 
the interrelations between the different elements of budget 
support, the degree of coordination between donors and 
partners, as well as the harmonisation of interventions 
(compare Westhorp 2014). In this respect, budget support 
and accompanying measures are affected by similar 
contextual factors, upon which donors only have a limited 
influence. These factors are outlined in chapter 4.3.1. 
There is a high degree of flexibility in planning, coordinating 
and implementing accompanying measures. Therefore, the 
various experiences with different aid modalities, types 
and leverage points of accompanying measures were 
assessed (chapter 4.3.2). In the following chapter, the most 
important context variables are considered to be success 
factors. These differ from country to country and in terms 
of their flexibility in the planning and implementation of 
accompanying measures. Thereby, it is important to keep 
in mind that several of the success factors discussed here 
can also be generally applied to projects and programmes 
of technical and financial cooperation. Nevertheless, these 
success factors are particularly important within the context 
of budget support. 
4.3.1 Success factors in the context of budget support
The existing interrelations between various elements of 
budget support have been visualised in the intervention 
logic of accompanying measures (figure 6) and explained 
(see chapter 4.2). Conditionalities, policy dialogue, and 
accompanying measures can contribute to reinforcing the 
focus on development within the partner country and to 
increasing the effectiveness of the financial contribution of 
budget support. Ideally, the various elements of the budget 
support package achieve a combined contribution to the 
objectives of budget support. However, deficiencies of 
individual elements can also impair the effectiveness of the 
whole package. The coordination between budget support 
donors and partner governments is extremely important for 
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budget support packages to reach their full potential. If ac-
companying measures are aligned with the priorities of the 
partner government, their chances of success are increased 
even further. According to participants of the online survey, 
the most important success factors for the utilisation and 
effectiveness of accompanying measures are related to the 
ownership of partner governments during the planning and 
implementation of development-oriented reforms, as well as 
the commitment of the involved institutions. 
Success factor: Ownership and commitment of the partners
With regard to accompanying measures, participants of the 
online survey assessed the ownership and commitment of 
the partner governments generally positive. This applies 
particularly to those measures focused on modernising 
public financial management, especially in the area of 
increasing revenues. The government’s interest in accom-
panying measures to strengthen parliamentary control, the 
media, and civil society is ranked lower. In some interviews, 
it was indicated that governments do not request support of 
the demand side to strengthen democratic accountability, 
because the government can exercise little control over 
these types of measures and fears the rise of opposition 
groups. 
Ownership and commitment of the partner side are high if 
accompanying measures strengthen the executive branch of 
government in public financial management. In addition to 
previous evaluations, the conducted interviews, especially 
with the partner side, prove that the partner governments 
must take on the responsibility for establishing the legal 
framework and conditions which enable transparent public 
financial management. The institutions themselves show 
their commitment through good governance and professi-
onal management. In the National Audit Office of Tanzania 
and in the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Ghana 
(Walters, 2005: 3f), committed senior managers were able 
to advance institutional capacity building, due to the strong 
backing of their serving presidents. As not all ministries and 
institutions in recipient countries show the same commit-
ment, it is important for donors to identify and strengthen 
reform forces.
According to their own statements, donor representatives 
contribute to ownership and commitment of partner insti-
tutions by aligning accompanying measures to the priorities 
of partner governments and by building and maintaining 
a relationship of trust with the partner representatives. 
They considered linking accompanying measures to PAF-
indicators and to donor-coordinated sanctions in cases 
where partners have failed to achieve these pre-determined 
objectives to be less important (figure 17).
Success factor: Alignment to priorities of the partner 
The alignment of accompanying measures to the priorities 
of the partner government is a central stipulation of the 
Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005). The online survey confirms 
that this alignment is an important success factor in relation 
to the ownership and commitment of partner governments. 
Accompanying measures are used most intensively in those 
cases where they were explicitly requested from the partner 
side. This functions well in public financial management, be-
cause the finance ministries of partner governments, which 
are responsible for the coordination of budget support and 
accompanying measures, have the authority and mandate to 
manage public finances. Therefore, these ministries can set 
clear priorities and track them. Conflicts of interests on the 
partner and donor side hamper a harmonised approach.
It is unlikely that the partners would demand a comparable 
volume of accompanying measures if the respective funds 
could also be made available as unearmarked budget 
support. In 2003, the Ghanaian government rejected the 
proposal of budget support donors to earmark five percent 
of budget support funds for accompanying measures 
in 2003 (Walters, 2005). One member of the Tanzanian 
government reported that external expertise in line with 
national priorities and desired qualifications would not 
necessarily be requested from budget support donors but 
rather from institutions where experts are best available 
at the most favourable conditions (such as from the IMF or 
also new donors).
At the same time, donors do not align their accompanying 
measures exclusively to the priorities and needs of partners, 
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but follow their own preferences as well, particularly in 
cases of bilateral technical assistance (Keijzer, 2013). In the 
context of budget support, donors strive to convince their 
own parliaments that they take fiduciary risks seriously. 
In addition to the measures to enhance public financial 
management, they also approach parliament, the media, 
and civil society in order to promote the demand for 
democratic accountability and to create a counterbalance to 
the political power gained by the ruling party through the 
provided budget support. In terms of promoting democracy, 
a diversified supply of accompanying measures from various 
donors, each with their own ideological background, creates 
a “market for democracy“ which strengthens transformative 
forces more sustainably than an harmonised support (Ziaja, 
2013).
Success factor: Relationship of trust
According to interview statements, a steady compliance 
with agreements and the reliable payment of the financial 
contribution of budget support strengthen the relationship 
of trust. A few donor representatives criticised that the 
Underlying Principles are not always assessed in a coherent 
way nor are they coordinated within the donor group. This 
leads to irritation and a loss of trust on the side of the 
partner government. The research on budget support has 
also found enormous shortcomings in the predictability 
of payments and in a harmonised interpretation of con-
ditionalities (Faust et al., 2012; Molenaers, 2012). Studies 
in Zambia show that the donor group did not succeed in 
establishing a coherent incentive system within the scope 
of budget support conditionality. Taking the example of 
budget support in Ghana, Schmitt (2014) describes how the 
proliferation of indicators in the PAF – due to diverging do-
nor interests - can endanger the relationship of trust in the 
policy dialogue. When assessing reform progress, Tanzanian 
partner representatives urged to set realistic expectations. 
Figure 17. Importance of the various prerequisites for enhancing ownership and commitment of the partner government
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Moreover, they expressed the expectation that when cases 
of corruption are uncovered, budget support donors should 
not judge this as endangering their trustworthiness, but 
rather recognise it as indication of an apparently well-
functioning control mechanism. 
When donors and partners meet on an equal ground (i.e. 
with representatives of a similar level of competence and 
comparable decision-making authorities from both sides), 
the relationship of trust can deepen. A financial contribution 
to budget support alone does not automatically generate 
access to the policy dialogue for donors. In this context an 
interviewee explicitly stated: „If you want to see our auditor 
general, then bring your auditor general“. Particularly in the 
technical dialogue, donor representatives are not always 
sufficiently qualified to adequately discuss complex proces-
ses related to financial management in a partner country. 
A trustful and effective dialogue can only be achieved, if 
both the donor and the partner side delegate competent 
representatives with decision-making authority to conduct 
the dialogue. In both general and sector budget support, the 
quality of the technical dialogue hinges on the commitment 
of the involved development partners (Schwedersky et al., 
2014). The commitment of the chair of the respective group 
is crucial in this respect, a position which often rotates 
among larger donors.
Success factor: Coordination
Accompanying measures have the greatest chance of 
success if they are jointly planned and implemented based 
on an analysis of critical points in the budget system (see 
chapter 4.2). Coordination is required for this, not only 
between budget support donors and partner governments, 
but also among donor representatives. In the context of 
budget support, the active policy dialogue between donor 
representatives and the government, as well as functioning 
technical mechanisms of dialogue at the institutional level 
provide important platforms for coordination. In the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005), partner 
countries commit themselves to autonomously coordinate 
all development measures. The coordination of accompa-
nying measures from the partner side is exercised in some 
countries by their respective finance ministry, as well as 
by other specific public financial management institutions. 
Tanzania’s court of auditors submitted a ten-year-plan for 
institution building43 in which improvements of the auditing 
infrastructure and the need for qualifying employees were 
mentioned, as well as options for support from donors. 
Representatives of the court of auditors reported that 
annual plans were drawn up based on this long-term 
strategy and are being implemented from the court of 
auditors’ own budget, the basket fund for public financial 
management in the context of budget support, and support 
from individual donors. If a specific donor expresses interest 
in a cooperation, the pending needs of the court of auditors 
to be addressed by the interested donor will be discussed. 
In addition to or in place of the coordination with the 
partner side, budget support donors consult among them-
selves more or less intensively when identifying the needs 
for accompanying measures and collaborating a division of 
labour for their provision. Thus, it is helpful to document the 
portfolio of accompanying measures of all donors. In Moz-
ambique, the EU delegation took the initiative and set up an 
overview of all donor activities in the area of public financial 
management. In partner countries with a large number of 
budget support donors, the coordination of accompanying 
measures is not conducted within the donor group as a 
whole, but in a subgroup of particularly active members (as 
for example in Mozambique). Moreover, there is the danger 
that the donor group might split up in several fractions 
(for example in Uganda) due to disagreements resulting 
from conflicting instructions coming from their respective 
headquarters. In several countries, donor representatives 
remarked that the coordination on site can only be as good 
as the agreement between the ministries of the involved 
donor countries. Problems often originate from different 
priorities of donor headquarters.
Within German DC, the process of planning, implementing, 
and monitoring accompanying measures provides opportu-
nities to exert influence, and hence improve coordination. 
This is even more important if the donor group does not 
act together in a coordinated way. In Mozambique, as well 
43 The Supreme Audit Institution Development Initiative – SAIDI. A 10 year Vision for the cooperation of development partners and GoT in support of NAOT’s development (Republic of Tanzania, 
2012) Lawson et al. (2014: 70ff)]. Der Nutzen der variablen Tranchen liegt eher aufseiten der Geber, da sie als innenpolitisches Signal eingesetzt werden können und es dem Geber ermöglichen, 
flexibel auf Governanceprobleme im Partnerland zu reagieren.
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as in Tanzania, long-term consultants financed by GIZ for 
the court of auditors and the financial authorities receive 
information on reform progress, which could be used in 
the technical dialogue for basket funds regarding public 
financial management. However, only KfW is represented 
in this technical dialogue. The coordination among German 
actors in the context of budget support was not systema-
tically evaluated, but interviews with representatives from 
KfW and GIZ indicate that such synergy effects have only 
been tapped selectively (BMZ, 2008a). One reason for 
this is that GIZ-representatives do not regard their own 
measures to promote public financial management, for 
fiscal decentralisation, and for democratic accountability 
to be accompanying measures in all countries receiving 
German budget support. They often also do not have access 
to dialogue platforms. In such a situation, the degree of 
coordination of German accompanying measures depends 
on the commitment of the local BMZ-delegation (HoC at the 
German Embassy or development consultants). 
4.3.2 Success factors for design and implementation of 
accompanying measures 
German accompanying measures differ depending on their 
aid modality, type of measures,44 and thematic areas which 
are to be addressed. Experiences in designing accompanying 
measures have been collected in the online survey and 
interviews. At the same time, general findings on success 
factors of technical cooperation and capacity development, 
which also apply to accompanying measures to budget 
support, have been taken into account. 
Aid modalities
As described in chapter 2, the allocation of accompanying 
measures to budget support is generally divided into 
joint-donor basket funds and measures of individual donors. 
Basket funds are not necessarily earmarked for specific 
thematic areas. They can provide funds for capacity building 
and technical cooperation, support reform programmes 
of the entire system of public financial management (for 
example Tanzania’s Public Finance Management Reform 
Programme, PFMRP), or strengthen the capacity of 
individual institutions (for example the court of auditors). 
Another type of basket fund is less specific, for instance the 
Technical Advisory Support Unit (TASU) in Uganda managed 
by the World Bank. According to information of budget 
support experts, this kind of basket fund works better if 
it is managed by the partner government. While this has 
not been observed in Uganda, there are positive examples 
to be found in middle-income countries, e.g. South Africa, 
where accompanying measures are strongly demanded in 
the context of sector budget support (Caputo et al., 2013). In 
middle-income countries, the partner government disposes 
of the administrative capacities to plan and control accom-
panying measures; at the same time, it is easier to recruit 
experts from the national labour market in better developed 
economies. 
Some donors of budget support tender for individual 
accompanying measures, such as training or consultancy 
programmes; other donors implement the measures on their 
own. Interviewees pointed out that countries with their 
own implementing agencies (e.g. Belgium and Germany) 
have an incentive to use these structures and prefer them 
to joint-donor coordinated approaches (see also Faust and 
Koch, 2014). In German DC, accompanying measures of KfW 
almost always consist of contributions to basket funds, whe-
reas GIZ implements accompanying measures themselves, 
partially with co-financing from one or several other donors. 
The different approaches of the two implementing agencies 
imply a conflict of objectives that can only be resolved 
through the close coordination of accompanying measures 
of GIZ and donor-harmonised basket funds of KfW. 
In their technical dialogue, partner and donor representa-
tives decide jointly on the specific use of the funds from a 
basket. Given the fact that the partner side can have the 
greatest influence on the use of funds from basket funds, 
this type of funding comes closest to the basic principles 
of budget support. In interviews, partner representatives 
stated their preference for basket funds with regard to the 
44 The provision of technical personnel is regarded to be little demand-oriented. Partners accept international experts as a free human resource that hardly incurs additional costs or they consider 
them to be the price they have to pay in order to receive other material benefits connected with the personnel. In addition to their actual roles of providing technical consultation and training, 
international experts often close staff gaps in partner institutions and take over management roles that can aggravate sustainable personnel planning. At the same time, donors use the personnel 
paid by them to receive information about their national employer and to influence decisions (Land, 2007).
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allocation of accompanying measures. For the DEval-evalu-
ation ‘30 years of Rwandan-German development coopera-
tion in the health sector’ synergy effects resulting from the 
linkage of sector budget support with a basket fund were 
outlined (Schwedersky et al., 2014). The advantages and 
disadvantages of basket funds are summarised in box 8. 
Box 8. Advantages and disadvantages of basket funds
Compared to individual projects, baskets are considered 
to be an aid modality that is especially well coordinated, 
harmonised, and aligned to the priorities of partners, 
as well as to utilising country systems. This facilitates 
a strong sense of ownership among partner countries 
(Maesschalck et al., 2014: 12). With basket funds, donors 
pool their financial contributions, thus reducing the indi-
vidual fiduciary risk for large and long-term investments. 
Furthermore, donors contribute different competencies to 
basket steering and management activities and exchange 
monitoring results. According to the findings of the inter-
views, the question of how well this functions in practice 
depends on whether a good reform strategy exists and is 
responsibly implemented by the government. With the 
number of donor representatives, the challenge grows for 
the chair of the group to bring about decisions shared by 
all representatives. Thus, the technical dialogue is descri-
bed to be relatively time-consuming and can only be held 
at a professional level by well-staffed donors. Compared 
to an individual donor representative, a well-coordinated 
working group can bring forward concerns raised during 
the technical dialogue with greater weight in the high-
level policy dialogue and can influence higher levels of 
decision-making (OECD, 2006: 72). In dialogue procedures 
for basket funds, which support public financial manage-
ment in a cross-institutional way as a whole, an adequate 
sequencing of reforms can be taken into account (de 
Renzio, 2006: 633). These positive effects are more likely 
when partners take over steering responsibilities and this 
is accepted by the donors. Initially, the transaction costs 
for the alignment in basket funds rise for both donors and 
partners. These transaction costs are likely to reduce only 
in the medium-term (Pech, 2010: 51ff). 
Donor representatives criticise the fact that coordination 
within the technical dialogue is very time-consuming. 
Basket funds as an instrument are not necessarily suitable 
for reacting to newly emerging political developments 
and short-term needs (Lawson, 2014). In an interview, it 
was critically remarked that decisions often correspond 
to the lowest level of agreement. Donor representatives 
reported that in order to be able to develop and test 
innovative approaches, they finance their own individual 
accompanying measures in addition to their contribution 
to a basket fund. The low visibility of the contribution 
of individual donors to basket funds is considered to be 
another disadvantage. From a donor’s perspective, indivi-
dual accompanying measures also provide more creative 
leeway than basket funds, for instance with respect to 
project duration. According to long-term GIZ-consultants, 
a long-term bilateral cooperation with institutions in the 
partner country is more likely to lead to the development 
of a relationship of trust than a basket fund with several 
donors.
Types of accompanying measures
Prior to the onset of budget support, the supply-oriented 
placement of international technical personnel was a 
formative element of bilateral development cooperation. 
Within the context of budget support, technical personnel 
continues to be provided through accompanying measures. 
Therefore, when allocating accompanying measures, the 
difficulties related to this type of measure, should be 
considered. These difficulties are documented in detail in 
the literature. 
With regard to the possible functions of technical consul-
tants (Land, 2007: 11ff) working in the context of budget 
support, the focus is generally on technical consultancy and 
capacity building. However, donors also benefit from the 
observer role and the influence which especially long-term 
4.  |  Results56
consultants can have on the implementation of reforms. 
This depends on a certain level of trust from the partner 
institution (compare chapter 4.2). However, the basic 
principles of budget support can be undermined, when 
external personnel only fill existing vacancies and take over 
management tasks within the partner institutions. Success 
factors for the provision of long-term experts are summa-
rised in box 9.
Box 9. Success factors for the placement of long-term 
experts 
During the last two decades, the finance ministries, as 
well as some subordinate authorities in the countries 
receiving budget support, have successfully attracted 
qualified personnel as managers. These professionals have 
often been educated at elite universities and have already 
gained work experience in international organisations. 
Even though this leadership circle is still small, only 
proven experts are accepted as international long-term 
consultants. National managers emphasise that external 
consultants should not only bring high technical skills, 
but also experience with the procedures and political 
processes of the partner country, fluent language skills 
in the local language, and professional intercultural 
competencies. Partner representatives in Tanzania stated 
their preference for national or regional experts. Interview 
partners from other countries point to the benefits of 
international experts in terms of independence and 
potential innovation. In order to ensure the best possible 
fulfilment of the specific requirements, the partner side 
should play a central role in the selection of consultants 
(Keijzer, 2013). Representatives of partner institutions 
emphasised that consultants should stay longer than two 
years to enable an effective contribution following their 
initial integration within the institution. 
According to statements of partner representatives and 
current or former consultants, the acceptance of long-
term consultants essentially depends on the relationship 
of trust they can establish in the institution where they 
work. To avoid conflicts of loyalty, consultants should be 
directly subordinated to managers in the partner instituti-
on and - in the context of basket funds - only report to the 
donor institution or the working group for the technical 
dialogue in agreement with their managers within the 
partner institution (see also Land, 2007). 
German accompanying measures include consultancy 
services, trainings, organisational development, studies 
and analyses, as well as the procurement of equipment, 
including IT-systems. The answer to the question which 
types of interventions are more promising, depends on the 
individual situation and the problem area to be addressed. 
Some needs and preferences stated in the online survey 
refer to several countries. According to the statement of 
participants of the online survey and numerous partner 
representatives, there is a need for the establishment of 
independent institutions for the analysis of public finances 
in many countries. Managers from institutions of public 
financial management and consultants, who have been, or 
still are in positions within these institutions, mentioned 
that there is a large need for training in medium-level 
management in their respective institutions. 
Partner representatives describe the work of short-term 
trainers as not very sustainable, which is why they should 
be limited to covering only very specific needs. In one 
interview, positive experiences with a long-term coaching 
programme were reported, in which a European expert pro-
vided short term consultancy services at regular intervals 
over a period of three years. The expert also accompanied 
the implementation of agreed steps via telephone and 
internet. In addition to receiving conventional trainings 
offered by external trainers at the institution, the managers 
of partner institutions also appreciated the opportunity to 
send employees for several months to the World Bank or to 
the IMF. These employees were able to acquire competen-
cies in these international organisations and incorporate 
them in their own institution upon return. Other reports 
described good experiences with Twinning-Programmes 
between institutions in the donor and partner country. In 
such a programme, for example, employees of the court of 
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auditors in the donor country regularly advise the court of 
auditors in the partner country; in turn, the partner country 
sends its employees to the court of auditors in the donor 
country for training. Another example is when GIZ invited 
members of the Tanzanian budget audit committee to Ger-
many, where they exchanged information and experiences 
with their colleagues in the German Parliament. According 
to statements of interview partners, such measures faci-
litate a coming together on equal ground and promote a 
trustful relationship from both sides.
Starting points of accompanying measures
Based on a systemic analysis, it must be decided in the 
respective context of each country, which weaknesses in 
the budget system will be addressed by accompanying 
measures. In the evaluated countries, the focus of accompa-
nying measures is currently on the area of public financial 
management. Strengthening its functionality facilitates po-
sitive effects for the entire system of development financing 
in the partner country. At the same time, a simultaneous 
promotion of the supply and demand side of accountability 
can ensure sustainable improvements of transparency (see 
chapter 4.2). Comparable synergies are also likely to happen 
between accompanying measures for the qualification of 
development policies and for the improvement of budget 
planning, if they contribute to improvements in the for-
mulation of demands in development-relevant sectors and 
thereby, increase efficiency in the allocation of the budget.   
Budget support and accompanying measures contributed to 
strengthening country systems on a central level. However, 
according to partner representatives from various countries, 
there are great deficiencies at the decentral level, for 
example, with regards to local accountability. These state-
ments correspond with the assessments of different budget 
support evaluations (Lawson et al., 2013; Lister, 2006). 
Qualification processes in public financial management and 
donor coordination in the context of general and sector 
budget support generally provide good starting points for 
addressing issues related to decentralisation (Barbe, 2012). 
A more detailed analysis is required to answer the question 
of why accompanying measures have been less successful 
in strengthening regional authorities. The budget support 
experts interviewed see a great need for future accompany-
ing measures in this area.
5.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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T
he following recommendations refer to a situation 
when Germany provided general budget support 
to low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
the period of 2003-2013, German general budget 
support programmes were implemented in nine Sub-Saharan 
African countries, of which three are ongoing. The majority of 
the nine recipients of German budget support have received 
and are still receiving general budget support from the EU 
and other bi- and multilateral donors. The volume of general 
budget support of German DC, as well as of other European 
bilateral donors, has on the whole declined during the last 
years. In contrast, a significant increase of sector budget 
support has been observed for the year 2014. However, the 
design of this type of budget support differs substantially from 
the design of general budget support that has been provided 
over the last decade.45 Whether this will become a new trend 
in the medium-term cannot be discerned at this point in time. 
Chapter 6 addresses the question to what extent the results, 
conclusions, and recommendations of the present evaluation 
are relevant for new budget support contexts.
The importance of accompanying measures has increased 
in German DC. The volume of accompanying measures has 
increased in the past years, both in absolute terms and with 
respect to the financial contributions of budget support. The 
shift from budget support to accompanying measures can 
be partially explained by the fact that, after certain breaches 
of the Underlying Principles of budget support (for example 
in Malawi and Uganda), the funds originally earmarked for 
budget support were used for accompanying measures.
Accompanying measures are relevant for budget support. 
They address the problem areas of budget support systems 
and, by strengthening well-functioning and meritocratic 
state structures, they directly contribute to the objective of 
good governance, and indirectly help to achieve the objec-
tive of poverty reduction. From the donors’ perspective, the 
focus of the instrument of general budget support has shif-
ted from the financing objective to the governance objective 
during the last years. Hence, the support of cross-sectoral, 
economic, and institutional reforms has become more im-
portant through the implementation of budget support and 
its accompanying measures. Even if accompanying measures 
are generally implemented to address all relevant problem 
areas, discrepancies exist between the severity of a problem 
and how it is addressed by accompanying measures. This 
can be particularly observed in the areas of budget imple-
mentation (which is under-addressed) and the formulation 
of development policies (which is over-addressed). Moreo-
ver, up to now accompanying measures have been targeted 
towards a centralised level of government, so that local 
capacities at a decentral level are still weak in many places. 
The thematic focus of accompanying measures has been on 
the area of public financial management. From the budget 
support donors’ point of view, in doing so, fiduciary risks can 
be reduced immediately, while the partner countries benefit 
from improved public financial management. Even if the 
system of public financial management is fully functional, it 
is just an instrument for budget implementation. Therefore, 
it makes sense to implement accompanying measures which 
strengthen the formulation and implementation of deve-
lopment policies in order to influence a poverty-oriented 
use of funds. Accompanying measures aimed at promoting 
democratic control can contribute to increasing the efficien-
cy of budget allocation and to ensuring that the interests of 
a vast majority of the population are reflected in the budget. 
Above that, they can counterbalance the concentrated pow-
er of the government, which is expanded by the provision of 
external budget support. They reduce not only the fiduciary, 
but also the political risks associated with the allocation of 
budget support. 
From the evaluation it can be concluded not only that 
a number of interrelations exist between the individual 
elements of budget support but also that the implementa-
tion of accompanying measures has an added value for the 
effectiveness of budget support. This added value primarily 
evolves from the interrelations with policy dialogue. Accom-
panying measures provide important information about the 
weaknesses in the budget support system, which influences 
policy dialogue on different levels. Moreover, the experience 
gained by implementing accompanying measures improves 
the professional expertise of donor representatives and 
thereby facilitates a better dialogue. Many donors use the 
45 This is related to market fund loans intended to support sector reform programmes in middle-income-countries in Asia and Latin America. The differences include the instrument itself (grant vs. 
loan to market conditions), the capacities of the recipient countries (e.g. Mexico vs. Burkina Faso), the importance of donor contributions (e.g. share of the national budget) and the objective of the 
instrument (poverty reduction and public financial management in Sub-Saharan Africa vs. sector reforms e.g. in the water sector).
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information from policy dialogue about weaknesses in the 
system to apply their respective accompanying measures 
in a more targeted manner to the identified problem areas. 
However, there are still major challenges concerning the 
coordination of accompanying measures. Policy dialogue is 
not being used systematically to coordinate the planning 
and implementation of accompanying measures.
The hypothesised relation between the financial elements 
of budget support and the effectiveness of accompanying 
measures has been generally confirmed by the interviewed 
donors and the online survey. Measures imbedded in the 
context of budget support receive more political backing 
and are protected against risks due to the Underlying 
Principles. Although the general financial incentive has been 
confirmed, demand for accompanying measures is limited 
to the area of public financial management. In other areas, 
the majority of accompanying measures are supply-driven. 
Synergies between accompanying measures in the areas of 
public financial management and democratic control have 
been confirmed by the donor side. Accompanying measures 
contribute to a rise in budget transparency on the supply 
side and in some cases to increased capacities on the 
demand side. Given the growing complexity of the issues 
of public financial management, civil society, parliament, 
and the media must continuously extend their expertise. In 
times of declining budget support and the reduced influence 
of donors it is important to strengthen the control function 
of local actors.
Budget support and accompanying measures are influenced 
by similar contextual factors upon which donors only have 
limited influence. However, there is a high degree of flexibili-
ty regarding the planning, coordination, and implementation 
of accompanying measures. Ownership and commitment 
of the partner government are crucial factors of success. 
These factors are highly present for accompanying measures 
aimed at strengthening public financial management, since 
donor interests in this area most clearly correspond to the 
priorities of their partners. In other thematic areas, the ow-
nership of partner governments is lower and the alignment 
and harmonisation among donors does not work as well. The 
relationship of trust between partners and donors depends 
on how reliable they comply with agreements, the predic-
tability of budget support disbursements, and a coherent 
assessment of the Underlying Principles and PAF. Moreover, 
a comparable level of competence among donor and partner 
representatives in policy dialogue promotes a trustful 
relationship. Close cooperation of donors and partners, 
not only within the donor group, but also among German 
implementing agencies, is an important prerequisite for 
needs-based planning and implementation of accompanying 
measures. Coordination works best in active sector working 
groups of technical dialogue with a professional chair.
5.1
Accompanying measures as an integral part of the 
budget support package 
By directly strengthening the country systems in critical  
areas, and through their positive influence on policy dia-
logue, accompanying measures can increase the effective-
ness of budget support. Moreover, they facilitate a greater 
acceptance of the aid instrument in the increasingly critical 
parliaments of many donor countries by contributing to the 
reduction of fiduciary risks associated with budget support.
In the German budget support guidelines (BMZ 2008), 
the role of accompanying measures to budget support 
has not been defined. Such a definition could be helpful to 
guide decisions on the type, extent, and thematic focus of 
accompanying measures, as well as in which countries these 
measures should be planned and implemented.
If accompanying measures are not implemented at the 
same time (or earlier) as the disbursement of the financial 
contribution of budget support, their contribution to the 
objectives of budget support is reduced. If budget support 
payments are suspended or terminated, the interdependen-
cy of the effects expected from accompanying measures 
also changes. In these cases the interrelations between the 
different elements of the budget support package, as they 
have been observed in this evaluation, do not occur or they 
occur only to a very limited extent.
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Recommendation 1 (BMZ): The financial contribution of 
budget support should continue to be flanked with accom-
panying measures. The role of accompanying measures 
should be clearly defined and they should be given greater 
consideration when revising the BMZ guidelines on 
budget support. Implementing accompanying measures 
should begin at the latest with the disbursement of the 
financial contribution and continue for the entire period of 
granting budget support.
Scope of accompanying measures 
The basic principle of budget support has been to provide 
funds that are not earmarked. The implementation of 
accompanying measures as part of the budget support 
package partially reverses this principle. According to 
findings of previous budget support evaluations, the 
effectiveness of the instrument of budget support decreases 
when the principles of budget support are not consequently 
implemented. Accompanying measures can address certain 
weaknesses in the country system and improve conditions 
for the allocation of general budget support, but they alone 
cannot compensate for fundamental deficiencies. In order 
to prevent undermining the instrument of general budget 
support through a gradual return to project aid in the form 
of accompanying measures, it is necessary to maintain 
an adequate ratio of accompanying measures to budget 
support. The need for accompanying measures differs from 
country to country, hence, fixed provisions for the ratio 
of budget support to accompanying measures are not 
recommended. In general, the weaker the state structures 
are within the partner country, the higher the need is for 
accompanying measures in relation to the financial contri-
bution of budget support. 
Recommendation 2 (BMZ): The financial contribution of 
budget support to a partner country should be consider-
ably higher than the volume of accompanying measures. 
The ratio of accompanying measures to budget support 
should be aligned in a flexible way to reflect the require-
ments of the respective partner country: countries with 
weaker state-administrative structures should receive a 
higher volume of accompanying measures.
5.2
Thematic areas for accompanying measures 
Currently, donors mainly use accompanying measures to 
strengthen public financial management in order to reduce 
fiduciary risks from the start – especially the risk of poten-
tial misappropriation. In order for budget support funds to 
have the best possible impact, they need to be channelled 
towards poverty-reducing purposes and implemented 
without trickle down losses. As the allocation of funds is ge-
nerally more poverty-oriented within the context of budget 
support, it cannot be improved by singularly implementing 
accompanying measures to strengthen public financial 
management. Improvements require a functioning interplay 
between good development planning and implementation, 
not only with public financial management institutions, but 
also with democratic control. The past has shown that the 
problem of misallocation to areas that are not a priority 
for reducing poverty, threatens the effectiveness of budget 
support at least as much as misappropriation. The choice of 
where to apply accompanying measures is largely driven by 
the donors’ motivation to reduce fiduciary risks. This could 
imply the risk of missing the ideal contribution for increa-
sing the effectiveness of budget support.
Recommendation 3 (BMZ): In order to increase the 
effectiveness of budget support by means of accompany-
ing measures, the planning of accompanying measures 
should be aligned to the actual systemic weaknesses. At 
the same time, the focus should not necessarily be on the 
immediate reduction of fiduciary risks.
Functioning public financial management is crucial for the 
effectiveness of general budget support as budget support 
depends on the country systems. Donors of accompanying 
measures use this to engage in a dialogue with the partner 
government about their public financial management as 
a whole. This is reflected by the fact that accompanying 
measures focus on this area. Accompanying measures, 
which modernise public financial management and thereby 
strengthen the partner systems, contribute not only directly 
to the budget support objective of good governance, 
but also indirectly to the objective of poverty reduction. 
5.  |  Conclusions and recommendations62
Moreover, they contribute to reducing fiduciary risks. 
Successes in strengthening public financial management can 
already be observed, particularly at a central level. Deficien-
cies are still mainly found at sectoral and decentral levels. 
Recommendation 4 (BMZ): Accompanying measures 
should continue to be focused on the area of public 
financial management. At the same time, more considera-
tion should be given to the interrelated thematic areas of 
improving development policy and promoting democratic 
control, as well as to sector and decentral levels.
In line with the well-known ‘implementation gap’, short-
comings in budget implementation are perceived to be 
especially problematic in most budget support receiving 
countries. At the same time, accompanying measures 
address this area only to a limited extent. One main reason 
for this is that budget implementation is a central state 
function of the partner, upon which donors only have 
limited influence. Moreover, bilateral donors have difficulties 
finding appropriate experts for the consultancy needs in 
the area of budget implementation. In theory, planning and 
implementation of the national budget consist of different 
steps in the budget cycle, but in practice, they overlap in 
time and content. In the budget cycle, deficiencies which 
occur during budget implementation partially result from 
shortcomings in the previous budget planning process, 
upon which donors could have a better influence. However, 
the aim is not to establish a complete budget according to 
technical criteria, but to design a precise and substantial 
plan based on a realistic estimation of revenues.  
Recommendation 5 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Before planning 
accompanying measures, the entire budget process should 
be examined for weaknesses, from the budget preparation 
to the implementation of the budget. In countries where 
the problem of poor budget implementation partly traces 
back to insufficient budget planning, an improvement of 
budget planning can be the first step. At the same time, 
starting points for the support of budget implementation 
should be identified.
In the past years, budget support and accompanying 
measures contributed to increased budget transparency. In 
some countries, however, there is still too little information 
available to hold the governments accountable, especially 
with regard to budget implementation. At the same time, on 
the demand side of accountability (parliament, civil society, 
and the media) the capacities are insufficient for indepen-
dent analysis, preparation, and use of available budget 
information. It is necessary that institutions of democratic 
control provide continuous analyses and commentaries 
on budget information so that increased transparency will 
actually lead to improved budget implementation.
Recommendation 6 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Measures which lead 
to higher transparency of budget implementation should 
be increasingly implemented. In order to ensure the best 
possible use of the information provided, there should be 
parallel measures to increase capacities on the demand 
side. To better prepare and distribute information, it could 
be useful for some partner countries to build additional 
capacities for independent analyses or to better qualify 
existing capacities.  
Democratic control 
Given the observed decline in the allocation of budget 
support in many countries, the influence of donors and 
their ability to keep track of poverty reduction and of 
budget expenditures are diminishing. The accountability 
of the partner government towards local actors, as well as 
towards state and non-state actors and institutions (such as 
the court of auditors, parliamentarian committees, non-
governmental organisations, research institutes, the media) 
gains importance in such situations and has to be demanded 
by these actors. This especially applies to countries with 
increasing revenues, as for example those drawn from 
extractive industries. Due to increased risks of corruption, 
a counterbalance to the executive level of government can 
be maintained by strengthening local actors of domestic 
accountability even though the influence of budget support 
donors decreases.
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Recommendation 7 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): Particularly in 
countries where revenues are expected to be increasingly 
drawn from extractive industries in the near future, 
accompanying measures should be used to reinforce state 
and non-state actors, as well as institutions of democratic 
control, in their endeavour to demand accountability from 
the government.
5.3
Implementation of accompanying measures
Basket funds
Most of the accompanying measures of KfW are implemen-
ted as financial contributions to basket funds to support a 
certain institution or a cross-institutional reform program-
me. Although GIZ normally implements accompanying 
measures themselves, by means of programmes of technical 
cooperation, they also sometimes make contributions to 
basket funds. 
Whether basket funding is recommended or not depends on 
various factors, such as the thematic area or the number of 
active donors. The instrument of basket funds (in compari-
son to a large number of individual projects) involves a high 
degree of coordination through which the efficiency of the 
cooperation also increases. Basket funds work especially 
well whenever there is a high degree of common interests 
between partners and donors (as well as among donors) 
and when the partner country takes the responsibility for 
implementing a good strategy. These requirements are often 
met in the area of public financial management. Donors ge-
nerally aim at reducing fiduciary risks and prefer objectives 
to be technical and easy to operationalise. The interests of 
the donors often correspond with the ones of the partners 
at least in the sub-areas of public financial management. 
Given the high degree of common interests and the potenti-
ally high gains in efficiency through improved coordination, 
basket funds generally are a good option to strengthen 
public financial management. As basket funds are financed 
by several donors, they provide advantages when it comes 
to financing development tasks involving high investment 
needs, long-term commitment, and high implementation 
risks.
Recommendation 8 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): When planning 
accompanying measures to strengthen public financial 
management, basket funds should be considered first. If 
the needs and requirements for successful basket funding 
are met, this should be the preferred option. 
However, with regard to supporting democratic accounta-
bility in cooperation with actors outside the executive level 
of government, there are good reasons for a more pluralistic 
donor approach. Indeed, the support of democratic ac-
countability benefits from social and political pluralism and 
promotes democratic participation more effectively, the 
more diverse the approaches of the donors. Moreover, donor 
interests vary widely in this thematic area, due to different 
ideological influences. 
Recommendation 9 (all donors): In order to promote 
diversity of opinion and pluralism, accompanying measu-
res can be used individually to support various civil society 
groups, including smaller ones, to achieve democratic 
control outside the executive level of government. Howe-
ver, these groups must be deeply rooted in the society of 
the partner country and committed to the basic rules of 
the democratic rule of law. Nevertheless, if several donors 
support the same institution of democratic control, for 
example a larger civil society organisation or a parliamen-
tary committee, this support should also be coordinated.
Coordination
The coordination of accompanying measures between part-
ners and donors, as well as among donors, is in many ways 
not adequate. Policy dialogue is not used systematically in 
order to coordinate the planning and implementation of 
accompanying measures.
Recommendation 10 (all donors): Policy dialogue should 
be used to a greater extent to identify the needs for 
assistance together with the partners, and to coordinate 
accompanying measures within the donor group.
When the work of BMZ, GIZ, and KfW is coordinated, an 
added value emerges for the entire package of budget 
support. Up to now, the coordination between GIZ and 
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KfW with respect to accompanying measures has taken 
place only selectively and non-systematically. This also 
results from the fact that the measures of GIZ classified as 
‘accompanying measures’ in this evaluation, predominately 
pursue individual objectives and are not primarily aligned 
to the objectives of budget support. These measures were 
often initiated before the introduction of budget support 
or continue after budget support has been withdrawn. 
Therefore, they are presented by GIZ to be independent 
measures from budget support. Nevertheless, interdepen-
dencies between these accompanying measures and budget 
support are also acknowledged by GIZ. These synergies 
are conceived as side effects rather than intended impacts. 
Due to weaknesses in the coordination between KfW and 
GIZ, neither possible synergies between accompanying 
measures of German DC, nor opportunities for the flow of 
information into the policy dialogue are currently being 
realised to their full potential. 
Recommendation 11 (BMZ, GIZ, KfW): In order to take 
advantage of synergies within German DC, the entire 
process of planning, implementing, and monitoring of 
current and planned accompanying measures should be 
conducted in close coordination between BMZ, GIZ, and 
KfW. Representation within the various bodies involved in 
policy dialogue should be based on prior agreement and a 
division of responsibilities.
5.4
Accompanying measures in future budget support 
evaluations 
Most of the evaluations for budget support consider 
accompanying measures only marginally, despite their 
increasing importance within the budget support package in 
recent  years. The findings gathered in this study regarding 
the effectiveness of accompanying measures and their 
potential for increasing the effectiveness of budget support 
can be incorporated into the programme theory and thus be 
considered in future evaluations. 
Recommendation 12 (BMZ, EC, all donors): In future multi-
donor evaluations of budget support, the contribution 
of accompanying measures, i.e. the measures explicitly 
designed as accompanying measures, as well as the 
accompanying measures in a broader sense, should receive 
more attention.
6.
OUTLOOK
6.  |  Outlook66
T
he findings of this evaluation refer to the allocation 
of general budget support to low-income countries 
with weak state capacities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Between 2003 and 2013, 79 percent of German gene-
ral budget support was allocated to this region. As described in 
the beginning of this report, the instrument of budget support 
is politically controversial and in a process of change, both in 
German and international DC. Hence, the results of this evalu-
ation should be considered in view of current developments in 
international budget support.
Decline of general budget support in the portfolios of 
bilateral donors 
During and after the evaluation period, the importance of 
general budget support in the portfolios of bilateral donors, 
as well as their share in the partner countries’ national 
budgets in Sub-Saharan Africa, have continuously declined. 
The reduction of German commitments to general budget 
support can, among other aspects, be attributed to the 
German Federal Government’s position to only grant budget 
support to selected countries that are subjected to strict 
entry criteria and continuous reviewing. Moreover, the 
Underlying Principles and thus the prerequisites for alloca-
ting general budget support are no longer fulfilled in many 
partner countries of the region. Nevertheless, Germany, 
as the most important contributor to the EU, still provides 
budget support through the programmes of the European 
Commission.
In view of decreasing contributions to general budget 
support, concerns arise regarding the future relevance of 
accompanying measures. From the donors’ perspective, the 
need to use accompanying measures to reduce fiduciary 
risks of budget support diminishes with decreasing budget 
support. However, from a developmental perspective, 
accompanying measures remain relevant. Even with decrea-
sing budget support contributions and increasing revenues 
of recipient countries, accompanying measures strengthen 
important areas and institutions of the country systems. 
In the course of decreasing budget support allocations, 
relevance can even increase when the donors’ influence on 
domestic policies diminishes and local actors in the partner 
country assume more responsibility for this control function. 
This applies to countries such as Mozambique and Tanzania, 
which expect significant revenues from extractive industries 
and aim to prevent potential negative consequences of this 
wealth of resources.
From general to sector budget support 
Currently, both bilateral donors, as well as the EU, appear 
to be moving away from general budget support towards 
more sector budget support. Currently, the largest share of 
budget support commitments by the European Commission 
are granted to Sector Development Contracts, while the in-
strument of general budget support - Good Governance and 
Development Contracts - is only used reluctantly. Beyond 
the focus of this evaluation, accompanying measures are 
also relevant for sector budget support programmes. Their 
effectiveness also depends on the quality of the country sys-
tems. On the partner side, a high demand for accompanying 
measures with a clearly defined profile was also observed for 
sector budget support (Caputo et al., 2013; Lawson, 2014). 
Similar to general budget support, sector budget support 
programs are agreed upon by the finance ministry of the 
partner country. However, the focus on one particular sector 
seems to limit donors’ influence on the central institutions 
of public financial management and on overall reform 
processes. Nevertheless, accompanying measures to sector 
budget support also serve to mitigate fiduciary and political 
risks and to strengthen capacities in specific sectors. 
Accompanying measures and different levels of statehood  
Since 2012, the European Commission has allocated general 
budget support to fragile states using a new instrument 
called State Building Contracts. In the context of fragile 
states, where establishing well-functioning administrative 
structures plays a pivotal role, accompanying measures can 
make an important contribution. Furthermore, accompany-
ing measures can be used to strengthen the capacities in 
potential future budget support recipient countries or to 
prepare their public financial management for a possible 
(re-)launch of sector or general budget support.  
Independently of the relevance of accompanying measures, 
the question of how they should be organised and applied 
still remains. For the cooperation with fragile states, as well 
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as for the preparation for the (re-)launch of budget support, 
an option would be to tailor accompanying measures to 
the requirements of donors and increase the visibility of 
efforts made towards reducing fiduciary and political risks 
associated with budget support. This does not rule out that 
accompanying measures address identified weaknesses 
in the partner country’s system in order to contribute 
to improving the system directly and to increase the 
effectiveness of budget support. However, countries with 
better elaborated administrative structures, as well as an 
active demand for certain accompanying measures, should 
be provided with non-earmarked funds to implement these 
measures autonomously. 
Reference points for future evaluations
The obtained results can be used for further evaluations in 
terms of methodology and content. The reconstructed the-
ory of change of accompanying measures, particularly the 
interrelations with other elements of budget support, can 
be used to expand the intervention logic of the European 
Commission and to better understand the contribution of 
accompanying measures in future evaluations. A sequenced 
approach comprising partial evaluations could help to 
counteract the tendency to overload the very comprehen-
sive evaluation framework currently being used (Lawson, 
2015). Concerning the content of future evaluations, various 
reference points emerge:
 • Accompanying measures of other types of budget support, 
or within the context of other countries (such as sector 
budget support in middle-income countries), could be 
evaluated. 
 • From the perspective of DC in the three thematic areas 
(public financial management, development policy, and 
democratic control), it could be analysed how bilateral 
phasing out of (general) budget support and the resulting 
exclusion from policy dialogue affects not only technical 
and financial cooperation in these three areas, but also the 
different aid modalities in the respective country.
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8.1
Methodological approach for the portfolio analysis 
The analysis provides an overview about the German port-
folio of accompanying measures in the context of general 
budget support. Until now, a generally acknowledged 
definition of accompanying measures does not exist and 
there is not an identification code in statistical data bases 
about aid flows similar to the Creditor Reporting System of 
the OECD-DAC. For the portfolio analysis a database of the 
complete range of accompanying measures was established. 
Additionally a definition for accompanying measures was 
developed, interventions to which this definition applies 
were identified, data about the volume of identified measu-
res were collected, and measures categorised.
1. Definition: Accompanying measures of German DC include 
all interventions of financial and technical cooperation 
which overlap in time with the allocation of general budget 
support and which can contribute to the effectiveness of 
general budget support due to interdependencies.  Three 
layers of accompanying measures are distinguished:
 a.) Accompanying measures of the first layer are measu-
res described in the programme document together 
with budget support and designed and labelled expli-
citly as ‘Begleitmaßnahmen der Budgethilfe’. They are 
exclusively programmes of financial cooperation.
 b.) Accompanying measures of the second layer are 
independent measures of technical cooperation, 
which are related to budget support in their 
practical implementation. They can contribute to 
the effectiveness of general budget support due to 
interdependencies.
 c.) Accompanying measures of the third layer are measu-
res of which only individual components are relevant 
for budget support. Among them are decentralisati-
on programmes or initiatives in the area of natural 
resource governance. Accompanying measures of 
the third layer were not incorporated in the portfolio 
analysis, but were given consideration in the two 
short missions to Mozambique and Tanzania.
2. Identification: First layer measures can clearly and easily be 
identified by taking a look at the programme documents 
of budget support (compare table 5). The allocation of 
accompanying measures to layer 2 and 3 is more compli-
cated and depends on interdependencies in the practical 
implementation of the measures. These interdependencies 
are not always clearly highlighted in the programme docu-
ments. Hence, in a discursive process with the responsible 
country manager of the BMZ and finally with the country 
directors of GIZ it had to be clarified which TC measures 
are primarily related to budget support and which only 
to a small extent. This clarification process was based on 
a list of measures that refer to budget support in their 
programme documents (programme proposals or others).  
A tabular overview of all accompanying measures collected 
according to this definition can be found in table 6 (annex 
8.2). In the portfolio analysis, only measures of the first two 
layers are taken into account as they are fully relevant for 
the effectiveness of budget support. Accompanying mea-
sures of the third layer are not included, because its total 
volume cannot be divided into budget support relevant and 
budget support irrelevant components on the basis of the 
available data. Therefore, a complete consideration would 
have led to a substantial distortion of the results. Selected 
examples of accompanying measures of other donors are 
mentioned in chapter 2.2.
3.  Data collection: In the next step, relevant data about 
accompanying measures and financial contributions to 
budget support were collected from various documents. 
The analysis of German accompanying measures and 
the German contributions to budget support is based on 
data about commitments retrieved from the respective 
programme documents. Data about actual disburse-
ments, especially in terms of accompanying measures, 
are only available to a limited extent. A comparison of 
disbursements with the commitments for accompanying 
measures indicates that they largely correspond, so that 
the chosen approach can give a meaningful picture.46 
46 Concerning the allocation of general budget support, in practice, delays of disbursements or even permanent withholding of committed budget support funds occur time and again, mostly due to irregula-
rities in partner countries such as political upheavals or corruption allegations. At times, actual disbursements exceed the amount of budget support funds originally committed. In contrast, the discrepancy 
between commitments and disbursements in terms of accompanying measures seems to be small. For the portfolio of accompanying measures of KfW, DEval has received the annual disbursement data 
allowing a comparison with the committed volumes. Apart from a few exceptions, including especially one accompanying measure in Malawi, which could only be implemented with a considerable delay in 
time, the disbursements correspond with the committed amounts. Therefore, it is uncritical to take the data for commitments of accompanying measures as a basis for the portfolio analysis.
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Accompanying measures have only been taken into 
account in the portfolio analysis during the period in which 
German budget support has actually been provided in the 
respective country. Otherwise, the measures cannot be 
considered to be ‘accompanying’. Measures that continued 
after the considered periods, are proportionally taken 
into account. The beginning of German budget support is 
defined as the year when the first German budget support 
commitment was made according to CRS-OECD-DAC. 
The end of the considered period depends on the year, in 
which budget support was suspended according to press 
releases of BMZ, or when it was phased-out. If German 
budget support was provided beyond 2013 or is still being 
provided, the measure is considered until the end of the 
evaluation period in the year 2013 (table 4). Measures for 
which implementation started after the termination of 
budget support or after 2013 are not taken into account.
Table 4. Considered periods for the portfolio analysis according to recipient country
from
(year, for which the first German budget support commit-
ment was made according to CRS OECD-DAC ; earliest date 
2003)
to
(2013 or the year, in which the German budget support was 
suspended or phased-out according to the BMZ press release;  
latest date 2013)
Burkina Faso 2007 2013*
Ghana 2004 2013*
Malawi 2009 2011**
Mali 2009 2012**
Mozambique 2004 2013*
Rwanda 2007 2012**
Tanzania 2004 2013
Uganda 2003 2012** 
Zambia 2007 2013
* Currently ongoing German budget support programme (status: April 2015).
**suspended German budget support due to infringements of the Underlying Principles (see chapter 2.2). 
The willingness of donors to allocate budget support is 
linked to the partner government’s compliance with the 
Underlying Principles as determined in a Memorandum of 
Understanding between donors and the partner govern-
ment. In the Underlying Principles, key criteria regarding 
democratic participation, human rights, the fight against 
corruption, good financial management, macroeconomic 
stability, and commitment to reform are described. An 
infringement of the Underlying Principles can imply a 
reduction, a (temporary) suspension or the phasing out of 
budget support. The determination of infringements of the 
Underlying Principles and resulting consequences remains 
at the discretion of the individual donors. For Germany, the 
final decision on whether an infringement of the Underlying 
Principles has occurred is made by the BMZ, not only based 
on analysis provided by KfW, but also on political considera-
tions among other things (Faust, 2012b). During the evalua-
tion period, there have been reductions or delays of budget 
support disbursements in almost all of the nine considered 
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countries. Budget support was permanently suspended in 
four of the nine countries due to the following reasons.
 • Malawi (2011): Violations of human rights and concerns 
about the compliance regarding the freedom of the press.
 • Mali (2012): military coup in March 2012.
 • Rwanda (2012): Allegation of supporting activists of illegal 
militias in the Eastern Congo, which includes infringements 
of the international arms embargo.
 • Uganda (2012): Corruption scandal in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, allegation of supporting the rebel group M23 in the 
Eastern Congo through the Ugandan military, discussion 
about a legislation against homosexuals.  
In contrast to other donors, Germany has not yet resumed 
budget support in any of these countries.
8.2
Information on German accompanying measures 
Table 5. Portfolio of accompanying measures layer 1
country Title of the measure Duration Type of financing Basket TC/FC Commitment 
in million euro
Burkina Faso Begleitmaßnahme zu “Unterstützung der nationalen burkinischen 
Strategie für Wachstum und nachhaltige Entwicklung” Kompo-
nente A: Unterstützung der Korruptionsbekämpfung
2012–2015 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 0.4
Burkina Faso Begleitmaßnahme zu „Unterstützung der nationalen burkinischen 
Strategie für Wachstum und nachhaltige Entwicklung“ Kompo-
nente B: Unterstützung des burkinischen Rechnungshofs
2012–2015 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 0.6
Ghana Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliche Unterstützung der 
ghanaischen Wachstums- und Armutsminderungsstrategie“
2003–2009 Co-financing No FC 0.3
Ghana Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliche Unterstützung der 
ghanaischen Wachstums- und Armutsminderungsstrategie“
2010–2012 Co-financing No FC 0.5
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Beteiligung am gemeinschaftlichen 
Programm für makroökonomische Unterstützung“
2004–2007 Individual 
financing
No FC 0.5
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Beteiligung am gemeinschaftlichen 
Programm für makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente A: 
Beratung des GoM im GP
2008–2009 Individual 
financing
No FC 0.4
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Beteiligung am gemeinschaftlichen 
Programm für makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente B: 
Rechnungshof
2008–2009 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 1.6
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Beteiligung am gemeinschaftlichen 
Programm für makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente C: 
Steuer- und Zollverwaltung
2008–2009 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 2
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente A: Unterstützung 
des Gemeinschaftsprogramms
2010–2011 Individual 
financing
No FC 0.8
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente B: Rechnungshof
2010–2011 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 0.8
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente C: Steuer- und 
Zollverwaltung
2010–2011 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 1
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Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente D: Parlament und 
Zivilgesellschaft im Budgetzyklus
2010–2013 Individual 
financing
No FC 0.4
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente B: Rechnungshof 
und Komponente C: Steuer- und Zollverwaltung
2011–2012 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 2.5
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente B: Rechnungshof
2012 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 0.8
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente C: Steuer- und 
Zollverwaltung
2012–2013 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 3.7
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente A: Unterstützung 
des Budgethilfeprogramms im Bereich Budgetanalyse – Stärkung 
der Begleitung des Budgetprozesses durch das Parlament, die 
Zivilgesellschaft und die Medien Mozambiques
2013–2014 Individual 
financing
No FC 1
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente B: Rechnungshof
2013–2014 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 2
Mozambique Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliches Programm für 
makroökonomische Unterstützung“ Komponente C: Steuer- und 
Zollverwaltung
2013–2014 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 5
Rwanda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Makroökonomische Programmunterstüt- 
zung im Rahmen der EDPRS II“
2009/10–
2010/11
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 1
Rwanda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Makroökonomische Programmunterstüt- 
zung im Rahmen der EDPRS III“
2011/12–
2013/14
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 3
Rwanda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Makroökonomische Programmunterstüt- 
zung im Rahmen der EDPRS IV“ Komponente A: PFM
2012/13–
2014/15
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 2
Rwanda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Makroökonomische Programmunterstüt- 
zung im Rahmen der EDPRS IV“ Komponente B: Rechnungshof
2012/13–
2014/15
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 1
Tanzania Begleitmaßnahme zu „Allgemeine Budgethilfe in Tansania“ 
Unterstützung des PFMRP
2009/10 Individual 
financing
Yes FC 0.8
Tanzania Begleitmaßnahme zu „Allgemeine Budgethilfe in Tansania“ 
Unterstützung des PFMRP
2012/13–
2014/15
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 2
Uganda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliche Unterstützung des 
National Development Plan in Uganda“ Unterstützung des PFM 
Reformprogramms FINMAP
2010/11–
2012/13
Individual 
financing
Yes FC 3
Uganda Begleitmaßnahme zu „Gemeinschaftliche Unterstützung des 
National Development Plan in Uganda“ Unterstützung der 
Steuersystemreform
2011/12–
2012/13
Individual 
financing
No FC 2
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Table 6. Portfolio of accompanying measures layer 2
country Title of the measure Duration Type of financing Basket TC/FC Commitment 
in million euro
Burkina Faso Beratung des Wirtschafts- und Finanzministeriums III 08/2006–
07/2009
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.5
Burkina Faso Beratung des Wirtschafts- und Finanzministeriums IV 08/2009–
07/2012
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.5
Burkina Faso Beratung des Wirtschafts- und Finanzministeriums V 08/2012–
07/2015
Individual 
financing
No TC 2
Ghana Verbesserung der öffentlichen Finanzen in Ghana – Good Financial 
Governance I – Verbesserung der Steuererhebung
09/2003–
08/2006
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.3
Ghana Verbesserung der öffentlichen Finanzen in Ghana – Good Financial 
Governance II
09/2006–
03/2010
Co-financing No TC 5
Ghana Verbesserung der öffentlichen Finanzen in Ghana – Good Financial 
Governance III
04/2010–
03/2013
Co-financing No TC 9
Ghana Verbesserung der öffentlichen Finanzen in Ghana – Good Financial 
Governance IV
03/2013–
12/2015 
Co-financing No TC 8
Malawi Beratung des Ministeriums für Wirtschaftsplanung und Entwicklung 
und des Finanzministeriums II
07/2008–
06/2012
Individual 
financing
No TC 4
Mali Beratung des Wirtschafts- und Finanzministeriums III – Beratung zur 
Umsetzung der Wachstums- und Armutsstrategie
09/2008–
12/2012
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.5
Sambia Demokratisierung, Staat und Zivilgesellschaft I 11/2005–
09/2009
Co-financing No TC 5.8
Sambia Demokratisierung, Staat und Zivilgesellschaft II 10/2009–
03/2012 
Co-financing No TC 6.2
Sambia Demokratisierung, Staat und Zivilgesellschaft II – TZ im weiteren 
Sinne
10/2009–
03/2012 
Individual 
financing
No TC 0.8
Sambia Demokratisierung, Staat und Zivilgesellschaft III – Politische 
Teilhabe von Zivilgesellschaft in Governancereformen und 
Armutsbekämpfung 
04/2012–
03/2015
Co-financing No TC 5
Sambia Unterstützung des Finanzministeriums bei der Verbindung der 
Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie mit dem Haushaltsprozess I
10/2005–
09/2007
Individual 
financing
No TC 2
Sambia Unterstützung des Finanzministeriums bei der Verbindung der 
Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie mit dem Haushaltsprozess II
10/2007–
09/2009
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.5
Sambia Unterstützung des Finanzministeriums bei der Verbindung der 
Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie mit dem Haushaltsprozess III
10/2009–
12/2012
Co-financing No TC 3.5
Sambia Unterstützung des Finanzministeriums bei der Verbindung der 
Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie mit dem Haushaltsprozess IV – 
Förderung von Good Financial Governance
01/2013–
12/2015
Individual 
financing
No TC 5
Tansania Unterstützung des tansanischen Rechnungshofes 10/2012–
12/2015
Individual 
financing
No TC 3.5
Uganda Stärkung der Menschenrechte in Uganda 10/2011-
12/2013
Individual 
financing
No TC 1.94
Uganda Unterstützung des Amtes des Premierministers bei der Umsetzung 
des Wiederaufbauplans für Norduganda
07/2008–
12/2012
Individual 
financing
No TZ 3.0
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Figure 19. German commitments to accompanying measures to budget support according to recipient country and layer 
(FC and TC), 2003–2013
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Figure 18. Annual German commitments for accompanying measures to budget support according to recipient country and 
category, 2003–2013
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8.3
Online questionnaire
Part A: General information about your current position
We would first of all like to ask some questions about your current position.
4. In which country is your assignment?
 
_____________ [please select]
5. What is your current position?
 Representative of a current donor of general budget support (non-German)
 Representative of a former donor of general budget support (non-German)
 Other donor representative (non-German)
 Current German Head of Cooperation
 Former German Head of Cooperation
 Programme manager of a German KfW Accompanying Measure to Budget Support
 Programme manager of a German GIZ Accompanying Measure to Budget Support
 Other, please specify _________________________
6. How many years have you worked in your current position?*
 up to 1 year
 > 1-2 years
 > 2-3 years
 > 3-4 years
 > 4-5 years
 more than 5 years
Part B: Budget support
Please note: in this survey, the term “budget support” refers to general budget support only.
Annex  |  8. 81
7. How do you generally rate the effectiveness of budget support in the country of your assignment regarding 
the following major objectives?*
Highly
effective
1 2 3
Not
effective
4
Cannot say
Poverty reduction     
Good governance     
8. Do you observe any of the following problems in the country of your assignment that might prevent budget 
support from efficiently contributing to the reduction of poverty?*
Highly
severe
problem
1
2 3
Not a 
problem 
at all
4
Cannot say
Total government funds are not sufficient.     
Funds are not appropriately allocated between sectors.     
Funds are not appropriately allocated within sectors.     
Funds are not appropriately allocated across regions.     
Funds are misappropriated, i.e. not used for intended purposes.     
Funds are parked on government accounts and not utilized timely.     
Utilized funds do not actually translate into results.     
Other, please specify _________________________     
Part C: Accompanying Measures to Budget Support (AM to BS)
Now we come to the core part of this survey. Before 
answering the next questions, it is important that you 
understand our definition of “Accompanying Measures to 
Budget Support”, hitherto shortened as AM to BS.
What do we mean by AM to BS? 
Many donors try to increase the effectiveness of budget 
support by providing technical assistance and capacity 
building flanking the provision of budget support funds. 
In this survey, we call all such measures that can improve 
the effectiveness of budget support funds AM to BS. These 
could be consultancy, research and training directed at the 
staff of government ministries and public institutions, as 
well as at representatives of civil society, just to cite some 
examples. AM to BS encompass both technical and financial 
assistance. They can be implemented either bilaterally or as 
contribution to a common fund.
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9. A: In how far do deficiencies in the following areas cause the problems you have identified in question 5? 
B: In how far are these deficiencies currently being addressed by AM to BS of all donors?
A: Cause of problems B: Adressed by AM to BS
Very 
much
1 2 3
Not
at all
4
Can-
not 
say
Very 
much
1 2 3
Not
at all
4
Can-
not 
say
Budget planning          
Budget execution          
Budgetary control (internal and external)          
Procurement          
Revenue generation          
Debt management          
Fiscal decentralization          
Formulation of development policies          
Implementation of development policies/reforms          
Monitoring of development policies/reforms          
Democratic control by parliamentarians          
Democratic control by civil society          
Democratic control by media          
Other, please specify _________________________          
Please imagine for a moment, you were the only donor in the country of your assignment and had to spend a given amount 
of money for different purposes.
10. Given the situation in the country of your assignment, which percentages would you allocate to budget support funds, AM to 
BS and other programmes/ projects, respectively? 
Please indicate the percentage you would allocate to each type. 
 
Budget support funds _____________ 
AM to BS _____________ 
Other programmes/projects _____________ 
Total  percent (must add up to 100%) 
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11. How would you distribute a given amount of money for AM to BS among the following thematic areas? 
Please indicate the percentage you would allocate to each type. 
 
Strengthening the public financial management system _____________ 
Improving formulation/ implementation of development policies _____________ 
Supporting democratic control _____________ 
Other _____________ 
Total  percent (must add up to 100%) 
12. How would you distribute a given amount of money for AM to BS among the following types of AM to BS? 
Please indicate the percentage you would allocate to each type. 
 
Short-term consultancy _____________ 
Long-term advisory _____________ 
Studies, research _____________ 
Training, workshops _____________ 
Equipment _____________ 
Other _____________ 
Total  percent (must add up to 100%) 
13. What else do you need to consider for ensuring that AM to BS optimally support the effectiveness of budget 
support? 
Please indicate the percentage you would allocate to each type. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
14. Generally, from your point of view as a donor, what are advantages and disadvantages of contributing to a common fund 
versus own implementation? 
_________________________ Advantages
_________________________ Disadvantages
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15. In relation to the objectives listed below, how do you rate 
 A: the actual contribution of the currently implemented set of AM to BS by all donors and 
 B: the potential contribution of AM to BS in general?
A: Actual contribution B: Potential contribution
High 
1 2 3
None
4
Can-
not 
say
High 
1 2 3
None
4
Can-
not 
say
Poverty reduction          
Good governance          
Reduction of fiduciary risks          
16. How do you rate  
A: the demand by the partner government for 
B: the level of donor coordination of AM to BS in the following thematic areas?
A: Government demand B: Donor coordination
Very 
much
1 2 3
Not
at all
4
Can-
not 
say
Very 
much
1 2 3
Not
at all
4
Can-
not 
say
Strengthening the public financial management  
system.
         
Improving formulation and implementation of 
develpoment policies.
         
Budgetary control (internal and external)          
Supporting democratic control by parliamentarians, 
civil society and media.
         
Other, please specify _________________________          
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17. How do you rate government ownership/ commitment to achieve the objectives of the currently implemented set of AM to 
BS by all donors?
Very high commitment  
1
 
2
 
3
No commitment at all  
4
Cannot say
    
18. Please specify thematic areas for which government ownership/ commitment is particularly high and low. 
_________________________ Areas of high commitment
_________________________ Areas of low commitment
19. What needs to be done to strengthen government ownership/ commitment? 
Please rate the importance of each of the following aspects. 
Very 
important
1 2 3
Not important 
at all  
4
Cannot 
say
The objectives of AM to BS need to correspond to government priorities     
A trust relationship between government and donor has to be maintained     
The government needs to be in the lead in selecting and managing technical 
advisors
    
The objectives of AM to BS have to be in line with well formulated PAF indicators.     
When PAF indicators are not met, donors need to respond with coordinated 
action
    
The amount of budget support that is retained when PAF indicators are not met, 
needs to be significant for the partner government
    
Other, please specify _________________________     
20. Besides government commitment, which other key factors for the success of AM to BS do you observe?
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Part D: Interrelations of AM to BS and other budget support inputs
21. According to your experience, the implementation of AM to BS generates information that is...
Strongly
agree
1 2 3
Strongly
disagree
4
Cannot 
say
useful for the policy dialogue around budget support     
useful for the high level political dialogue     
actually used in the policy dialogue around budget support     
actually used in the high level political dialogue     
22. According to your experience, the policy dialogue is used for…
Strongly
agree
1 2 3
Strongly
disagree
4
Cannot 
say
identifying obstacles to an efficient functioning of budget support     
targeting AM to BS to overcome obstacles to an efficient functioning of budget 
support
    
coordinating the planning of AM to BS     
coordinating the implementation of AM to BS     
discussing monitoring results about the progress of AM to BS     
other, please specify _________________________     
In the following section, we want to investigate the interrelations between AM to BS that strengthen the supply and the 
demand side of accountability.
23. In which aspects do AM to BS improve the provision of budget information by public finance management institutions? 
Multiple answers possible.
 Quantity of budget information
 Quality of budget information
 Timeliness of budget information
 Accessibility of budget information
 Other, please specify _________________________
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24. In which aspects do AM to BS improve the capacity of civil society, parliamentarians and the media to absorb and utilize 
budget information? 
Multiple answers possible.
 Being aware of budget information
 Accessing budget information
 Understanding budget information
 Commenting budget information for the public
 Requesting improved provision of budget information
 Other, please specify _________________________
Finally, we would like to learn more about your portfolio of AM to BS.
25. Which donor do you represent?
 
_____________ [please select]
26. In which of the following fields is the donor you represent financing/ implementing AM to BS? 
Please tick all applicable.
 Budget planning
 Budget execution
 Budgetary control (e.g. auditor general)
 Procurement
 Revenue generation (e.g. tax, customs)
 Debt management
 Fiscal decentralization
 Formulation of development policies
 Implementation of development policies/ reforms
 Monitoring of development policies/ reforms
 Democratic control by parliamentarians
 Democratic control by civil society
 Democratic control by media
 Other, please specify _________________________
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27. What type of measures do you finance/ implement? 
Please tick all applicable.
 Short-term consultancy
 Long-term advisory
 Studies, research
 Training, workshops
 Equipment
 Other, please specify _________________________
28. How do you conceptualize AM to BS?
 As an integral part of the budget support package
 Independent of budget support package
 Other, please specify _________________________
29. How do you implement AM to BS? 
Please tick all applicable.
 Bilateral technical assistance
 Bilateral financial assistance
 Contribution to common fund
 Other, please specify _________________________
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8.4
Response to the online survey
Table 7 illustrates that the majority of the invited (current) 
Heads of Development Cooperation (HoC), the current 
person responsible (or the last at the time of the terminati-
on of measures) for the programmes, as well as programme 
managers of German accompanying measures participated 
in the online survey (response rate: KfW: 92 percent, HoC: 
91 percent, GIZ: 75 percent). Hence, on the German side, 
a representative opinion that refers to all German accom-
panying measures on the part of the HoC can be assumed, 
while for implementing agencies it has to be assumed that 
they focus on their own measures (KfW: Layer 1, GIZ: Layer 
2). Concerning representatives of other donors, it has to 
be assumed that among the 47 percent of respondents, 
active budget support donors are better represented which 
could result in a slight bias toward pro budget support. The 
response rate between the countries ranges from 43 to 81 
percent. Here, the differentiation between countries with 
and without budget support does not provide any explana-
tory pattern: currently, Mozambique and Burkina Faso are 
budget support countries, whereas Uganda and Zambia do 
not receive German budget support anymore. Both pairings 
respectively show very different response rates.
 
Table 7: Response rates to the online survey 
Information in percentage Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Zambia Total
Other donors 73 71 43 50 36 40 43 50 38 47
GIZ 100 100 50 50 50 50 100 100 67 75
KfW 100 50 - - 100 100 100 100 100 92
HoC 100 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 91
Total 81 75 45 55 43 50 56 72 54 58
Information in absolute 
numbers response/ request
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Zambia Total
Other donors 8/11 5/7 3/7 4/8 9/25 4/10 6/14 5/10 3/8 47/100
GIZ 2/2 2/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/1 4/4 2/3 15/20
KfW 2/2 1/2 0/0 0/0 2/2 1/1 2/2 2/2 1 11/12
HoC 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/2 1/1 10/11
Total 13/16 9/12 5/11 6/11 13/30 7/14 10/18 13/18 7/13 83/143
Information in percentage Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Zambia Total
Share of non-Germans 
among the invitees 
69 58 64 73 83 71 78 56 62 68
Response rate 81 75 45 55 43 50 56 72 54 58
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8.5
Severity of problem and addressing through 
accompanying measures
The yellow lines mark the mean values of the severity of 
the problem and its addressing through accompanying 
measures. On average, the problems are ranked to be 
more severe than it corresponds to the addressing through 
accompanying measures. In total, there tend to be too few 
accompanying measures. The dots at the bottom left (top 
right) represent the problem areas, which are below-average 
(above-average) in their severity and which are addressed 
Figure 20. Comparison of severity of problem and addressing through accompanying measures with mean values
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through accompanying measures below-average (above-
average). Problem areas on the top left are addressed 
above-average, but are regarded to be below-average in 
their severity. Accordingly, dots at the bottom right corre-
spond to problem areas, which are above-average in their 
severity, yet addressed below-average. 
8.6
Interview guidelines
The interviews with representatives of budget support 
donors and the partner side were conducted 
 A. during the explorative mission to Mozambique, 
 B. to explore the results from the online survey in greater 
detail, as well as 
 C. to capture the partners’ perspective in Tanzania. 
Hereinafter, three guidelines are depicted to give an 
example. The questions were in part specifically tailored to 
the respective interlocutors. Additionally, interviews were 
conducted in preparation of the online survey as well as to 
reflect the evaluation results; those questions are not listed 
here in detail. 
 
A. Key questions for budget support donors in Mozambique
Budget support 
1 What is the current trend in your country’s budget support policy?
Accompanying measures
2 Does/did your country provide any technical assistance and/or capacity building flanking the financial contribution of BS?
3 What is the overall goal?
4 What kind of measures? What are key objectives?
5 Are they part of the BS agreement or separate programmes? Contribution to basket funding and/or own implementation?
6 How do you assess their effectiveness? What changes have you observed as a result of AM? What are reasons for  
 success/failure?
Multidonor context
7 Is there a demand for AM? From whom and for what kind of AM?
8 Are you aware of other donors assistance flanking the financial contribution of BS?
9 Are they coordinated among the G19? How does the coordination work?
10 Do you notice any specific focus regarding AM among different donors?
11 How do you perceive German AM?
Functioning of AM in the context of BS
12 Is the information from policy dialogue used for providing targeted AM? Are the experiences with AM fed back into policy  
 dialogue? (Relation to PAF?)
13 Are the experiences from implementing AM discussed among donors? Is the provision of AM coordinated among donors?
14 Do you think that BS works as incentive for the government to accept and utilise AM? Would you say that a PFM programme 
  is more effective when BS is provided?
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15 Has the combination of strengthening the PFM system (supply side of accountability) with empowering parliament and civil 
 society (demand side) generated specific effects? 
16 Has the PRSP support contributed to poverty oriented allocation of the budget? Has the combination of PRSP support with 
 empowering parliament and civil society generated specific effects? (Question for BS countries with PRSP portfolio.) 
Future of AM
17 In times of reduced BS, do you think that AM are still relevant and effective? Do they need to be adapted, and how?
18 What kind of AM will be needed? For which thematic sector? 
 
B. Key questions for representatives of German implementing agencies after the online survey
1 Do you have any general comments relating to the online survey or the evaluation?
2 How long have you worked in this position at XY?
3. One finding of the online survey is that particularly the implementation of the budget poses a big problem. However, there  
 are just a few accompanying measures carried out in the area of budget implementation. Do you agree with this assessment? 
 What could be the reason? Is it realistic apply more accompanying measures in this area? What would be an alternative?
4. Budget Planning: is regarded as less problematic. Agreement? Due to accompanying measures? Is the focus of donors on 
 budget planning too strong? 
5. Analogous to procurement: Too few accompanying measures? Why? Is there more one could/ should do? 
6. One important success factor for accompanying measures is the government’s commitment. Our survey has shown that  
 in order to strengthen commitment, a relationship of trust between donors and the partner government is crucial. From your  
 perspective, what are the decisive factors to establish or maintain this relationship?
7. Donors rank the demand of partners in the area of PFM higher than in other areas such as strengthening of democratic  
 control or promoting the formulation of development policies. To which subareas does this particularly apply, and why? 
8. Another important success factor for accompanying measures is the coordination between donors. This coordination seems  
 to be better in the area of public financial management than in other areas such as formulating and implementing  
 development policies as well as promoting democratic control. How can this be explained? 
9. Policy dialogue has a potentially high influence on accompanying measures. Our survey illustrates that within the scope of  
 policy dialogue, the obstacles for an efficient functioning of budget support are identified, yet there is no targeted  
 commitment to eliminate these obstacles. Can you explain why? How could this missing link be established? 
10. Do any special effects arise from the simultaneous strengthening of the PFM system, namely the accountability of the supply  
 side and the demand side, and thereby parliament, civil society, and the media?    
11. Some respondents stated that accompanying measures have strengthened the capacities of parliament and civil society with  
 regard to the absorption of information relating to the budget to such an extent that additional or better information has  
 been demanded from them. Are you familiar with something like that from XY? If so, was the request answered?
12. Do you believe that budget support constitutes an incentive for the government to accept and use accompanying measures?  
 Do you think that a PFM programme is more effective if budget support is provided? Why?
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C. Key questions for partner representatives in Tanzania
Personal Information
1 What is your position?
2 How many years have you been working in your current position/ in this thematic field?
Relevance
3 How do you generally rate the effectiveness of GBS in Tanzania regarding the following major objectives?
 - Poverty reduction: 
 - Good governance: 
4 In relation to these objectives, how do you rate the actual contribution, and the potential contribution of AM to BS?
5 How far do deficiencies in the following areas cause problems that prevent budget support from efficiently contributing to  
 the reduction of poverty?
 - See list in questionnaire.
6 How far are these deficiencies currently being addressed by AM to BS by all donors?
 - See list in questionnaire.
7 Please imagine for a moment that you could allocate the total budget of all donors in Tanzania to different purposes. 
 Given the situation in Tanzania, which percentages would you allocate to budget support funds, AM to BS and other  
 programmes/projects, respectively? 
 Why?
8 How would you distribute a given amount of money for AM to BS among the following thematic areas? 
9 How would you distribute a given amount of money for AM to BS among the following types of AM to BS? Why?
10 You have rated (budget execution, procurement, democratic control …) as particularly severe problems in the budget support  
 system that are not sufficiently addressed by AM to BS. Do you have any suggestions what kind of technical assistance/ 
 capacity development could help to improve the situation?
11 You have rated (budget planning, formulation of devt. policies, …) not as severe problems yet addressed by AM to BS. Does  
 this mean, in the future these AM to BS are not needed anymore?
Functioning
12 Do AM to BS in your area generate information that is useful for policy dialogue? 
 If yes > Examples.
13 Do AM to BS in your area generate information that is actually used in policy dialogue?  
 If yes > Examples.
14 Is the policy dialogue used for identifying bottlenecks in the budget support system? Does this lead to providing  
 targeted AM? 
15 Is the planning and implementation of AM to BS coordinated among donors? If yes, does this coordination take place in the  
 policy dialogue? If yes, at which level? If not, where else does coordination take place? Why does coordination not take place?  
 Does coordination vary across sectors? > Examples.
16 Please think about the technical assistance/capacity building in your institution. Would this assistance meet the same level of 
 interest if there was no budget support in Tanzania? Why? 
17 Does the effort towards meeting the PAF indicators increase the motivation to request and utilise technical assistance and  
 capacity building?
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18 Has the combination of strengthening the PFM system (supply side of accountability) with empowering parliament and civil  
 society (demand side) generated specific effects?  
 (Please give us concrete examples)
Success factors
19 What should donors consider in the planning and provision of AM to BS?
20 Do you have any other recommendations for donors?
8.7
Overview of the respondents and interviewees
 
 
Table 8: Participants of the online survey
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Rwanda Tansania Uganda Zambia TOTAL
Germany 5 4 2 2 4 3 4 8 4 36
Other donors (incl. 
multilateral donors)
8 5 3 4 9 4 6 5 3 47
TOTAL 13 9 5 6 13 7 10 13 7 83
Table 9: Interviewees 
Short mission Mozambique Short mission Tanzania Other interviews TOTAL
Germany 12 5 27 44
Other bilateral donors 10 3 5 18
Multilateral donors 4 4 5 13
Independent experts 3 1 2 6
Partner 12 15 27
TOTAL 41 28 39 108
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